Foreign press about Russia and beyond. Does Iran have an atomic bomb? Nuclear arms race in the Middle East

And the Ransky Foreign Ministry gave Europe two months to decide.

Over this time european countries should give Tehran clear assurances that they will comply with the 2015 nuclear deal. Otherwise, Iran reserves the right to make a “forced decision”. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi announced this in an ultimatum on May 13, 2018.

What these "forced decisions" will be is not difficult to guess. Iran will start developing its own nuclear weapons again. And it will take him a very short time. The fact is that Iran, as a very sensible country claiming regional status, has surely insured itself.

Nuclear arms race in the Middle East

So, Iran's statement clearly hints that Iran is preparing to resume its military nuclear program. The Saudis have the same plans, and Israel, as we know, has long been a member of the nuclear club with an alleged pair of hundreds of ammunition. Moreover Saudi ArabiaMost likely, it expects to “accelerate” work on the creation of a nuclear bomb through negotiations with Pakistan, to which it once gave money for the creation of the first “yatren-baton” in the Islamic world.

I am sure that this path is the least expensive and most feasible for the kingdom. Iran was developing nuclear weapons independently and thoroughly. By the early 2010s, he had achieved fairly great success in this direction, but under pressure from the United States, he was forced to curtail his work. I have every reason to believe that they were not completely folded. Rather, they are not folded at all, but elsewhere ...

Iran's missile program (nuances)

We touched on this topic in detail when we considered the possibilities of the Iranian strategic missile forces and the Israeli missile defense system to reflect their strike, if required in the future. Now the time has come to elaborate on what I then preferred to keep silent about, but which I had already mentioned in passing. I have always been "confused" by the apparent complementarity of North Korea's nuclear missile program and the Iranian nuclear missile shield program.

Iran has created quite good ballistic missiles SD, but did not make ICBMs. In turn, the DPRK has focused on these missiles. Iran has created new guidance systems for warheads. And also a multiple warhead, which primarily makes sense for nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Koreans not only created a nuclear charge, but also worked on its miniaturization (how successful is the question, but that is a matter of time and money) and did not bother creating precise guidance systems and multiple warheads.

Interesting logic, right? If we dig deeper, then the sharp intensification of the development of nuclear weapons and new missiles in the DPRK began precisely when Iran abandoned such developments at home. And it was then that they were able to achieve great and, most importantly, many unexpected successes in this matter. And few wondered where the DPRK found the resources for all this.

Of course, we can assume that the whole thing is in China and its help. There is also logic in this. And if it is still Iran? It is no secret that Pyongyang obtained many secrets by buying them from countries such as Ukraine. The achievements of Soviet designers in many ways served as the basis for the work of North Korean specialists. But few people already remember that since the beginning of the 2000s, it was Iran that very tightly huddled the Ukrainian leadership and received a lot of valuable knowledge in the field of rocketry from it and even bought samples from it (for example, several cruise missiles X-55).

And it's not a secret that earlier Iran and the DPRK cooperated very closely in this industry and the scheme of Iranian money in exchange for a missile product has long been worked out in relations between the two countries. This and the presence of serious financial capabilities in Tehran and the lack of such in the DPRK make us look at the problem of creating an Iranian nuclear bomb in a completely different way. But what if it has already been created and just lies elsewhere.

Denuclearization of North Korea or Nucleization of the Middle East

Nobody knows how many nuclear warheads the DPRK has today. As no one knows about the secret agreements of the two regimes. And how can one fail to recall Pyongyang's sudden serious revision of its attitude to its nuclear program. Kim Jong-un is eagerly going to meet the United States on the issue today nuclear disarmament... A year ago, he said that his country would never part with a nuclear bomb, and today Washington even announces the dates when such an event can happen (2020).

Even though they are hypothetical for now, the breakthrough is still very remarkable. And if we assume that all the bomb developments, as well as part of the warheads, will be transported to Iran? Impossible, you say? Not sure. Then, having its own centrifuges and production facilities, in a couple of years Tehran will be able to become a full-fledged owner of nuclear weapons (and intercontinental missiles to boot). And for the first time, to discourage Israel from doing stupid things, a dozen North Korean charges will be enough. After all, Israel's missile defense system is not yet ready to withstand this threat, and after a dozen years all this may become meaningless ... So, as we see the nuclear threat from Iran, this is not a bluff at all. Moreover, the most interesting thing about this is that Tehran did not violate the terms of the 2015 agreement.

Negotiations successfully completed in Lausanneunder a framework agreement with Iran... "Six" of international mediators consisting ofUSA, UK, France, Germany, China, Russia signed a document with Tehran limiting the development of Iran's nuclear programs in exchange for the lifting of fundamental sanctions. At the same time, Iran retains the right to a peaceful atom, including work on uranium enrichment. Dlava of the Iranian foreign ministry Mohammad Javad Zarif said that Tehran is setting itself the task of entering the world nuclear fuel market. For this, it is planned to introduce a number of new technological developments already at the disposal of Iran.

According to EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Federica Mogherini, the negotiators reached basic agreements that create the basis for reaching a final agreement with Iran, scheduled for late June. The Six hopes that the agreement will prevent the development of an Iranian atomic bomb under the guise of a civilian nuclear program, and put an end to the international crisis that has lasted for 12 years.

Iran agreed to make its nuclear program as transparent as possible, not to develop new nuclear projects and abandon uranium enrichment at all facilities except one at Natanz. If the International Energy Agency confirms that Tehran has complied with all the key terms of the treaty, the US and EU sanctions imposed on Iran will be suspended. If there is even the slightest suspicion that Iran is playing a dishonest game, comprehensive checks will be carried out.

Despite the fact that the United States and other countries regard the agreements reached with Iran as a great victory, the French side commented on the event very restrainedly. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius noted that although the agreement is undoubtedly a step towards positive shifts in the issue of Iran's nuclear program, "there is still work to be done." He advised Iran not to violate the agreement reached, the implementation of which France is taking under its control.

The only one who was not happy about the success in the negotiations with Iran was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In his opinion, the agreement threatens the existence of Israel. It is interesting that at the same time Israel is the only state in the Near and Middle East that has long had its own nuclear weapons, means of delivery and, in general, a much more powerful scientific and technological base in the nuclear sphere than Iran. And, unlike Iran, Israel has not yet joined the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).

A costly path to compromise

Difficulties in relations between Iran and the world community arose in 2003. Then it turned out that Iran had been engaged in nuclear activities and development for 18 years, despite the fact that it is an official member of the IAEA. The Iranian government was handed over by the country's opposition party, and then the information was confirmed by Western intelligence. The reason for accusations of Tehran's desire to obtain its own nuclear weapons was the centrifuges for uranium enrichment not registered by the IAEA, discovered in 2004. Later, the West's accusatory line was based on information that Iran had begun work on enriching its uranium to the level of 20%.
All attempts to organize fruitful negotiations with Iran to end nuclear activities They did not lead to anything, and with the coming to power of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, discussions on this issue stopped altogether.

In 2006, the dossier on Iran's nuclear program was transferred to the UN. Every year, starting in 2006 and ending in 2010, the organization's Security Union adopted new sanctions, but they did not have the desired success. The situation got off the ground when the EU and the US introduced their sanctions against Iran's nuclear program three years ago, which hit the country's economy very painfully. The two most critical sanctions are the ban on oil and gas imports to the EU and the US, and the exclusion from the SWIFT interbank system.

Analysts estimate that from 2012 to 2013, Iranian oil exports decreased by a million barrels per day, which in monetary terms amounted to $ 40 billion per year. During the same period, about $ 100 billion of Iranian petrodollars were blocked in Western banks. Since the Iranian banking system was cut off from the rest of the world during the sanctions, this led to a decrease in foreign trade by about a third, increasing the cost of imports equally. As a result, Iran's GDP in 2013 fell by 6.6%.

As soon as Hassan Rouhani came to power, an agreement was concluded in Geneva that was the first step towards an Iranian nuclear compromise. Meetings between Iran and the Six began every month, but the terms of the final agreement were constantly shifted due to ideological and political differences, as well as due to certain technological difficulties. Finally, on April 2, a basic agreement was reached between Iran and the mediators. So the path to this event was really long and difficult.

The agreement with Iran is, first of all, beneficial to the EU and the United States, because they suffer tangible losses from the anti-Iranian sanctions. From 1995 to 2012, according to official data from American experts, the United States lost about $ 175 billion of potential export earnings from trade with Iran. In addition, America and Europe are planning to forge new relationships with the Middle East to ease gas dependence on Russia. Iran, by the way, understands well. According to President Hassan Rouhani, "Iran has a unique status in the energy sector, therefore it can be a reliable source of energy for Europe."

Nuclear reserves

According to Barack Obama, after the April agreement reached, the world can sleep peacefully without fear of the Iranian nuclear threat. But is Iran's nuclear potential really that terrible? Interestingly, Iran became one of the first states to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signing it in 1969 and ratifying it in 1970. Four years later, Tehran signed a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which provides for regular inspections on Iranian territory.

The development of the Iranian nuclear program began in the 60s, and, surprisingly, with the active support of the United States and Europe. The first nuclear reactor with a capacity of 5 MW, using more than 5.5 kg of highly enriched uranium as fuel, was presented by Washington to the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In parallel, France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and Germany took part in the program for the development of nuclear power in Iran, participating in the construction of two nuclear power plants in Bushehr and Ahvaz, supplying equipment and nuclear fuel, and training specialists.

The overthrow of the Shah's regime and the establishment of a republican form of government in Iran led to the severance of relations with the West. The nuclear program was continued only in the 90s, with new partners in the person of China and Russia. The latter, in particular, completed the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr. With the coming to power of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the pace of development of the nuclear industry, including uranium enrichment technologies, increased dramatically. For this, a heavy water production plant was built in Arak, a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, and a nuclear research reactor in Keredzha.

Iran currently has seven centers for the development and production of missile technology that can be used for the potential delivery of nuclear weapons. According to experts, the Iranian armed forces have shorter and medium-range ballistic missiles of up to 1,600 km. At the same time, it is planned to create a ballistic missile with a much greater flight range (including Shehab-5 and Shehab-6) and a firing range of 3,000 to 6,000 km. In the coming years, the Sajil-2 ballistic missile will also appear with an estimated range of at least 2,000 km. Potentially, these missiles can be used against Israeli and American military bases located in the Persian Gulf. In 2011, Iran announced its intention to produce carbon fiber composite materials, which, according to experts, indicates the country's readiness to create intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The volumes of Iranian production of low-enriched and medium-enriched uranium (up to 5% and 20%, respectively) and the existing scientific and production nuclear base indicate that Iran has a really real potential for creating nuclear weapons. And if he decides to create it, he will find a way to do it bypassing all agreements: after all, it is not for nothing that for many years no one guessed that Tehran had secret nuclear programs.

Therefore, the world can hardly sleep well, especially since there is e shche and Israel, whose assets are no longer supposed, but quite real nuclear weapons, aviation and rocket means its deliveries, covered by modern national anti-missile systems. It is obvious that without a comprehensive settlement of the Iranian and Israeli nuclear problems, as well as the elimination of chemical weapons by Israel, the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Near and Middle East is simply impossible.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has never had an easy relationship with the outside world. Sometimes it seems that after the collapse of the USSR, Iran has been chosen in the West as the main geopolitical enemy and an object of criticism. In this situation, Russia is trying to maneuver: it maintains friendly relations with Iran, but also avoids excessive rapprochement, on the one hand, it launches a nuclear power plant in Bushehr, on the other hand, it cancels the supply of air defense systems.

Mahmoud Reza Sajjadi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Islamic Republic, spoke in an interview with Slon.ru about the Iranian nuclear program, Iran's attitude to the "Arab Spring", lack of cooperation with Russia, Turkey's turn to the East and why a minor was executed in Iran. Iran in Russia.

- Iran has waited 35 years for the Bushehr nuclear power plant to start operating. Do you think this will change the life of the country? Iran, on the other hand, has not had any problems with energy security so far - with such reserves of oil and gas.

- Yes, we have oil and gas reserves, just like Russia and the United States, but this does not prevent these countries from developing other types of energy production, including building nuclear power plants.

We have not only built a nuclear power plant, we also have solar energy and use hydropower for our needs. As you understand, oil and gas are exhaustible resources that will sooner or later run out, so we are not standing still, developing other energy supply sectors.

In general, the argument that Iran has oil and gas, so there is no need for a nuclear power plant, is very similar to a situation when a person has savings, and he is persuaded not to work, to live on the money that has been postponed. But it doesn't work that way! Each person must work to meet the needs of the family.

In addition, we all know about the "Dutch syndrome" that persecutes countries where there is oil, and we do our best to avoid the same phenomenon in Iran, without tying the economy to natural resources.

- Western countries see Iran's readiness to develop nuclear weapons in such an interest in the development of nuclear technologies. Iran intends to acquire its own atomic weapons over time? What international events can force Iran to accelerate on this issue?

- Let's start with the fact that the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant was started under the Shah's regime, when the Americans themselves began to build nuclear power plants in Iran. For some reason, then no one thought that this could be the first step towards creating atomic weapons... But after the revolution and the overthrow of the Shah's regime, the States saw in this nuclear power plant a threat to the whole world. Strange, isn't it? Why? Because Iran became independent and ceased to pursue US interests, which was the case under the Shah.

You see, if Iran wanted to have nuclear weapons, it would not sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, just as Israel and India did not sign it. We allow inspecting our facilities, we quite often have IAEA inspectors who have not been able to find evidence that Iran has developed nuclear weapons.

Iran has several reasons not to acquire nuclear weapons. First, Iran has weapons that are far more powerful than nuclear weapons. It is this weapon that protects Iran from American aggression. The states have been threatening us for several years, but they have not dared to attack - only because they understand that the entire people will stand up to defend their homeland. No other state would have been able to survive under the pressure felt by Iran over the past 32 years, but Iran has managed to survive and develop. The war with Iraq lasted eight years, while the whole world supported the Iraqi regime, we defended ourselves and were able to repel the onslaught.

And then we do not believe that nuclear weapons are a deterrent, a weapon capable of preventing war. Moreover, it requires huge financial investments that can be directed towards a peaceful channel.

No, the West knows that Iran has no goal to create nuclear weapons, and only uses it as a pretext for pressure and blackmail. And there are no processes that can force Iran to think about creating nuclear weapons. In principle, Iran does not need it.

- Iran has filed a lawsuit against Russia in the International Chamber of Commerce for the fact that Moscow refused to supply Iran with S-300 missile systems, citing new sanctions from the UN Security Council. It will not worsen bilateral relations

- If Iran had a goal of punishing Russia with fines, then, undoubtedly, relations would worsen. But Iran does not believe that the sale by Russia missile systems The S-300 is related to the sanctions of the UN Security Council, and by filing a lawsuit with the International Chamber of Commerce, we want to help Russia get the legal prerequisites for supplying the complexes to Iran.

- Are you satisfied with the current level of development of relations between Iran and Russia? What hinders the development of cooperation?

- No, absolutely not satisfied! I believe that the level of trade relations between Iran and Russia would be much higher if Russian businessmen knew Iran, the possibilities of the Iranian economy are better.

First, in Russia, the economy is very closely intertwined with politics, and this complicates a lot. Secondly, as long as there is no banking cooperation, it will not be possible to establish relations that could be beneficial to the two countries. Thirdly, there is a pro-Western lobby, which, defending the interests of the West, greatly interferes with mutually beneficial cooperation, trying to prove that from an economic point of view, Iran is an unreliable partner.

Although people who have been to Iran or worked with Iranian partners say the exact opposite, i.e. that there is a huge potential for the development of economic cooperation! And finally, the relevant Russian economic actors have very little knowledge of the Iranian reality.

- Over the past year, a wave of revolutions swept across the Arab world. In your opinion, what is more here: internal factors or interference of external forces?

- It depends on the specific country. For example, in Egypt, exclusively internal reasons aroused popular indignation. Hosni Mubarak's regime was dictatorial, mired in corruption, dependent on the influence of American forces, and therefore we saw people taking to the streets to overthrow it. So the people of Egypt took Iran as an example thirty years ago. In support of my words, I can cite the following fact: Iran did not have an embassy in Cairo for so many years - only a small bureau representing the interests of Iran - but after Mubarak left, the Israeli embassy was closed, and the Iranian one was opened.

But in Syria - the opposite. Outside forces are working there, which by all means, including financial ones, are trying to overthrow the government, but we see that there are no such mass demonstrations in Syria as in Egypt. This means that it will not be possible to overthrow the Syrian government to please the West.

- Could something like Egypt or Tunisia repeat itself in modern Iran?

- Not. It's impossible. Iran has already gone this way, we overthrew the shah's puppet regime, and today we can say that the majority of the population is satisfied with the state of affairs in Iran.

- How does Iran feel about the strengthening of Turkey's influence in the Arab world?

- Turkey is a fraternal country where, at last, not the military came to power, but people who are sincerely believers, which makes our relations warmer and closer. And the fact that Turkey has turned to the Islamic world is wonderful. And I will say that if today Turkey is faced with a choice between Europe and Islam, then Turkey, in the interests of its own people, will definitely choose Islam.

- Not so long ago, the Iranian government, under pressure from Tabriz (the main city of Iranian Azerbaijanis), allocated $ 900 million for measures to prevent the drying up of Lake Urmia. So said the head of the Organization for the Protection environment IRI Mohammad Javad Mohammadizadeh. This was almost immediately declared a victory for the Azerbaijanis living in Iran. Do you agree with this statement?

- Isn't Lake Urmia located in Iran? Of course, it is located in Iran, and we are doing everything to improve the environment in our country. As for the position of Azerbaijanis in Iran ... Today our spiritual leader is an Azerbaijani. Azerbaijanis occupy quite high posts in our country, because they have always selflessly served Iran, like all peoples inhabiting Iran, regardless of their ethnicity, which makes Iran such a strong state.

- The last question, which is the most difficult to ask. How is it possible that a minor was executed in modern Iran?

- The fact is that Iran lives according to the laws of God, which we consider to be wiser than the laws written by man. According to these laws, responsibility comes from the age of 17.

Iran has a very reverent attitude towards human life, and that is why the death penalty for murder is defined in our country so that no one dares to attempt on the life of another person. In a specific case, the person knew what he was facing in the event of this crime. However, Alireza Mollasoltani decided to kill, driven by personal animosity. The state could forgive him only and only if the criminal was forgiven by the parents of the murdered person. They have not forgiven. Moreover, the parents of the murdered demanded this execution, demanded retribution. The majority of the population is satisfied with the state of affairs in Iran.

The pressure that the United States and the West as a whole apply to Iran to keep it from acquiring nuclear weapons is being completely in vain. The Islamic Republic already has not only nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, but also enough enriched uranium to produce new weapons. Even worse, Iran has delivery vehicles.

The West has been concerned about Iran's growing uranium production capabilities for about a decade, confident that Iran is working on a nuclear bomb, although the government continues to insist that its uranium enrichment program is purely peaceful.

When Iran began its nuclear program in the mid-1980s, I worked as a CIA spy inside the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The intelligence of the guards at the time learned of Saddam Hussein's attempt to acquire a nuclear bomb for Iraq. The corps commanders concluded that they needed a nuclear bomb, because if Saddam had it, he would use it against Iran. At the time, the two countries were at war.

Mohsen Rezaei, the then commander of the Guard, received permission from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to begin a covert program to acquire nuclear weapons. To this end, the Guard made contact with Pakistani generals and Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Commander Ali Shamkhani traveled to Pakistan offering billions of dollars for the bomb, but all negotiations ended instead with blueprints and centrifuges. The first centrifuge was delivered to Iran by Khomeini's private jet.

As part of a second but parallel effort to acquire nuclear weapons, Iran turned to former soviet republics... When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, Iran was eager to obtain thousands of tactical nuclear weapons that were scattered across the former republics of the Union.

In the early 1990s, the CIA asked me to find an Iranian scientist who would testify that Iran has a bomb. The CIA learned that Iranian intelligence agents had traveled to nuclear facilities throughout the former Soviet Union, with a particular interest in Kazakhstan.

Muslim Iran actively courted Kazakhstan, which accounted for a large part of the Soviet arsenal and was predominantly Muslim, and Tehran offered it hundreds of millions of dollars for a bomb. Reports soon surfaced that three nuclear warheads were missing. This was confirmed and russian general Viktor Samoilov, who dealt with disarmament issues for General Staff... He admitted that three warheads had disappeared from Kazakhstan.

Meanwhile, Paul Muenstermann, then vice-president of the German Federal Intelligence Service, said Iran had received two of the three nuclear warheads, as well as medium-range nuclear weapons delivery vehicles from Kazakhstan. He also said that Iran acquired four 152mm nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, which were reportedly stolen and sold by former Red Army officers.

To make matters worse, a few years later, Russian officials said when comparing documents on the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia, they found a discrepancy of no less than 250 nuclear warheads.

Last week, Mathew Nasuti, a former U.S. Air Force captain who at one point was hired by the State Department as an advisor to one of the provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq, said that in March 2008, during a briefing on Iran at the State Department, a Middle East department expert told the crowd that it was "common knowledge" that Iran acquired tactical nuclear weapons from one or more of the former Soviet republics.

Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer, a seasoned Bronze Star rewarded intelligence officer ( military medal, an American military honor of courage, the fourth most important award in the US Armed Forces, established in February 1944 - approx. transl.), told me that his sources say that Iran now has two working nuclear warheads.

An editorial in the Iranian newspaper Kayhan, a newspaper directly overseen by the office of Iran's spiritual leader, warned last year that nuclear explosions in American cities would follow if Iran were attacked.

Despite the firm knowledge that Iranian leaders are seeking nuclear weapons, Western leaders have chosen the path of negotiation and appeasement in the hope of finding a solution to the Iranian issue. It has been about three years of the Obama administration's work, and we must admit that the policy of first a carrot in the form of goodwill and cooperation, and then a carrot in the form of sanctions, failed to convince the Iranians to abandon the nuclear program, and could not contain their aggressive positioning. Today, Iranian leaders, despite four sets of UN sanctions, continue to implement both their missile and nuclear enrichment programs, and they have enough enriched uranium to create six nuclear bombs, according to the latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ...

Iran and the proliferation of nuclear weapons

The future of Iranian-American relations depends, at least in the short term, on the resolution of a largely "technical" military problem. As I write these lines, a potentially epochal change is taking place in the region's military balance and psychological balance. This is due to the rapid evolution of Iran towards the status of a nuclear power during negotiations with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5 + 1). Remaining in the shadow of discussion of technical and scientific possibilities, this issue is in fact the focus of the international order, because it is about the ability of the international community to ensure compliance with justified requirements against a backdrop of truly sophisticated rejection, about the real willingness of the clerical regime to cooperate and about the prospects for a nuclear arms race. in the most volatile region of the world.

The traditional balance of power is based on military and industrial power. It can only be changed gradually - or through conquest. The current balance of power reflects the level of scientific development and may be threatened due to any developments in the territory of a single state. No conquest could have strengthened Soviet military power more than the desire to break the American nuclear monopoly of the late 1940s. Likewise, the proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot but affect the regional balance - and the international order - and result in a whole series of active counteractions.

For cold war the American leadership has built its international strategies in the context of the fearsome concept of mutual deterrence: we understood that nuclear war will entail sacrifices on a scale comparable to the death of humanity. In addition, the leadership was aware that a willingness to go to extremes - at least to a certain point - is essential if we do not want to allow the world to slide into ruthless totalitarianism. Containment within these "parallel nightmares" was possible because there were only two nuclear superpowers on the planet. Each has conducted comparable risk assessments of the use of nuclear weapons. But as soon as nuclear weapons began to spread throughout the world, the policy of containment began to turn into fiction, and the very concept of containment lost its meaning. IN modern world it is already very difficult to figure out who is holding whom and on what grounds.

Even if we assume that the "new" nuclear countries will carry out the same calculations of survivability as the USSR and the United States, with regard to military operations against each other - and this is a very dubious assumption - these countries are still capable of undermining the current international order, and immediately in several aspects. The complexity of protecting nuclear arsenals and installations (as well as creating complex warning systems, following the example of advanced nuclear states) increases the chances of unleashing a war - because of the temptation of a surprise attack and a preemptive strike. In addition, nuclear weapons can be used as a shield against extremist attacks. (And other nuclear powers cannot ignore atomic war at their borders.) Finally, the experience of "private" proliferation of nuclear weapons from the technically friendly Pakistan North Korea, Libya and Iran has the most serious consequences for the international order, as the proliferating country is not formally considered a rogue state.

There are three obstacles to overcome on the road to building its own nuclear capability: acquiring delivery systems, setting up production of fissile materials, and starting production of warheads. When it comes to delivery systems, there is a vast open market today with the main sellers being France, Russia and to some extent China; financial resources are required first of all. Iran has already acquired the original technology and can develop it at its own discretion. The technology for the production of warheads is also not a secret behind seven seals, and such production itself is relatively easy to hide from observers. Perhaps the best, if not the only, way to prevent the emergence of a new nuclear power is to intervene in the uranium enrichment process. A necessary element of this process is the use of centrifuges - devices that produce enriched uranium. (Enrichment of plutonium is also dangerous and is also being discussed in the relevant negotiations.)

To prevent the development of Iran's nuclear potential, the United States and other permanent members of the UN Security Council have been negotiating for over a decade (two administrations on both sides have changed). Six UN Security Council resolutions since 2006 have required Iran to end its uranium enrichment program. Three American presidents from both parties, all permanent members of the UN Security Council (including China and Russia) and Germany, the leadership of the International Atomic Energy Agency have all stated and continue to declare that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons is unacceptable and that Iran must immediately stop uranium enrichment. And for the sake of achieving this goal, no means are considered impermissible - according to two American presidents at once.

The stable development of the Iranian nuclear program is evident against the background of the gradual softening of the position of the West. When Iran ignored UN resolutions and built centrifuges, the West put forward a number of proposals, each time increasing the "degree of permitted" - it insisted that Iran completely stop uranium enrichment (2004), then allowed the production of low-enriched (LEU, less than 20%) uranium (2005 ), then suggested that Iran export most its LEU reserves, and France and Russia could produce fuel rods with 20% uranium (2009), then agreed to allow Iran to maintain sufficient LEU reserves to operate a research reactor - on the condition that Iran cease operations of the centrifuge complex at Fordow (2013) ... This complex was once considered a secret facility; after the discovery of the plant, the West stubbornly demanded its complete closure. Today, Western conditions admit that the operation of the complex can only be suspended, with guarantees that make it difficult to restart. In 2006, a P5 + 1 group was created to coordinate the positions of the international community, and its representatives demanded that Iran stop its nuclear program before negotiations began; in 2009, no one remembered this condition. In such a situation, Iran, of course, has not the slightest reason to perceive any initiative as final. Acting deftly and daringly, at each stage of the crisis, he showed less interest in compromise than the group of Western powers, and thus sought more and more concessions.

When negotiations began (2003), Iran had 130 centrifuges. At the time of this writing, the number of centrifuges has reached approximately 19,000 (only half in use). Before negotiations began, Iran had no way of fissioning uranium; in an interim agreement for November 2013, Iran admitted that it possesses 7 tons of low-enriched uranium (given the number of centrifuges in the country, this stock can be turned into weapons in a few months, and it will be enough to produce 7-10 bombs like the one that was dropped to Hiroshima). Yes, Iran has promised to eliminate about half of its reserves, but not directly: 20% uranium will only be converted into a form from which it can be easily restored to its original state, and Iran will have the capacity for this. In any case, with so many centrifuges, enrichment of up to 20 percent already seems insignificant, since uranium enriched to 5 percent (the threshold value given for reaching the negotiators) can be enriched to the desired degree in the same few months.

The points of view of representatives of both sides in the negotiations reflect different interpretations of the world order. The Iranians have actually openly declared that they will not abandon their chosen course, and they are not afraid of possible attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Western negotiators are convinced (and, while emphasizing their commitment to peace and diplomacy, periodically speak about it aloud), the consequences of a military attack on Iran are incomparable with the risks of further development of Iranian nuclear potential. Their arguments are backed up by the "mantra" of professionals: there is a way out of each impasse - a new proposal for which they are responsible. For the West, the main question is whether a diplomatic solution can be found or whether military action is required. In Iran, the nuclear program is seen as one of the points of the struggle for a new regional order and ideological domination, a struggle that is being conducted everywhere and everywhere, by means of peaceful and military means - from paramilitary operations to diplomacy, official negotiations, propaganda, political sabotage, and all these methods equally enhance the overall effect. In this context, the pursuit of an agreement should take into account the fact that Tehran will at least examine the chances of easing tensions in order to get rid of sanctions, but preserve the nuclear infrastructure and maximum freedom of action, and return to the implementation of the nuclear program later.

Under an interim agreement in November 2013, Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment in exchange for lifting some of the international sanctions imposed for violating UN Security Council resolutions. But since the agreement allowed Iran to continue enrichment for another six months, the agreement would expire by the time a permanent agreement should be ready. The practical consequences are obvious: the West de facto recognized the Iranian nuclear program and did not specify (as we said in our country) its scope.

Negotiations for a permanent agreement are ongoing. The conditions - or at least the possibility of their development - are still unknown, but it is clear that they, like many things in the Middle East, will affect the “red line”. Will Western negotiators (on behalf of the P5 + 1 group) insist that the restrictions will affect the enrichment process, as formulated in UN resolutions? This is an extremely difficult task. Iran will have to reduce the number of centrifuges to a level that matches the plausible numbers of a civilian nuclear program, and destroy or mothball the rest. Such an outcome, the actual abandonment of the military nuclear program, promises the prospect of a radical change in the West's relations with Iran, especially if the parties agree, in addition, to jointly fight against Sunni and Shiite violent extremism, which actively threatens the region.

Given the repeated statements by the supreme leader of Iran that Iran will not give up the capacity it already has - these statements were supported by their explanations a whole host of senior Iranian officials - the Iranians, apparently, intend to agree to abandon the production of warheads or to reduce the number of centrifuges to the minimum that allows, if necessary, to return to the implementation of the military nuclear program. Under such a scheme, Iran will demonstrate to the international community its loyalty to its leader's fatwa against the production of nuclear weapons (the text of this fatwa has not been published, and no one has seen it - only Iranian leaders); he is ready to commit himself to renouncing the creation of nuclear weapons and to allow inspectors to monitor the implementation of agreements. Of course, everything will depend on the amount of time it will take Iran to develop nuclear weapons after the violation of the agreements, if they can be signed. Iran managed to build two secret uranium enrichment complexes literally in the midst of international inspections, and therefore, when preparing an agreement, it is necessary to take into account the possibility of similar actions on its part in the future. And Iran cannot be left as a "virtual" nuclear power - after all, this country is capable of becoming nuclear much faster than any "non-nuclear" neighbor can prepare for such an option or any nuclear power can intervene.

Iran, with exceptional skill and dexterity, is realizing its proclaimed goal of undermining the state system in the Middle East and ousting the West from the region. It does not matter whether he creates and tests nuclear weapons in the near future or "simply" retains this possibility - the consequences of such an outcome for the regional and global orders are comparable. Even if Iran is satisfied with the potential chance to develop nuclear weapons, it will achieve it despite the most comprehensive international sanctions ever imposed on any country. Iran's geostrategic rivals, that is, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, will also begin to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, because the desire to catch up with Iran will become irresistible. The risk of an Israeli preemptive strike will increase significantly. As for Iran, by withstanding sanctions and building a nuclear arsenal, it will strengthen its credibility, intimidate its neighbors and exacerbate its ability to engage in traditional methods of warfare.

It was argued that a new approach to US-Iranian relations would be shaped by negotiations on the nuclear program, and this would compensate for the West's "retreat" from historical positions. Often reference is made to America's relationship with China, which evolved from hostility to mutual recognition and even cooperation over a relatively short period of time in the 1970s. Iran can be persuaded, as is sometimes said, not to brandish such a defiantly virtual nuclear "club" in exchange for goodwill and strategic cooperation with the United States.

The comparison, alas, is lame. China had forty-two Soviet divisions on its northern border after a decade of escalation of mutual enmity, and internal turmoil began. He had every reason to look for an "alternative" international system in which to gain a foothold. There are no such obvious reasons for cooperation in the West's relations with Iran. Over the past decade, Iran has seen the downfall of two of its greatest adversaries - the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq (ironically overthrown by the Americans) - and increased its influence and military presence in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. The two current main rivals for influence in the region, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are preoccupied with domestic problems, while Iran quickly overcame them (apparently successfully) by crushing opposition in the 2009 democratic uprising. Iran's leaders are received in an internationally respectable society, without requiring any significant changes in current policies, and Western companies were ready to invest in the country even during the sanctions period. Surprisingly, the rise of Sunni extremism along Iran's borders could make Tehran ponder. But it is equally likely that Tehran views the current strategic landscape as developing in its favor, and its revolutionary course as fully justified. Which option Iran chooses depends on its own preferences, and not on American perceptions.

Until now, Iran and the West have each put their own meaning in the very concept of negotiations. American and European negotiators were cautiously optimistic about the prospect of a nuclear deal and exercised the utmost restraint in public commentary in the hope of ensuring a favorable atmosphere - and Ayatollah Khamenei called nuclear negotiations part of an "eternal religious struggle" when negotiations are a form of battle and compromise is unacceptable. In May 2014, six weeks before the expiration of the interim agreement, Iran's supreme leader reportedly described negotiations on the nuclear program as follows:

“The reason we want to keep fighting is not because the Islamic leadership is militant. It just makes sense, sailing across a sea of \u200b\u200bpirates, to be fully equipped and ready and able to defend yourself.

In such circumstances, we have no choice but to continue the fight and let this fact determine our inner and foreign policy country. Those who seek compromise and want to surrender to the occupiers, accusing the Islamic Republic of fomenting war, are in fact committing treason.

All officials of the country, whether they are engaged in economics, science, culture, politics, law-making or foreign negotiations, must be aware that they are fighting and continue to fight for the creation and survival of the Islamic system ... Jihad will never end, because Satan and the Satanic front will exist forever. " ...

For nation states history plays the same role as character does to man. In the case of proud Iran with its rich history three periods can be distinguished, three interpretations of the international order. The policy of the state that existed before the Khomeini revolution was to protect its borders, respect the sovereignty of other countries and the desire to enter into unions - in fact, in pursuit of its own national interests within the framework of Westphalian principles. Imperial tradition places Iran at the center of the civilized world; the autonomy of neighboring countries in this case should be eradicated as far as possible. Finally, there is the jihadist Iran described above. Which of these traditions are current senior Iranian officials drawing inspiration from? If we believe that a radical change has occurred, what led to it? Is the conflict psychological or strategic? How will it be resolved - through a change in attitudes or a change in policy? If the latter, what kind of change should be sought? Can different views of the world order be reconciled? Or the world must wait until the fervor of the jihadists dies out, as it happened earlier in Ottoman Empire, due to the change in the dynamics of power and "home" priorities? The future of American-Iranian relations - and, perhaps, world peace depends on the answers to these questions.

The United States of America should be prepared to reach a geopolitical understanding with Iran based on Westphalian principles of non-intervention - and develop a compatible concept of regional order. Before the Khomeini revolution, Iran and the United States were de facto allies, and this alliance was based on a sober assessment of national interests, with the common sense of American presidents from both parties. Iranian and American national interests were perceived as coinciding. Both countries opposed the dominance in the region of the superpower, which at that time was the Soviet Union. Both have shown a desire to respect each other's sovereignty in their Middle East policies. Both supported the economic development of the region, even if only partial, “fragmentary”. From the American point of view, there is every reason to restore such relations. Tensions between Iran and the United States have arisen as a result of Tehran's acceptance of jihadist rhetoric and direct attacks on American interests and the international order.

How Iran synthesizes its complex heritage will depend largely on internal dynamics; in a country so culturally and politically complex, this dynamic looks unpredictable to outside observers and is not subject to external threats and persuasion. Whichever “face” Iran goes out into the world with, the fact remains: Iran has a choice. He must decide if he is a country or a territory. The United States should seek and encourage cooperation in every way. But the persistence and determination of Western negotiators - of course, necessary condition such an evolution is not enough to ensure the desired outcome. Iran's withdrawal from support for groups such as Hezbollah will be an important and fundamental step towards restoring constructive bilateral relations. The question is, does Iran see the chaos on its borders as a threat - or an opportunity to realize a millennial dream?

The United States must develop a strategic understanding of what is happening. Administration officials explaining the diminution of the American role in the Middle East argue about a balanced system of Sunni states (plus, perhaps, Israel) as a counterweight to Iran. Even if such an education actually arises, its viability is guaranteed only by an active American foreign policy... After all, the balance of power is not static, its constituent parts are in constant motion. The United States is needed as an arbiter and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is important for America to be closer to any of its rivals than they are to each other, and not to allow itself to be drawn into geopolitical games, especially in an extremist form. In pursuit of its own strategic goals, the United States can become a key factor - perhaps the only one - on the basis of which Iran will determine what to choose: the path of revolutionary Islam or the path of a great country, legitimate and operating under Westphalian principles. But America can only play this role if it stays and changes its mind about leaving.