On February 5, 2018, the deadline for the implementation of the main restrictions, which were imposed on Russia and the United States signed by the START-3 treaty. The full name of the signed document is an agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on measures to further reduce and limit the strategic offensive arms, START-III. This bilateral agreement regulated further mutual reduction of the arsenal of deployed strategic nuclear weapons And came to replace the START-I Treaty, which has expired in December 2009. The START-3 Treaty was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague, the presidents of the two countries Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama, he entered into force on February 5, 2011.

Question

It is worth noting that countries thought about reducing strategic offensive arms back in the late 1960s. By that moments and the USSR, and the United States has accumulated such nuclear arsenals, which made it not just to turn each other several times in the ashes, but also to destroy all human civilization and life on the planet. In addition nuclear Racewhich was one of the attributes of the Cold War seriously on the economy of the two countries. The extension of the nuclear arsenal was spent huge cash. In these conditions, negotiations began between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1969 in Helsinki in order to limit nuclear reserves.

These negotiations led to the signing of the first treaty between the countries - SEAS-I (restriction of strategic arms), which was signed in 1972. Signed by the USSR and the USA Agreement secured the amount of nuclear delivery tools for each of the countries at the level on which they were at that time. True, by the time in the United States, and in the USSR, it was already begun to equip their ballistic missiles with separating head units with individual guidance blocks (they carried several warheads at once). As a result, it was during the discharge of relationship that a new, previously unprecedented, avalanche-like process of increasing nuclear potential began. At the same time, the contract involved the adoption of new ICBMs placed on submarines, strictly in the amount in which the ground-based ballistic missiles were previously written off.

The extension of this agreement was the ASS-II treaty, signed by the countries on June 18, 1979 in Vienna. This agreement was forbidden to bring nuclear weapons into space, he also established restrictions on the maximum number of strategic carriers: launcheling installations of the ICBM, launchers of BRPL, strategic and rocket aircraft (but not actually nuclear warheads) below the existing level: up to 2400 units (including 820 MBR launchers equipped with a separated head part). In addition, they were obliged by January 1, 1981 to reduce the number of carriers to 2250. Of the total number of strategic systems, only 1320 carriers could be equipped with head units with combat blocks of individual guidance. He imposed a contract and other restrictions: he prohibited the design and deployment of ballistic missiles based on focus (with the exception of submarines), as well as on the seabed; Mobile heavy ICBMs, winged rockets with RGCH, limited the maximum throwing weight for pallistic rockets of submarines.

The following joint agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments was a permanent agreement on the elimination of rockets of medium and less distance from 1987. He put a ban on the development and deployment of ballistic missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km. In accordance with this Country Treaty, within three years, not only all the ballistic missiles of ground-based data from these types, but also all launchers, including rockets both in the European and in the Asian part Soviet Union. The same agreement was first introduced a universal classification of ballistic missiles by range.

The following contract was START-1, signed by CCCR and the USA on July 31, 1991 in Moscow. He entered into force after the collapse of the Soviet Union - December 5, 1994. The new contract was designed for 15 years. The conditions for the signed agreement prohibited each of the parties to have more than 1600 units of nuclear weapons delivery (ICBM, BRPL, strategic bombers) on combat duty. The maximum number of nuclear charges themselves was limited to 6000. On 6 December 2001, it was announced that countries fully fulfilled obligations under this contract.

Signed in 1993, the START-2 treaty first could not ratify for a long time, and then they simply refused it. The following existing agreement was an agreement on the reduction of the offensive potentials of the SNP, which limited the maximum number of warheads is still three times: from 1700 to 2200 units (compared with START-1). At the same time, the composition and structure of the arms fell under the reduction were determined by states on their own, this moment was not regulated in the contract. The contract entered into force on June 1, 2003.

START-3 and its results

The agreement on measures to further reduce and limit the strategic offensive arms (START-3) entered into force on February 5, 2011. He changed the START-1 Treaty and canceled the agreement of the SNP contract of 2002. The contract provided for a further large-scale reduction in nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States. According to the terms of the contract by February 5, 2018, and in the future, the total amount of weapons did not exceed 700 deployed ICBMs, BRPL and strategic rocket bombers, 1550 charges on these rockets, as well as 800 deployed and uniform commissioning of ICBM, BRPL and heavy bombers (TB) . It was in the Treaty of START-3 that the concept of "uneven" media and launchers were introduced for the first time, that is, not in combat readiness. They can use for learning or testing and have no warheads. The contract also contained a ban on the basing of strategic offensive arms outside the national territories of the two states.

The START-3 Treaty In addition to limiting the nuclear weapons directly implies the bilateral exchange of telemetry data, which were obtained during test starts. The exchange of telemetry information on launch launching is carried out by mutual agreement and on a parity basis no more than five launches per year. At the same time, it is obliged to exchange information on the number of carriers and warborations twice a year. Also, inspection activity was prescribed, up to 300 people can take part in the inspection, whose candidates are consistent within a month, after which they are given visas for two years. At the same time, the inspectors themselves, members of inspection delegations and flight crews, as well as their aircraft during inspections on the territory of the two countries, use complete inviolability.

In 2018, the START-3 Agreement is expected to extend, as its term expires only in 2021. As the US ambassador to Russia, John Hantsman, noted in January 2018, confidence between states in the issue of arms reduction is currently not lost - Washington and Moscow successfully work on the implementation of START-3. "We work in a positive direction towards START-3, I call it" moment of enthusiasm ", after February 5, work will not stop, work will be more intense. The fact that we approach this date to achieve goals will inspire confidence, "the ambassador noted.

As the TASS notes, on September 1, 2017, the Russian Federation has placed 501 by the deployed nuclear weapon carrier, 1561 nuclear warhead and 790 deployed and uniform start-up installations of the ICBM, BRPL and TB. The United States has 660 deployed media, 1393 warhead and 800 deployed and uniform start-up settings. From published data, it followed that for Russia, in order to fit into the limit on START-3, it was necessary to reduce 11 warheads.

Nuclear Arsenal of Russia and USA

To date, the basis of modern strategic weapons continues to be nuclear weapons. In some cases, it also includes high-precision weapons with conventional warheads, which can be used to destroy strategically important enemy objects. By appointment, it is divided into offensive (shock) and defensive weapons. The composition of strategic offensive arms (START) includes all ground complexes of the ICBM (both shaft and mobile), strategic nuclear rocket submarines (ARPL), as well as strategic (heavy) bombers who can act carriers of the strategic winged rockets of the class "Air Surface "and atomic aviation bombs.

Topol-M Mobile version

Russia

The following ICBDs fall under the RCM: PS-12M "Topol" under the Rocket Forces of Strategic Appointments (RVSH); RS-12M2 "Topol-M"; RS-18 (according to NATO codification - "Stiletto"), RS-20 "Dnipro" (according to the NATO codification "Satan"), R-36M UTTC and P-36M2 "Voevod"; RS-24 "Yar". According to TASS, currently about 400 ICBMs with combat blocks of various types and different power are within the Russian group of RVSN. Thus, more than 60 percent of weapons and warheads of strategic nuclear forces are concentrated here. Russian Federation. A noticeable difference from the United States is the presence in the ground components of the nuclear triad - mobile complexes. If the USBR is located exclusively in stationary mining installations, then mobile primer is used in the RVSN, along with mine basing. rocket complexes On the basis of multi-axis chassis MZKT-79221.

In 2017, RVSH was replenished with 21 new ballistic missiles. In future plans, the removal of the ICBM "Poplar" with the replacement of them to more modern and perfect ICBM "Yar". At the same time, Moscow expects to extend the service life of the most severe ICBM R-36M2 "Voivod" of the most severe ICBP of the RVSN at least until 2027.

The naval component of the Russian nuclear triad is presented, as of March 1, 2017, 13 atomic submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles on board. The basis of 6 submarine rocket mines of the project 667BDM "Dolphin", which are armed with ballistic missiles P-29RMU2 "Sinya" and their modification "liner". Also in the ranks are still three submarine 667 Kalmar projects and one project of the project 941UM "Akula" - "Dmitry Donskoy". She is the biggest submarine in the world. It was at Dmitry Donskoy "the first tests of the new Russian ICBM, which falls under the Treaty of START-3 - R-30 Rockets" Bulaw ", which is produced in Votkinsk. In addition to the listed submarines, the combat watch is currently carrying and three atomic submarines of the new project 955 "Borey", armed with "Maud", are boats: K-535 "Yuri Dolgoruky", K-550 "Alexander Nevsky" and K-551 "Vladimir Monomakh " Each of these submarines carries up to 16 MBR. Also on the modernized project "Borea-A" in Russia, another 5 such missilers are being built.

APL of the project 955 "Borea"

The basis of the air part of the nuclear triad in Russia is two strategic bombers that fall under the contract of START-3. This is a supersonic strategic bomber-rocket-maker with a wing of a changeable sweatshirt Tu-160 (16 pieces) and an honorary veteran - turboprop strategic bomber-rocket train Tu-95ms (about 40 deployed). According to experts, these turboprop aircraft can be successfully used up to 2040.

The modern US nuclear arsenal consists of MINUTEMAN-III mine ICBM (there are 399 deployed launchers of ICBM and 55 uniform), ballistic missiles on submarines of Trident II (212 deployed and 68 uniform), as well as winged missiles and air bombs with nuclear combat part, The carriers of which are strategic bombers. MINUTEMAN-III missile for a long time is the basis of the American forces of nuclear deterrence, it consists in service with 1970 and is the only MBR of ground-based in service american army. All this time, the rocket is constantly upgraded: replacement of combat units, power plants, control systems and guidance.

Test launch MINUTEMAN-III

The carriers of the MBR TRIDENT II are atomic submarines of the Ohio class, each of which carries on its board 24 such rockets equipped with separating head units of individual guidance (no more than 8 combat units on the rocket). In total, 18 such submarines were built in the United States. At the same time, 4 of them are already converted into carriers of the winged missiles, the modernization of missile mines allowed Tomahawk winged missiles to be added to 154 in the mine. 22 mines are converted, two more are used as gateway chambers for docking mini-submarines or special modules for the release of combat swimmers. Since 1997, this is the only type of American plague consisting. The main weapons are the MBR TRIDENT II D-5. According to American specialists, this rocket is the most reliable weapon as part of the US Strategic Arsenal.

The Pentagon also included in the number of deployed strategic bombers - 49 machines, including 11 low-width strategic bombers Northrop B-2a Spirit and 38 "old-old Boeing B-52H, another 9 b-2a and 8 B-52H are unnecessary. Both bombers can use both winged rockets with nuclear warheads and atomic bombs of free fall and controlled air bombs. Another American strategic bomber B-1B, developed in the 1970s specifically for the application of missile strikes through the territory of the Soviet Union, since the 1990s is converted to the carrier of conventional weapons. By the time the end of the START-3 US Army does not plan to use it as a nuclear weapon carrier. According to 2017, 63 B-1B Lancer bombers were consisted as part of the US Air Force.

Major Strategic Bomber Northrop B-2A Spirit

Mutual claims of Party

US Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan said, what condition should be carried out so that the United States complies to the Agreement on measures to further reduce and restrict the START (dealing with the START-3 Agreement) and the emergency to eliminate missiles of medium and low range of RSMD. According to Sullivan, USA "want to comply with arms control agreements, however, for this, their interlocutors must be" tuned in the same way, "Interfax Agency reports it. It is worth noting that in January 2018 the State Department confirmed the fulfillment of the conditions signed in 2010 START-3 treaty, but the United States continues to accuse Russia in violating the RSD Treaty. In particular, in Washington, it is believed that in Yekaterinburg in OKB "Novator" a new winged ground-based rocket was created - the land modification of the famous "caliber" was created. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in turn states that the Condicated Conduction Rocket Rocket 9M729 complies with the terms of the contract.

At the same time, according to the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on the defense of Vladimir Shamanov, Moscow is experiencing serious doubts about the fulfillment by Washington assumed the obligation under START-3. Shamanov noted that Russia did not receive confirmation of the re-equipment of trident II missiles and heavy bombers B-52m. The main questions of the Russian side relate to the conversion of part of American strategic offensive arms. According to Vladimir Putin, during a meeting with the leaders of the leading Russian media on January 11, 2018, the United States must verify the changes that Russia can ensure that there is no return potential for some media. Moscow lack of such evidence is concerned. According to the Russian ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Antonova, a dialogue continues on this issue with the American side.

Information sources:
http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4925548.
https://vz.ru/news/2018/1/18/904051.html
http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/file/chto_takoe_snv-3.
Materials from open sources

Over the past 50 years, the central link of Russian-American interaction has been relations in the military-strategic field and in directly related to the field of international arms control, primarily nuclear. It seems that from now bilateral, and, therefore, multilateral control over nuclear weapons becomes a monument of history.

Today, the United States does not intend to associate their hands in any way agreements on limitation and reduction of weapons.

In the US military policy there are noticeable changes for reasons for reasons, rather than the need to combat transnational terrorism. Forgotten the non-fragmented START-2 and CTBT agreements (nuclear tests). Washington announced the exit from the contract. Sharply (almost $ 100 billion) increased the pentagon budget. A new nuclear doctrine has been adopted, providing for the modernization of strategic offensive arms, the creation of penetrating nuclear fuel charges of low-power, which is allowed to be used in combination with high-precision conventional weapons, as well as the possibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

In addition to the political component - continuation of the US line for global military-political dominance in the twentieth century - this course also has technological and economic dimensions related to the interests of American military-industrial corporations, as well as the intention of American leadership through massive financial injections into major military-technological programs Ensure an increase in the scientific and technical level of the American industry.

According to a number of our experts, changes military Policy Washington does not pose a direct threat to Russia's national security, in any case, for the next 10-15 years, to the real deployment of the American strategic system to real deployment. However, these changes, first of all, the termination of the agreement on the pro agreement cast doubt on the international regime of arms control, can cause a new round of arms racing, give an additional impetus to the distribution process of wamp and its delivery tools.

The tactical line of Russia regarding the actions of the United States seems to be true: the leadership of Russia did not hit panic, did not fall on the path of rhetorical threats and did not declare the desire to compete with the United States in the field of offensive and defensive weapons. At the same time, the fact that the steps made by the Americans belong to the discharge of strategic and therefore require our own strategic decisions regarding their own nuclear policy.

Important when determining our further line seems to be the following factors.

Despite the serious improvement in the international situation and minimizing the likelihood of major wars and military conflicts between leading states, a cardinal reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in their policy is not observed. On the contrary, unprecedented on-scale september terrorist acts and changing threat priorities behave, judging by the new US nuclear doctrine, to a decrease in the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons with the emergence of a poorly controlled escalation. This also contributes to the further distribution of wage and its delivery means, as well as increasing regional instability.

In whatever direction, the political relations between Moscow and Washington have developed, while their arsenals remain nuclear weapons, military departments will have to develop plans for its use against each other, at least "in the extreme case."

The peculiarity of the period after the end of the Cold War is the unpredictability of the development of the military-political situation in the world. In this situation, the United States continues to modernize its nuclear forces and retain the ability to their rapid increases; At the same time, the question of concluding new legally binding and controlled agreements on the irreversible abbrestations of START with Russia on irreversible contractions.

The technology gained in the USA and the results of the inventory tests of individual components indicate the possibility in the medium term to deploy a well-workable limited system of combating missiles, the density of which can be continuously increased in the future.

Based on this, Russia does not have another choice, except to remain in the foreseeable perspective of a powerful nuclear power. The currently operating plans for the development of Russian figs, on the one hand, were calculated on the entry into force of the START-2 Treaty and the conservation of a contract for the pro agreement, and on the other hand, they are focused on their transformation into the similarity of the American "Triads" with the increase in the deposit of marine and Aviation components to the detriment of the Ground Grouping of the ICBM.

In the new strategic situation created by the United States, it becomes necessary to the immediate revision of our plans in the field of Speed \u200b\u200bin the direction of the maximum extension of the deadlines for the operation of the ground grouping of the ICBM with RGCH IN; Maintaining the planned combat composition of the Sea Part "Triads", as well as an aviation component capable of solving both nuclear and non-nuclear tasks. Neither the military nor from an economic point of view would be unreasonable to preserve the old plans developed for a qualitatively different situation. The relevance of the development of information and management systems of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia increases.

Nuclear Balance with USA in a relatively wide range total Warheads and martial abilities (it is not about non-efficient parity recovery) would continue to provide special strategic relations with the United States and a politically significant role of Russia in the world. At the same time, the interest of the United States would be maintained in the continuation of the dialogue on offensive and defensive arms, throughout the complex of political and economic relations. The relevance of the development of information and management systems of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia increases.

According to the diplomatic line, it is necessary to do everything possible to preserve the negotiation regime of arms control, including the task of concluding a new treaty with the United States on START.

At the same time, the analysis shows that the United States will most likely not go to a full-scale treaty providing irreversible and controlled reductions in strategic arms, which initially insisted the Russian side. In addition, contrary to previously repeatedly given assurances that the American system developed by will be limited (capable of intercepting only a few dozen warheads), to fix such limitations Washington is explicitly not yet inclined. If this is the US plans for the active use of space systems, it becomes all the more apparent that the future American system of potentially can threaten Russia.

The agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive potentials (DSNP), concluded in May 2004 in Moscow, does not satisfy the fundamental requirements for the irreversibility and control of abbreviations and, moreover, it does not provide for restrictions on the ability of the pro. Essentially, it means that the United States really does not reduce the strategic carriers or nuclear warboards to them. Conditionally dividing its START for promptly deployed and reserves, they only translate part of the currently deployed funds into an operational reserve, thereby increasing the return potential. This means that at any time the Americans can increase their operational deployed strategic weapons to almost the current level. We, taking into account the peculiarities of our strategic offensive arms, the remaining time of their service, the decay of the previously existing cooperation of manufacturers and a number of other factors are forced to really reduce their START. At the same time, the economic costs for their liquidation and disposal for us are quite significant.

Under these conditions, the United States, especially taking into account the creation in the near future missile potential, receive absolute strategic dominance in the world, the opportunity to act with all the lights from the position of force in solving any international issues, including in relation to Russia.

From our part it is advisable to deal with the signing of a new agreement, which includes the following principal elements:

The agreed limit level on the warheads (in the range of 1700-2200 units), achieved for 10 years, in combination with the freedom of placing warheads on the carriers and irreversibility of the START abbreviations;

Preservation of control measures established under the START-1 Agreement, in the "lightweight" mode;

The fixation of the provisions on the limited future about the American side speaks by establishing a limit agreed amount of warhead, which will be able to intercept such a pro;

Ban on the deployment of cosmic base systems;

Ensuring transparency and enhanced confidence-building mode in the field of strategic arms.

With this version, Russia would largely preserve the independence of its nuclear policy and at the same time achieved restrictions on us for the development of strategic offensive and defensive arms.

In the event that on this basis, it will not be possible to enter the agreement, it would be possible to offer to the Americans to sign a joint statement about the readiness of the parties in the near future to complete consultations (negotiations) on the problem of strategic arms. Such a decision would allow us to more carefully and comprehensively conduct an analysis of the emerging situation, including taking into account the long-term consequences of the US output from the Pro Treaty, as well as to calculate various options for the development of our sims in new conditions that are not limited to contractual obligations.

At the same time, it is advisable to nominate deeply thought-out and well-argued by our proposals for cooperation with the United States in the field of pro, not undermining strategic stability, including to jointly create and use global information systems, as well as on the new generation of confidence in nuclear weapons - as strategic and tactical. Political winning such a step for Russia is obvious.

In particular, it would be possible to propose to carry out the joint development of Russian-American information system Space Basing (Now the Americans themselves work on such a low-bit system, which received the name "Sbirs-Low", which is one of the most critical components of the future american system Pro). This idea can be motivated by the new character of Russian-American relations, the US will readiness to cooperate our two countries, including in the field of confidence in the field of confidence. future system According to the statements of the US President, will not be directed against Russia. The attitude of the Americans to our offer will clearly demonstrate how valid the statements of American officials about the absence of the Russian focus of the program developed in the USA.

At the same time it would be extremely desirable to involve American leadership in a wider political and strategic dialogue. To this end, it would be possible to make a proposal to jointly look for ways to minimize risks emanating from the objectively existing situation of mutual nuclear deterrence.

In the event that the Americans do not show interest at all, any mutual agreement that takes into account the interests of Russia's security, we, in all likelihood, will not have a different choice, how to go to an independent nuclear policy. In the new situation, Russia could independently determine the quantitative and qualitative composition of its nuclear forces, making a traditional focus on land-based ICBMs, and above all with RGCH IN, which will ensure that it will ensure the possibility of ensuring the preservation of the potential of the US nuclear deterrence in any embodiment of the military-political situation. Economic opportunities for this, as evaluations show, we have.

Under these conditions, we must weigh the feasibility of renewing work on the means to ensure effective countering the American Pro, including various methods of both its overcoming and neutralization. It is also important to schedule a set of measures of active and passive protection of domestic shenas. It is estimated that this is the most economical way to counter US planning plans. In addition, here we have a solid bore, which it would be appropriate to claim.

When developing a long-term line of Russia in nuclear area It seems that we need to proceed from the following obvious provisions:

The former understanding of strategic stability, based mainly on the nuclear balance of Russia and the United States, is outdated, and in this sense the contract for the quality of the "cornerstone" of strategic stability;

The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence, based on the ability of the parties to mutual guaranteed destruction, is fundamentally contrary to the proclaimed partnership principle in bilateral relations;

The contract on about outdated and in the sense that he was part of The strategic relationship between the USSR and the United States of the Cold War Age, a kind of tool for the management of nuclear arms racing during the period of acute confrontation of two superpowers;

Although the bid to nuclear deterrence was proclaimed in military doctrines of leading countries of the world, it should be clear that nuclear weapons are not a weapon of the XXI century: it will inevitably be impaired by the deployment of systems of pro, high-precision ordinary weapons and other new military technologies. It is necessary to be prepared for the fact that the United States at a certain point will refer the question of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons - at least in advantage purposes. In this sense, "nuclear greatness" after a while will not be able to provide the status of the Great Power to anyone. Moreover, those countries that will continue to emphasize nuclear weapons may be after some time in moral loss.

It is therefore talking about, given these strategic paradigms of the development of world military policies, which are objective and independent of the will of those or other political figures, To calculate the most optimal nuclear policy of Russia essentially for the transition period - from nuclear to retradent (nuclear-free) world. Even if such a transition is delayed for decades, a meaningful behavior in this matter is needed now - at least, taking into account the duration of life cycles of modern nuclear weapons systems (from 10 to 30 years or more).

At the same time, it would be possible to offer to Americans to start a wide political dialogue on the transfer of partnerships from the declarative phase to real. For example, to propose to conclude a new large-scale political agreement, similar to the "basics of the USSR and the US relationship" (1972), but responding to new reality, challenges and threats to international security and a new partner level of bilateral relations. (It is clear that the Declaration on the strategic framework of Russian-American relations, adopted in Sochi on April 6, 2008, does not solve this task.) It was in this kind that a document could be a provision for the need to jointly look for a way out of the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence, confirming Previously assumed obligations to deal with the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This obligation, in particular, could be specified by agreement on the start of consultation on the ways of joint and balanced phased movement towards the nuclear-free world and the conditions for its maintenance.

If the subject dialogue begins in this area, the mutual concerns of the parties on the offensive and defensive arms will be departed into the background, if they are not taken at all. And then the relationship between the parties in the military-strategic area will shut down, finally be the dominant of bilateral interaction, giving way to cooperation in other areas, to a greater extent to the challenges and threats of the XXI century

In 1991 and 1992 US Presidents and the USSR / Russia nominated unilateral parallel initiatives to bring out the combat composition of a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of both countries and their partial liquidation. In Western literature, these proposals are known as "presidential nuclear initiatives"(Pyats). These initiatives wore voluntary, legally inconsistent nature and formally not linked to the response steps of the other side.

As then it seemed, on the one hand, it allowed them to quickly fulfill them, not fucked in a complex and long-term negotiation process. Projects of some initiatives were prepared by experts in Voronezh on the basis of one institution, for which employees needed to remove one-room apartment in Voronezh for several months. On the other hand, the lack of legal framework facilitated if necessary, exit from one-sided obligations without the implementation of legal procedures for the denunciation of an international treaty. The first Pyats on September 27, 1991 put forward the US President Bush. The President of the USSR Gorbachev announced "Response Steps and Counterts" announced on October 5. His initiatives received further development and concretization in the proposals of the President of Russia Yeltsin dated January 29, 1992

Decisions of the US President provided: the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear warheads intended for arming the means of delivery of ground-based base (nuclear artillery shells and warheads for the tactical missiles "Lance") to the US territory, including from Europe and South Korea, for subsequent dismantling and destruction; removal from weapons of surface wars and submarines of all tactical nuclear products, as well as the deep bombs of marine aviation, their warehousing in the United States and the subsequent destruction of approximately half of their quantity; Termination of a minor range of the SREM-T missile development program, designed for weapons tactical shock aviation. Counter steps on the part of the Soviet Union, and then Russia were as follows: all tactical nuclear facilities that are in service with land forces and air defense will be replied to the pre-warning bases of enterprises to assemble nuclear warheads and on centralized storage warehouses;

all the warheads intended for ground-based products are subject to liquidation; A third of the warheads intended for tactical carriers of marine basing will be destroyed; It is planned to eliminate half of nuclear fuel charges for anti-aircraft missiles; It is planned half to reduce by eliminating the reserves of aviation tactical nuclear ammunition; Nuclear ammunition was offered on a mutual basis. aviation Tools, together with the US, to withdraw from the combat units of front-line aircraft and place in centralized storage warehouses 5. Quantitative to assess these reductions is very difficult, since, as opposed to information on strategic nuclear power, Russia and the United States did not publish official data on their reserves of tactical nuclear weapons.

According to unofficial published estimates, the United States should have eliminated at least about 3,000 tactical nuclear ammunition (1300 artillery shells, more than 800 warheads for Lance missiles and about 900 units of marine weapons, mainly deep bombs). In armament they remained bombs of free fall destined for the Air Force. The total number of their number in the early 1990s was estimated in 2000 units, including about 500-600 airbabes - in warehouses in Europe 6. The overall assessment of the US tactical nuclear arsenals is currently given above.

According to the estimates of the Russian authoritative study, 13,700 tactical nuclear warheads were to reduce 13,700 tactical nuclear warheads, including 4000 warheads for tactical missiles, 2000 artillery shells, 700 engineering troops (nuclear fugasis), 1500 warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, 3,500 warheads for front-line Aviation, 1000 warheads intended for ships and submarines Navy, and 1000 warheads for naval aviation. This was read by two thirds of tactical nuclear warheads that were in service with the former USSR in 1991. 7, the income is difficult to overestimate. First, for the first time it was decided to dismantle and dispose of nuclear warheads, and not only their delivery means, as was done in accordance with agreements on the reductions of strategic offensive arms. Complete liquidation was subject to several classes of draw: nuclear shells and mines, nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, nuclear fugasses 8. Secondly, the scope of contractions significantly exceeded the indirect limitations laid down in the agreements on START. Thus, according to the existing Treaty of START 1991, Russia and the United States should have been withdrawn from combat composition of 4-5 thousand nuclear warheads, or 8-10 thousand units together. Abbreviations within the framework of the Pyats, opened the prospects for the elimination of more than 16 thousand warheads in the aggregate.

However, the implementation of the Pyats from the very beginning met serious difficulties. At the first stage in 1992, they were associated with the conclusion of Russia tactical nuclear warheads from the territory of a number of former Soviet republics. The conclusion of this type of weapon was agreed into fundamental documents to terminate the existence of the USSR, signed by the leaders of new independent states in 1991. However, some of the former Soviet republic began to repair the obstacles to these measures. In particular, in February 1992, President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk banned the export of tactical nuclear ammunition to Russia. Only joint demarches of Russia and the United States forced him to resume the transportation of this type of weapons. In the spring of 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons were derived. The redeployment of nuclear ammunition for strategic carriers was completed only in 1996.

Another difficulty was that in the conditions of the extremely severe economic situation of the 1990s, Russia experienced serious difficulties with financing the utilization of nuclear weapons. Disarmament activity was inhibited by the lack of sufficient volumes on warehouse storage facilities. This led to the overflow of warehouses, violations of the adopted security regulations. The risks associated with unauthorized access to nuclear warp during their transportation and storage, forced Moscow to adopt international assistance to ensure nuclear safety. It was provided mainly to the United States according to the well-known program of Nanna-Lugar, but also other countries including France and the UK. For considerations of state secrets, Russia refused to assist directly when dismantling nuclear ammunition. However, foreign assistance was in other, less sensitive areas, for example, by providing containers and cars to safely transport nuclear warheads, protective equipment of nuclear storage facilities, etc. This made it possible to free the financial resources necessary for the destruction of ammunition.

The provision of foreign aid provided partial one-sided transparency, not provided by the past. Donor states, primarily the United States, insisted on their right access to objects that were assisted on their part to verify the target use of the equipment supplied. As a result of long and difficult negotiations, mutually acceptable solutions were found, on the one hand, guaranteeing compliance with state secrets, and on the other - the required level of access. Such limited transparency measures covered such essential objects as enterprises for disassembling and assembling nuclear ammunition, which are managed by Rosatom, as well as the objects of the warehousing storage of nuclear weapons, subordinated by the Ministry of Defense. The latest officially published information on the implementation of the incomplete in Russia was presented in the speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Ivanov at a conference on the implementation of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on April 25, 2000

According to him, "Russia ... continues to consistently carry out unilateral initiatives in the field of tactical nuclear weapons. Such a weapon is completely removed from the surface ships and multipurpose submarines, as well as air-based Navy aircraft and placed in centralized storage places. Liquidated one third of nuclear ammunition from the total amount for tactical launch missiles and aircraft Navy. The destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, artillery shells, as well as nuclear mines is completed. Half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of nuclear aviation bombs are destroyed. Estimates of the implementation of Russia of the Pyas are given in Table. 9. Thus, as of 2000, Russia basically fulfilled the Pyats. As planned, all naval ammunition were brought to centralized storage facilities, and a third of them were destroyed (however, with regard to the withdrawal of all such funds with the Navy bases, a significant ambiguity associated with the abormity of official wording remains). A certain number of tactical nuclear warheads still remained in service with land forces, Air Force and air defense. In the event of the Air Force, it did not contradict the Pyats, since, according to the January 1992, the initiatives of the President of Yeltsin envisaged to bring tactical ammunition from combat composition and destroy together with the United States that did not. With regard to the elimination of the air force of the Air Force, the obligations of Russia were fulfilled by the 2000. For the means of air defense, the PAI was performed in the part of the elimination, but not in the field of complete withdrawal from the anti-aircraft missile troops.

Thus, during the 1990s, Russia fulfilled the incomplete in the field of warheads of the Air Force and, possibly Navy, as well as partial air defense. In the ground forces, some tactical nuclear ammunition remained in service and was not eliminated, although the Phyres provided their full conclusion on centralized storage facilities and full elimination. The latter was explained by financial and technical difficulties. Performance of the Pyx became one of the requirements of the Overview Conference on the NPT 2000. Their implementation was an integral part of the "13 steps" plan to fulfill the obligations of nuclear powers in accordance with Art. VI contract. The "13 steps" plan was adopted at a consensus review conference, that is, representatives of Russia and the United States voted for his adoption. However, after 19 months, Washington announced a unilateral exit from the Russian-American Treaty of 1972 on the limitation of missile defense systems, which was considered the cornerstone of strategic stability. This decision was taken against the obligations of the United States according to the "13 steps" plan, which ensured compliance with this contract.

The US exit from the contract on Pro Treaty in June 2002 violated a very delicate balance of mutual obligations between Russia and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament, including in relation to the draw. Obviously, a violation by one of the members of the NPT of its obligations for a number of items adopted by the Overview Conference of 2000 decisions (including the plan "13 steps") made an unlikely complete compliance with these solutions and other parties. During the work of the Overview Conference on the NPT 2005, no provisions on the "13 steps" plan were not taken, which actually indicates that he has lost strength. It could not but affect the performance of the Py. Thus, on April 28, 2003, in the speech of the head of the Russian delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee to the Overview Conference of 2005, the following was stated: "The Russian side proceeds from the fact that the consideration of the issues of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be carried out in the separation from other types of weapons. It is for this reason that the well-known unilateral Russian initiatives in the field of disarmament 1991-1992 are integrated and, in addition, affect tactical nuclear weapons and other important issues that have a significant impact on strategic stability. "

The official link of Russia to the fact that the plays affect in addition to the taste and other important issues affecting strategic stability explicitly proceed from the idea of \u200b\u200bthe interconnection of the implementation of initiatives 1991-1992. With the fate of the contract for about as the cornerstone of strategic stability. In addition, the assertion that the question of the draw cannot be considered in the separation from other types of weapons, it is obviously a hint of the situation established with the entry into force of the adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This contract was signed in 1990 and provided for maintaining the balance of power in Europe on a block basis in five types of conventional arms (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters and aircraft). After the collapse of the organization of the Warsaw and the USSR itself, with the expansion of NATO to the East, it is completely outdated.

In order to maintain a system for limiting conventional weapons, the parties held negotiations on his adaptation, which were crowned with the signing of an adapted version of CFA in Istanbul. This option was more important to the military-political realities established in Europe after the end of the Cold War and contained certain security guarantees for Russia, limiting the possibility of deploying NATO's troops at its borders. However, NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted CFEs under highly contrived pretexts. In the context of adoption in NATO, the Baltic states, an increase in imbalance on conventional arms to the detriment of Russia and in the absence of ratification of the adapted Treaty West Russia in December 2007 declared a one-sided suspension of compliance with the basic CFES (despite the fact that the adapted Agreement as a superstructure over the baseline never entered into force ).

In addition, in front of Russia with a new relevance arose about the role of nuclear weapons, primarily tactical as the means of neutralizing such an imbalance. It is obvious that the concerns associated with the promotion of NATO to the East in the absence of adequate international legal guarantees of security, in the eyes of Russia, questioned the feasibility of performing the income in full, especially with regard to the political and legally non-obligatory nature of these obligations. As far as can be judged by the lack of further official statements about the fate of Pyas, they were not fulfilled in full.

This fact clearly shows both the advantages and disadvantages of informal arms control regimes. On the one hand, within the framework of the Pyats, significant reductions in tactical nuclear weapons were carried out including the destruction of thousands of nuclear ammunition. At the same time, the lack of verification measures does not allow the parties with confidence to assume exactly which cuts in reality took place. The lack of legally binding status facilitated the parties to the actual refusal to implement the initiatives, without declaring it at all.

In other words, the advantages of the "informal" approach to disarmament have a tactical nature, but in the long term, it does not have sufficient sufficient sustainability in order to fulfill the role of a stabilizer of changing political and military relations of the parties. Moreover, such initiatives themselves become an easy victim of such changes and can turn into an additional distrust and tension source. Another thing is that after the end of the "Cold War", former opponents could afford much more radical, fast, less complex technically and less burdensome economically agreements on disarmament.

On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed agreements on the restriction of strategic armaments (ASS). In connection with the anniversary of this event, Le Figaro offers you an overview of the main Russian-American bilateral agreements.

Disarmament or restriction of strategic armaments? The policy of nuclear intimidation during the Cold War originated the mad arms race of two superpowers, which could lead to a catastrophe. That is why 45 years ago, the United States and the USSR signed the first agreement on the reduction of strategic arms.

Treaty 1: First Bilateral Arms Reduction Agreement

On May 26, 1972, US President Richard Nixon and Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev signed an agreement on the restriction of strategic arms. The signing took place in front of the TV chamber in the Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. This event was the result of the negotiations began in November 1969.

The contract limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers, their location and composition. Supplement to the contract of 1974 reduced the number of areas deployed by each side of the regions. However, one of the points of the Treaty allowed the parties to terminate the treaty unilaterally. That was what the United States was made in 2001 to start the deployment of the pro on its territory after 2004-2005. The date of the final exit of the United States from this Agreement has arrived on June 13, 2002.

The agreement of 1972 includes a temporary agreement for a period of 20 years, which prohibits the production of launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles of ground-based bases and limits the launchers of ballistic missiles on submarines. Also, according to this agreement, the parties undertake to continue active and comprehensive negotiations.

This "historical" agreement was to especially help in restoring the equilibrium of the deterrence. And this does not concern the production of offensive arms and restrictions on the number of warheads and strategic bombers. The drum forces of both countries are still very high. First of all, this contract allows both countries to temper the costs, while maintaining the ability mass lesion. This prompted André Frossard to write in the newspaper on May 29, 1972: "Being able to arrange about the 27th ends of the world - I don't know exactly - gives them a sufficient sense of safety and allows them to save us from many additional ways to destroy. For this we need to thank their kind heart. "

Agreement 2: Weakening of tension between the two countries

After 6 years of negotiations, the new treaty between the USSR and the United States on the restriction of strategic offensive armaments was signed by the American President Jimmy Carter and Secretary General CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna June 18, 1979. This complex document includes 19 articles, 43 pages of definitions, 3 pages with transfers of the reserves of military arsenals of the two countries, 3 pages of the protocol, which will enter into force in 1981 and, finally, the Declaration of Principles that will form the basis of the negotiations on ADS-3 .

The contract limited the number of strategic nuclear weapons of both countries. After the signing of the Agreement Jimmy Carter said in his speech: "These negotiations that are continuously for ten years have caused the feeling that nuclear competition if it is not limited to general rules and restrictions, can only lead to a catastrophe." At the same time, the American president clarified that "this contract does not take away the need for both countries to maintain their military power." But this contract was not ratified by the United States due to the invasion of the USSR to Afghanistan.

Agreement on the elimination of medium and low rockets

On December 8, 1987, in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed an indefinite agreement on the elimination of medium and low-range missiles (RSMD), which entered into force in May 1988. This "historical" agreement first provided for the elimination of arms. It was about the rockets of medium and low range with a radius of action from 500 to 5.5 thousand km. They were from 3 to 4% of the total arsenal. In accordance with the contract, the parties, within three years from the date of its entry into force, had to destroy all the rockets of the middle and low distance. The contract also provided for the procedures for mutual checks "in the field".

During the signing of the Rihan agreement, he stressed: "For the first time in history, we have crossed the discussions of arms control to discuss their reduction." Both presidents particularly insisted on the reduction of 50% of their strategic arsenals. They focused on the future START Treaty, whose signing was originally scheduled for the spring of 1988.

START-1: the beginning of this disarmament

On July 31, 1991, US President George Bush and his Soviet colleague Mikhail Gorbachev signed an agreement in Moscow to reduce strategic offensive arms. This agreement was the first present reduction in the strategic arsenals of two superpowers. According to his conditions, countries should have been in three stages (for seven years) by quarter or third to reduce the number of the most dangerous types of weapons: intercontinental ballistic missiles and underwater basing missiles.

The number of warheads should have been reduced to 7 thousand for the USSR and 9 thousand for the United States. The privileged position in the new arsenal was assigned to bombers: the number of bombs should increase from 2.5 to 4 thousand in the United States and from 450 to 2.2 thousand at the USSR. In addition, various control measures were envisaged in the contract, and it was finally entered into force in 1994. According to Gorbachev, he became a blow to the "fear infrastructure".

START-2: radical cuts

Context

End of the RSD Treaty?

Defence24 02/16/2017

Treaty RSMD is dead?

The National Interest 11.03.2017

START-3 and nuclear jerk of Russia

The Washington Times 10/22/2015

US will discuss with Russia nuclear disarmament

Russian service "Voice of America" \u200b\u200b02.02.2013 On January 3, 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his American colleague George Bush signed the START-2 contract in Moscow. He became a big event, since it provided for a reduction in nuclear arsenals by two-thirds. After the entry into force in 2003, American reserves were to decrease from 9 thousand 986 warheads up to 3.5 thousand, and Russian - from 10 thousand 237 to 3 thousand 027. That is, to the level of 1974 for Russia and 1960 for America .

Another important point was registered in the contract: the elimination of missiles with separating warheads. Russia refused OT. high-precision weaponswhich constituted the basis for its consideration forces, while the United States was removed half the rockets installed on submarines (practically not detects). START-2 was ratified by the United States in 1996 and Russia in 2000.

Boris Yeltsin saw a source of hope in it, and George Bush considered him a symbol of the "end of the Cold War" and "the best future free of fear for our parents and children." Be that as it may, reality remains not so idyllic: both countries can still destroy the entire planet several times.

SNP: a point in the cold war

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George Bush Jr. and Vladimir Putin signed an agreement in the Kremlin to reduce strategic offensive potentials (SNP). It was about decreasing arsenals for two thirds in ten years.

Nevertheless, this is a small bilateral agreement (five short articles) did not differ and did not contain verification measures. His role from the point of view of the image of the parties was more important than its filling: not the first time they said about the reduction. Be that as it may, it still became a turning point, the end of the military-strategic parity: not possessing the necessary economic opportunities, Russia refused to claim the status of the superpower. In addition, the contract opened the door to " new era", Because accompanied by a statement about the" new strategic partnership. " The United States made a bet on ordinary armed forces and understood the uselessness of most of their nuclear arsenal. Bush noted that the signing of the SNP allows you to get rid of the "Heritage of the Cold War" and hostility between the two countries.

START-3: National Interest Protection

On April 8, 2010, US President Barack Obama and his Russian colleague Dmitry Medvedev signed another agreement on reducing strategic offensive arms (START-3) in the Spanish living room of Prague Castle. It was designed to fill the legal vacuum, which arose after the expiration of the START-1 period in December 2009. A new ceiling of nuclear arsenals of two countries was installed on it: a reduction in nuclear warheads up to 1.55 thousand units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic rockets of submarines and heavy bombers - up to 700 units.

In addition, the agreement provides for checking the numbers by a joint group of inspectors seven years after its entry into force. It is worth noting that the installed planks are not too different from those that were listed in 2002. It also does not refer to tactical nuclear weapons, thousands of deactivated warheads in warehouses and bombs of strategic aviation. The American Senate ratified it in 2010.

START-3 became the last Russian-American agreement in the field of control over nuclear weapons. A few days after the entry into office in January 2017, the US President Donald Trump said that he would offer Vladimir Putin withdrawing sanctions from Russia (were put into response to the annexation of the Crimea) in exchange for the reduction of nuclear weapons. According to the latest American State Department, the United States has 1 thousand 367 warheads (bombers and rockets), while the Russian arsenal reaches 1 thousand 096.

Insurance materials contain estimates of exclusively foreign media and do not reflect the position of the EOSMI's editorial office.

According to the interpretation of the United States, the agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments reduces the number of deployed warheads, which are installed on rocket carriers and are ready for launch. The overall arsenal of nuclear weapons of Russia and the United States also contains other names of weapons. In addition to the deployed strategic nuclear weapons, both countries use tactical nuclear weapons, which is intended for use in ground military operations, has less power and has a smaller range.

Currently, the overall stock of US nuclear weapons is about 11,000 warheads, including almost 7,000 deployed strategic warheads; More than 1000 units of tactical nuclear weapons and almost 3,000 units of strategic and tactical warheads that are not installed on the delivery system. (The United States also has thousands of units of nuclear warhead components that can be mounted in full-fledged weapons).

At the moment, the Russian nuclear arsenal includes about 5,000 units of deployed nuclear weapons, about 3,500 units of operational tactical nuclear weapons and more than 11,000 strategic and tactical warheads in stock. All this constitutes a total reserve from 19,500 units of nuclear warheads. Unlike the United States, Russia has these reserves in part, as the dismantling of the warhead is very expensive. Also, in contrast to the United States, Russia continues to produce a limited number of new nuclear warheads, mainly because its warheads have a much smaller service life and must be replaced with a greater frequency.

Strategic Nuclear Service Control Treaties

Ass-1

Began in November 1969, negotiations on the restriction of strategic offensive armaments led in 1972 to the agreement on the limitation of missile defense systems (Pro), which prohibits the creation of missile defense of the country's territory. A temporary agreement was also concluded, under which the parties undertake not to begin construction of additional stationary launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ground-based base. The parties also undertake to limit the launchers of ballistic rockets of submarines (BR PL) and the number of modern submarines with ballistic missiles by the number of in combat and under construction at the date of signing of the Agreement. This agreement does not affect the topic of strategic bombers and warheads and allows both countries on their own decisions regarding the increase in the amount of weapons used by adding warheads to the ICBM and in ballistic missiles on submarines. Under this Agreement, the United States cannot have more than 1054 mine launchers MBR and 656 launchers of ballistic missiles from a submarine. The Soviet Union was limited by the number of 1607 ICBM of mine and 740 launchers from submarines.

OS-2

In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed on the conclusion of an agreement that is a continuation of the ASS 1. The AUC-2 Agreement, signed in June 1979, initially limited the number of Soviet and American commissioning of ICBM, BP pl, and heavy bombers up to 2400.

Various restrictions on unfolded strategic nuclear forces were also indicated. (In 1981, the contract offered to reduce the number of rocket carriers up to 2250). The conditions of this contract required the Soviet Union to reduce the number of launch vehicles by 270 units. At the same time, the number of US military facilities was lower than the established norm and could be increased.

President Jimmy Carter recalled the contract from the Senate, where he was at the stage of ratification after soviet troops Entered Afghanistan in December 1979. This contract never entered into force. However, since the parties have not stated their intention to refuse to ratify the contract, Washington and Moscow continued to generally comply with his provisions. However, on May 2, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said that future decisions on strategic nuclear service would be accepted on the basis of an emerging threat, and not on the terms of the ASS contract.

START-1

The agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons was first proposed in the early 1980s by the President Reagan and was finally signed in July 1991. The main provisions of the START-1 Agreement are to reduce the number of strategic carriers to the level of 1600 units and the number of warheads placed on these media to 6,000 units. The contract obliged to destroy the remaining media. Their destruction was confirmed by inspecting objects and regular exchange of information, as well as using technical means (for example, satellites). Entering the Agreement was postponed for several years due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the efforts to concentrate the nuclear weapons of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in Russia. Reducing weapons under the terms of the START-1 treaty were carried out in 2001. This contract is valid until 2009, if the parties do not extend its validity period.

START-2

In July 1992, Presidents George Bush - Senior and Boris Yeltsin agreed to make changes to the START-1 Treaty. START-2 Treaty, signed in January 1993, obliged the parties to reduce strategic arsenals to the level of 3000-3500 units of warheads and forbade the use of terrestrial missiles with several warheads. START 2 worked with warheads on the same principle as the START-1, as well as the previous contract, requested the destruction of missiles, but not warheads. Initially, January 2003 was appointed the date of execution of the contract. In 1997, the date was postponed to December 2007, because Russia was not sure of its capabilities to meet at the initial term. The contract did not take effect, since Russia ringed its ratification with the approval of the New York Protocols to the START-2 and Pro agreements signed in 1997. In 2001, the Bush administration took a firm course on the deployment of a large-scale system of anti-missile defense of the United States and the refusal to a pro agreement.

Structure of the START-3 Treaty

In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on the structure of the START-3 treaty for subsequent negotiations, the conditions of which included a reduction in strategic warheads to the level of 2000-2500 units. A significant moment is that the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads was stipulated in this contract to ensure the irreversibility of the process of reduction of weapons, including prerequisites for preventing a sharp increase in the number of warheads. Negotiations should have started after START-2 enter into force that it did not happen.

Moscow Agreement on Reducing Strategic Offensive Arms (Sort).

On May 24, 2002, Presidents Georges Bush Jr. and Vladimir Putin signed an agreement on which the United States and Russia should reduce their strategic arsenals to 1700 - 2200 warheads. Although the parties did not agree on the rules for calculating the warhead, the Bush administration made it clear that the United States would decline only to the warheads involved in launch vehicles, and would not count the warheads written off from the active service and storage as abbreviated. Russia did not agree with this approach to the interpretation of the contract and hopes to negotiate the rules for calculating abbreviated warheads. Restrictions on the contract are the same as according to START-3, but Sort does not require the destruction of missile carriers, in contrast to START-1 and START-2, or the destruction of warheads, as prescribed in START-3. This contract must still be approved by the Senate and the Duma.

Control agreements on strategic weapons.
The number of used warheads	Limits the number of missiles, not warhead	Limits the number of missiles and bombers, does not limit the warhead
Number of rocket carriers used	USA: 1.710 ICBMs and ballistic missiles on submarines; USSR: 2.347 ICBMs and ballistic missiles on submarines;			Does not stipulate	Does not stipulate	Does not stipulate
	Expired expired	Not entered into force		Not entered into force	Not considered	Signed, expects ratification.
date of signing					Not applicable
Date of entry into force		Not applicable		Not applicable	Not applicable
Period of execution	Not applicable
Term of the end of action					Not applicable

Measures on control over non-strategic nuclear weapons

Agreement on medium-range nuclear forces (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty)

Signed on December 8, 1987, this contract requires the US and Russia of the accountable destruction of all land ballistic and winged missiles with a radius of action from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. A distinctive inspection with its unprecedented regime, the nuclear power contract, the Middle range, the basis of the component of the verification of the existed START-1 agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. The agreement on the nuclear power forces of the average range entered into force on June 1, 1988, and both sides completed the reduction by June 1, 1992, when a total of 2692 missiles remained. The contract became a multilateral after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and today the USA, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are participants in the contract. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are also parties to agreements, but do not participate in meetings under the contract and inspections at facilities. The action of the prohibition on the medium-range missiles is unlimited.

Presidential Nuclear Security Initiatives

On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced the US intention to minimize almost the entire tactical nuclear weapons of the United States so that Russia was accepted in the same way, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear distribution in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bush in particular, stated that the United States would destroy all artillery shells and nuclear ballistic middle rocket warheads and remove all non-strategic nuclear warheads from the surface of ships, submarines and based on the land of naval aircraft. The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev paid for the same October 5, promising to destroy all nuclear artillery equipment, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles and all nuclear fugas. He also promised to minimize all Soviet tactical naval nuclear weapons. However, there are serious questions about the fulfillment of these promises from the Russian side, and there is a great uncertainty about the current state of the Russian tactical nuclear forces.