One of the important issues that causes controversy among many researchers is how many people died in World War II... General identical data on the number of deaths from the German side and the side Soviet Union (the main opponents) will never be. Fatalities approximately - 60 million people,from all over the world.

This gives rise to many myths and unjustified rumors. Most of the dead are civilians who died during shelling of settlements, genocide, bombing, hostilities.

War is the greatest tragedy for humanity. Discussions about the consequences of this event continue to this day, although more than 75 years have passed. Indeed, more than 70% of the population took part in the war.

Why are there differences between the death toll? It's all about the difference in calculations, which are carried out by different methods, and information is obtained from different sources, and after all, how much time has passed ...

The history of the death toll

It is worth starting with the fact that the calculation of the amount of people killed began only during the period of publicity, that is, at the end of the 20th century. Until that time, no one had done this. The death toll could only be guessed at.

There were only the words of Stalin, who declared that 7 million people died in the Union during the war, and Khrushchev, who informed the Minister of Sweden about the losses of 20 million people in a letter.

For the first time, the total number of human losses was announced at a plenum dedicated to 45 years since the victory in the war (May 8, 1990). This figure was almost 27 million deaths.

Three years later, in a book called "The secrecy stamp has been removed. Losses of the armed forces ... "the results of the study were highlighted, during which 2 methods were used:

• accounting and statistical (analysis of documents of the Armed Forces);
• demographic balance (comparison of population at the beginning and after the end of hostilities)

The death of people in World War II according to Krivosheev:

One of the scientists who worked in a team, investigating the issue of the number of those killed in the war, was G. Krivosheev. Based on the results of his research, the following data were published:

1. The losses of the USSR during the Second World War (together with the civilian population) amounted to 26.5 million dead.
2. Germany's losses - 11.8 million.

This study also has critics, according to which Krivosheev did not take into account the 200,000 prisoners of war released by the German invaders after 1944 and some other facts.

There is no doubt that the war (which unfolded between the USSR and Germany and its companions) was one of the most bloody and terrifying in history. The whole horror consisted not only in the number of participating countries, but in the cruelty, ruthlessness, ruthlessness of peoples towards each other.

The soldiers had absolutely no compassion for the peaceful people. Therefore, the question of the number of people killed in World War II remains controversial even now.

For many years, military losses during the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War have been the subject of disputes and speculations. Moreover, the attitude towards these losses changes exactly the opposite. So, in the 70s, the propaganda apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU for some reason almost proudly broadcast about the heavy human losses of the USSR during the war. And not so much about the victims of the Nazi genocide, but about the combat losses of the Red Army. With completely incomprehensible pride, the propaganda "cant" was exaggerated about only three percent of the soldiers born in 1923 who survived the war. They enthusiastically broadcast about entire graduation classes, where all the young men went to the front and not one returned. Almost socialist competition was developed among rural areas, who have more villages, where all the men who went to the front died. Although, according to demographic statistics, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War there were 8.6 million men in 1919-1923. birth, and in 1949, during the All-Union census, there were 5.05 million of them alive, that is, the decrease in the male population of 1919-1923. births during this period amounted to 3.55 million people. Thus, if we assume that for each of the ages 1919-1923. there is an equal number of male population, then there were 1.72 million men of each year of birth. Then it turns out that the conscripts born in 1923 died 1.67 million people (97%), and the conscripts born in 1919-1922. births - 1.88 million people, i.e. about 450 thousand people from those born in each of these four years (about 27% of their total number). And this despite the fact that the servicemen of 1919-1922. births were the cadre Red Army, which took on the blow of the Wehrmacht in June 1941 and was almost completely burned out in the battles of the summer and autumn of the same year. This alone easily refutes all the speculations of the notorious "sixties" about the supposedly three percent of surviving front-line soldiers born in 1923.

During the "perestroika" and the so-called. "Reforms" the pendulum swung in the other direction. The inconceivable figures of 30 and 40 million servicemen who died during the war were enthusiastically cited, the notorious B. Sokolov, a doctor of philology, by the way, and not a mathematician, is especially zealous with statistical methods. The absurd ideas were voiced that Germany lost during the entire war only almost 100 thousand people killed, about a monstrous ratio of 1:14 dead German and soviet soldiers, etc. The statistical data on the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces, given in the reference book "The secrecy stamp has been removed", published in 1993, and in the fundamental work "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century (losses of the Armed Forces)", were categorically declared falsification. And according to the principle: since this does not correspond to someone's speculative concept of the Red Army's losses, it means falsification. At the same time, the enemy's losses were underestimated and underestimated in every possible way. With veal delight, numbers are announced that do not climb into any gate. So, for example, the losses of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf operational group during the German offensive near Kursk in July 1943 were cited in a total of 6,900 killed soldiers and officers and 12 burned out tanks. At the same time, wretched and ridiculous arguments were invented to explain why the practically preserved 100% combat capability tank army suddenly backed away: from the Allied landings in Italy, to the lack of fuel and spare parts, or even to the rains that had begun.

Therefore, the question of Germany's human losses during the Second World War is quite relevant. And, interestingly, in Germany itself, fundamental research on this issue is still lacking. There is only indirect information. When analyzing the losses of Germany during the Second World War, most researchers use the monograph by the German researcher B. Müller-Hillebrandt “The Land Army of Germany. 1933-1945 ". However, this historian resorted to outright falsification. So, indicating the number of conscripts in the Wehrmacht and SS troops, Müller-Hillebrand gave information only for the period from 06/01/1939 to 04/30/1945, modestly keeping silent about the contingents previously called up for military service. But by June 1, 1939, Germany had already deployed its armed forces for four years, and by June 1 of that year, the Wehrmacht had 3214.0 thousand people! Therefore, the number of men mobilized in the Wehrmacht and the SS in 1935-1945. takes on a different look (see table 1).

Thus, the total number of mobilized in the Wehrmacht and SS troops is not 17 893.2 thousand people, but about 21 107.2 thousand people, which immediately gives a completely different picture of Germany's losses during the Second World War.

Now let's turn to the actual losses of the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht had three different loss accounting systems:

1) along the channel "IIa" - military service;
2) through the channel of the health service;
3) through the channel of personal registration of losses in the territorial bodies of the list registration of military personnel in Germany.

But at the same time there was interesting feature - the losses of units and subunits were taken into account not in total, but according to their combat purpose. This was done in order for the Reserve Army to have comprehensive information about what contingents of servicemen need to be submitted to replenishment in each particular division. A reasonable enough principle, but today this method of accounting for the loss of personnel makes it possible to manipulate the numbers of German losses.

Firstly, the personnel losses of the so-called. "Combat strength" - Kampfwstaerke - and support units. So, in German infantry division of the 1944 staff, the "combat strength" was 7,160 people, the number of combat support and rear units was 5609 people, and the total number - Tagesstaerke - 12,769 people. In a tank division in 1944, the "combat strength" was 9307 people, the number of combat support and rear units was 5420 people, and the total number was 14 727 people. The "combat strength" of the active Wehrmacht army was approximately 40-45% of the total number of personnel. By the way, this makes it possible to very famously falsify the course of the war, when the total number of the Soviet troops at the front is indicated, and the German - only the combat. Like, signalmen, sappers, repairmen, they don't attack ...

Secondly, in the "combat strength" itself - Kampfwstaerke - there were separate units "directly leading the battle" - Gefechtstaerke. Infantry (motorized rifle, tank-grenadier) regiments, tank regiments and battalions, and reconnaissance battalions were considered to be units and subunits "directly fighting" within the divisions. Artillery regiments and divisions, anti-tank and anti-aircraft divisions belonged to combat support units. IN Air Force - Luftwaffe - "units directly leading the battle" were considered flight personnel, in the Naval Forces - Kriegsmarine - this category included the crew. And the accounting of the losses of the personnel of the "combat strength" was kept separately for the personnel "directly leading the battle" and for the personnel of the combat support units.

It is also interesting to note that only those killed directly on the battlefield were taken into account in combat losses, but servicemen who died from severe wounds during the evacuation stages were already included in the losses of the Reserve Army and were excluded from the total number of irrecoverable losses of the active army. That is, as soon as the injury was determined as requiring more than 6 weeks to heal, the Wehrmacht soldier was immediately transferred to the Reserve Army. And even if they did not have time to take him to the rear and he died near the front line, all the same, as an irrecoverable loss, he was already taken into account in the Reserve Army and from the number of combat irrecoverable losses of a particular front (Eastern, African, Western, etc.), this serviceman was excluded ... That is why in the account of the losses of the Wehrmacht appear almost only the killed and missing.

There was also one more specific feature of accounting for losses in the Wehrmacht. Czechs drafted into the Wehrmacht from the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Poles drafted into the Wehrmacht from the Poznan and Pomeranian regions of Poland, as well as the Alsatians and Lorraine through the channel of personal registration of losses in the territorial bodies of the list of German military personnel were not taken into account, since they did not belong to the so-called ... "Imperial Germans". In the same way, ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) who were drafted into the Wehrmacht from the occupied countries of Europe were not counted through the personal account. In other words, the losses of these categories of servicemen were excluded from the total account of the irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht. Although more than 1200 thousand people were drafted from these territories to the Wehrmacht and the SS, not counting the ethnic Germans - Volksdoches - of the occupied countries of Europe. From the ethnic Germans of Croatia, Hungary and the Czech Republic alone, six SS divisions were formed, not counting the large number of military police units.

The Wehrmacht also did not take into account the losses of auxiliary paramilitaries: the National Socialist Automobile Corps, Speer's Transport Corps, the Imperial Labor Service and the Todt Organization. Although the personnel of these formations were directly involved in supporting the hostilities, and at the final stage of the war, subunits and units of these auxiliary formations rushed into battle against Soviet troops on German territory. Often, the personnel of these formations were poured into the composition of the Wehrmacht formations directly at the front, but since this was not a replenishment sent through the Reserve Army, the centralized registration of this replenishment was not kept, and the combat loss of this personnel was not taken into account through the service channels of accounting for losses.

Separately from the Wehrmacht, a record was kept of the losses of the Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth, which were widely involved in participation in hostilities in East Prussia, East Pomerania, Silesia, Brandenburg, West Pomerania, Saxony and Berlin. Volkschurm and Hitler Youth were under the jurisdiction of the NSDAP. Often, the units of both the Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth were also directly at the front poured into the Wehrmacht units and formations as a replenishment, but for the same reason as with other paramilitary formations, the personal registration of this replenishment was not carried out.

Also, the Wehrmacht did not take into account the losses of the military-police units of the SS (primarily the Feljandarmerie), which fought against partisan movement, and at the final stage of the war they rushed into battle against units of the Red Army.

In addition, as part of the German troops, the so-called. "Volunteers" - Hilfswillige ("hivi", Hiwi), but the losses of this category of personnel in the total combat losses of the Wehrmacht were also not taken into account. It is necessary to dwell on the "volunteer helpers". These "assistants" were recruited from all countries of Europe and the occupied part of the USSR, in total in 1939-1945. up to 2 million people (including about 500 thousand people from the occupied territories of the USSR) joined the Wehrmacht and the SS as "volunteers". And although most of the Hiwi were service personnel of the rear structures and the commandant's offices of the Wehrmacht in the occupied territories, a significant part of them were directly part of the combat units and formations.

Thus, unscrupulous researchers excluded from the total number of irrecoverable losses in Germany big number lost personnel who were directly involved in hostilities, but not formally related to the Wehrmacht. Although auxiliary paramilitary formations, the Volkssturm, and "volunteer assistants" suffered losses during the battles, and these losses can rightfully be attributed to the combat losses of Germany.

Table 2 presented here attempts to bring together the numbers of both the Wehrmacht and the paramilitary forces of Germany, and roughly calculate the loss of personnel of the armed forces of Nazi Germany during the Second World War.

The number of German servicemen who were captured by the Allies and surrendered to them may be surprising, despite the fact that 2/3 of the Wehrmacht troops operated on the Eastern Front. The bottom line is that in the captivity of the Allies in the common cauldron, both the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS (designation of the SS field troops operating on the fronts of World War II), and the personnel of all kinds of paramilitary formations, Volkssturm, NSDAP functionaries, employees territorial divisions of the RSHA and police territorial formations, up to firefighters. As a result, the Allies numbered up to 4032.3 thousand prisoners of war, although the real number of prisoners of war from the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS was significantly lower than the Allies indicated in their documents - about 3000.0 thousand people, but in our We will use official data for calculations. In addition, in April-May 1945, German troops, fearing retribution for the atrocities committed on the territory of the USSR, rapidly retreated westward, seeking to surrender to the Anglo-American troops. Also, in late April - early May 1945, the formation of the Wehrmacht Reserve Army and all kinds of paramilitary formations, as well as police units, surrendered to the Anglo-American troops in droves.

Thus, it is clearly seen from the table that the total losses of the Third Reich on the Eastern Front in killed and dead from wounds, missing, dead in captivity reach 6071 thousand people.

However, as you know, not only German troops, foreign volunteers and paramilitary units of Germany fought against the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front, but also the troops of their satellites. It is also necessary to take into account the losses and "volunteers -" Hiwi ". Therefore, taking into account the losses of these categories of personnel, the overall picture of the losses of Germany and its satellites on the Eastern Front takes the picture shown in Table 3.

Thus, the total irrecoverable losses of Nazi Germany and its satellites on the Eastern Front in 1941-1945. reach 7 million 625 thousand people. If we take losses only on the battlefield, excluding those who died in captivity and the losses of "volunteer assistants", then the losses are: for Germany - about 5620.4 thousand people and for the satellite countries - 959 thousand people, in total - about 6579.4 thousands of people. Soviet losses on the battlefield amounted to 6885.1 thousand people. Thus, the losses of Germany and its satellites on the battlefield, taking into account all the factors, are only slightly less than the combat losses of the Soviet Armed Forces on the battlefield (about 5%), and no ratio of 1: 8 or 1:14 of the combat losses of Germany and its satellites the losses of the USSR are out of the question.

The figures given in the tables above, of course, are very approximate and have serious errors, but give, in a certain approximation, the order of losses of Nazi Germany and its satellites on the Eastern Front and during the war in general. At the same time, of course, if not for the inhuman treatment of Soviet prisoners of war by the Nazis, the total number of losses of Soviet servicemen would have been much lower. With an appropriate attitude towards Soviet prisoners of war, at least one and a half to two million people from among those who died in German captivity could have survived.

Nevertheless, a detailed and detailed study of the real human losses in Germany during the Second World War does not exist to this day, because there is no political order, and many data concerning the losses of Germany are still classified under the pretext that they can inflict "moral trauma" on the current German society (let it be better to remain happily unaware of how many Germans perished during the Second World War). Contrary to the popular picture of the domestic media in Germany, actively falsifying history. The main goal of these actions is to implement in public opinion ideas that in the war with the USSR, Nazi Germany was the defending side, and the Wehrmacht was the "vanguard of European civilization" in the fight against "Bolshevik barbarism." And there they actively extol the "brilliant" German generals, who held back the "Asian hordes of Bolsheviks" for four years, with minimal losses of German troops, and only the "twenty-fold numerical superiority of the Bolsheviks" who filled up the Wehrmacht with corpses broke the resistance of the "valiant" Wehrmacht soldiers. And the thesis is constantly being discussed that the "peaceful" German population died more than soldiers at the front, and most of dead civilian population allegedly accounted for eastern part Germany, where Soviet troops allegedly committed atrocities.

In the light of the problems discussed above, it is necessary to touch upon the clichés stubbornly imposed by pseudo-historians that the USSR won by "filling a German with the corpses of its soldiers." The USSR simply did not have that many human resources. On June 22, 1941, the population of the USSR was about 190-194 million people. Including the male population was about 48-49% - approximately 91-93 million people, of which men in 1891-1927. births were about 51-53 million people. We exclude about 10% of men unfit for military service even in war time, is about 5 million people. We exclude 18-20% of the “booked” - highly qualified specialists who are not subject to conscription - this is about 10 million more people. Thus, the conscription resource of the USSR was about 36-38 million people. This is what the USSR actually demonstrated by calling 34 476.7 thousand people into the Armed Forces. In addition, it should be borne in mind that a significant part of the conscript contingent remained in the occupied territories. And many of these people were either driven to Germany, or died, or embarked on the path of collaboration, and after the liberation of the Soviet troops from the occupied territories, much fewer people were drafted into the army (by 40-45%) than could have been drafted before the occupation. In addition, the economy of the USSR simply would not have survived if almost all men capable of carrying weapons - 48-49 million people - were drafted into the army. Then there would be no one to melt steel, produce T-34 and Il-2, raise bread.

To have in May 1945 the Armed Forces numbering 11 390.6 thousand people, to have 1046 thousand people to be treated in hospitals, to demobilize 3798.2 thousand people due to injuries and illnesses, to lose 4600 thousand people. captured and killed 26,400 thousand people, the Armed Forces should have mobilized just 48 632.3 thousand people. That is, with the exception of cripples completely unfit for military service, not a single man in 1891-1927. birth in the rear should not have remained! Moreover, given that some of the men of military age ended up in the occupied territories, and some worked in industrial enterprises, older and more younger ages... However, the mobilization of men born in 1891 was not carried out, as well as the mobilization of conscripts born in 1927. In general, the doctor of philology B. Sokolov would be engaged in the analysis of poetry or prose, perhaps, he would not become a laughing stock.

Returning to the losses of the Wehrmacht and the Third Reich as a whole, it should be noted that the issue of accounting for losses there is quite interesting and specific. So, very interesting and noteworthy are the data on the losses of armored vehicles given by B. Müller-Hillebrandt. For example, in April-June 1943, when there was a lull on the Eastern Front, and the fighting was only in North Africa1019 tanks and assault guns were considered as irrecoverable losses. Moreover, by the end of March, the Africa Army had barely 200 tanks and assault guns, and in April and May, at most 100 armored vehicles were delivered to Tunisia. Those. in North Africa in April and May, the Wehrmacht could have lost at most 300 tanks and assault guns. Where did the other 700-750 lost armored vehicles come from? Were secret tank battles on the Eastern Front going on? Or in Yugoslavia, the Wehrmacht's tank army found its end these days?

Similarly, the loss of armored vehicles in December 1942, when there were fierce tank battles on the Don, or losses in January 1943, when the German troops were rolling back from the Caucasus, abandoning equipment, Müller-Hillebrand results in only 184 and 446 tanks and assault guns. But in February-March 1943, when the Wehrmacht launched a counteroffensive in Donbass, the losses of the German armored vehicles suddenly reached 2,069 units in February and 759 units in March. It should be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht was advancing, the battlefield remained behind german troops, and all armored vehicles damaged in battles were delivered to the tank repair units of the Wehrmacht. In Africa, the Wehrmacht could not bear such losses, by the beginning of February the "Africa" \u200b\u200barmy consisted of no more than 350-400 tanks and assault guns, and in February-March received only about 200 armored vehicles for replenishment. Those. even if all german tanks in Africa, the losses of the "Africa" \u200b\u200barmy in February-March could not exceed 600 units, the remaining 2228 tanks and assault guns were lost on the Eastern Front. How could this happen? Why did the Germans lose five times more tanks in the offensive than in the retreat, although the experience of the war shows that the opposite is always the case?

The answer is simple: in February 1943, Field Marshal Paulus' 6th German Army surrendered in Stalingrad. And the Wehrmacht had to transfer to the list of irrecoverable losses all armored vehicles, which he had long lost in the Don steppes, but continued to be modestly listed in the mid-term and long-term repairs in the 6th Army.

It is impossible to explain why, gnawing deeply echeloned, saturated anti-tank artillery and tanks defended the Soviet troops near Kursk in July 1943, German troops lost fewer tanks than in February 1943, when they launched counterstrikes against the troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts stretched out in line. Even if we assume that in February 1943, German troops lost 50% of their tanks in Africa, it is difficult to assume that in February 1943 in Donbass small Soviet troops were able to knock out more than 1000 tanks, and in July near Belgorod and Orel - only 925.

It is no coincidence that for a long time, when the documents of the German "panzerdivisions" were seized in the "boilers", serious questions arose, where did german technologyif no one broke out of the encirclement ring, and the number of abandoned and broken equipment does not in any way correspond to what is written in the documents. Each time, the Germans had significantly fewer tanks and assault guns than were listed according to the documents. It was only by the middle of 1944 that they realized that the real composition of the German tank divisions must be determined by the "combat-ready" column. Situations often arose when there were more “dead tank souls” in German tank and tank-grenadier divisions than there were actually available combat-ready tanks and assault guns. And the burned-out, with towers rolled on one side, with gaping gaps in the armor, tanks stood in the yards of tank repair enterprises, on paper moving from cars of one repair category to another, waiting either to be sent to be melted down, or they were captured by Soviet troops. But German industrial corporations at this time were quietly "sawing" the finances allocated for allegedly long-term repairs or repairs "with sending to Germany." In addition, if in Soviet documents it was immediately and clearly indicated that an irretrievably lost tank had burned out or was broken so that it could not be restored, then in the German documents only a knock-out unit or unit (engine, transmission, chassis) was indicated, or it was indicated location of combat damage (hull, turret, bottom, etc.). At the same time, even a tank completely burnt out from a shell hit in the engine compartment was listed as having engine damage.

If we analyze the data on the losses of the "Royal Tigers" from the same B. Müller-Gillebrandt, an even more striking picture emerges. In early February 1945, the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS had 219 Pz. Kpfw. VI Ausf. B "Tiger II" ("Royal Tiger"). By this time, 417 tanks of this type were produced. And lost, according to Muller-Hillebrandt, - 57. Total difference between produced and lost tanks - 350 units. Available - 219. Where did 131 cars go? And that's not all. According to the same retired general, in August 1944 there were no lost "King Tigers" at all. And many other researchers of the history of the Panzerwaffe also find themselves in an awkward position, when almost all indicate that the German troops recognized the loss of only 6 (six) Pz at Sandomierz. Kpfw. VI Ausf. B "Tiger II". But then what about the situation when near the town of Shidluv and the village of Oglendów near Sandomierz, Soviet trophy groups and special groups from the armored directorate of the 1st Ukrainian Front were thoroughly studied and described with the indication of the serial numbers of 10 knocked out and burned and 3 fully operational "Royal Tigers" ? It remains only to assume that, standing within the line of sight of the German troops, knocked out and burned down "Royal Tigers", were listed by the Wehrmacht in their long-term repairs under the pretext that theoretically these tanks could be recaptured during a counterattack and then returned to service. Original logic, but nothing else comes to mind.

According to B. Müller-Hillebrandt, by February 1, 1945, 5840 were produced heavy tanks Pz. Kpfw. V "Panther" ("Panther"), lost - 3059 units, there were 1964 units in stock. If we take the difference between the produced "Panthers" and their losses, the remainder is 2781 units. There was the same, as already indicated - 1964 units. At the same time, the tanks "Panther" were not transferred to the satellites of Germany. Where did the 817 units go?

With tanks Pz. Kpfw. IV is exactly the same picture. Produced by February 1, 1945, these machines, according to Muller-Hillebrandt, 8428 units, lost - 6151, the difference is 2277 units, there were on February 1, 1945 - 1517 units. No more than 300 vehicles of this type were transferred to the Allies. Thus, up to 460 cars are unaccounted for, which disappeared into no one knows where.

Tanks Pz. Kpfw. III. Produced - 5681 units, lost by February 1, 1945 - 4808 units, the difference is 873 units, there were 534 tanks on the same date. No more than 100 units were handed over to the satellites, so about 250 tanks disappeared from the register.

All in all, more than 1,700 tanks "Royal Tiger", "Panther", Pz. Kpfw. IV and Pz. Kpfw. III.

Paradoxically, so far none of the attempts to deal with the irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht in technology have been crowned with success. No one was able to expand in detail by months and years, what real irrecoverable losses were borne by the Panzerwaffe. And all because of the peculiar method of "accounting" for losses of military equipment in the German Wehrmacht.

Likewise, in the Luftwaffe, the existing method of accounting for losses made it possible for a long time to count in the "repair" column shot down, but fallen on its territory, aircraft. Sometimes even a smashed plane that fell in the location of German troops was not immediately included in the lists of irrecoverable losses, but was considered damaged. All this led to the fact that in the squadrons of the Luftwaffe up to 30-40%, and even more, the equipment was constantly listed as not combat-ready, smoothly moving from the category of damaged to the category to be written off.

One example: when in July 1943, on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, pilot A. Gorovets shot down 9 Ju-87 dive bombers in one battle, the Soviet infantry surveyed the crash sites of the Junkers and provided detailed data on the downed aircraft: tactical and serial numbers, data on dead crew members, etc. However, the Luftwaffe acknowledged the loss of only two dive bombers that day. How could this happen? The answer is simple: by the evening of the day air combat the territory where the Luftwaffe bombers fell was occupied by German troops. And the downed planes ended up in German-controlled territory. And of the nine bombers, only two crumbled in the air, the rest fell, but retained their relative integrity, although they were twisted. And the Luftwaffe, with a clear conscience, attributed the downed aircraft to the number of those only received combat damage. Surprisingly, this is a real fact.

And in general, considering the issue of losses of Wehrmacht equipment, it must be borne in mind that huge money was made on the repair of equipment. And when it came to the financial interests of the financial and industrial oligarchy, the entire repressive apparatus of the Third Reich stood at attention. The interests of industrial corporations and banks were held sacred. Moreover, most of the Nazi bosses had their own selfish interests in this.

One more specific point should be noted. Contrary to popular belief about the pedantry, accuracy and scrupulousness of the Germans, the Nazi elite understood perfectly well that a complete and accurate accounting of losses could become a weapon against them. After all, there is always a possibility that information about the true scale of losses will fall into the hands of the enemy and will be used in a propaganda war against the Reich. Therefore, in Nazi Germany they turned a blind eye to the confusion in the accounting of losses. At first, there was a calculation that the winners are not judged, then it became a deliberate policy in order not to give the winners in the event of a complete defeat of the Third Reich arguments for exposing the scale of the disaster to the German people. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that at the final stage of the war, a special erasure of the archives was carried out in order not to give the winners additional arguments in the case of accusing the leaders of the Nazi regime of crimes not only against other peoples, but also against their own, German. After all, the death of several million young men in a senseless slaughter for the sake of the implementation of delusional ideas about world domination is a very weighty argument for the prosecution.

Therefore, the true scale of human losses in Germany during the Second World War is still waiting for its scrupulous researchers, and then very interesting facts may open before them. But on condition that these are conscientious historians, and not all kinds of corned beef, mlechin, Svanidze, Afanasyevs, Gabriilpopovs and Sokolovs. Paradoxically, the commission for countering the falsification of history has more work to do within Russia than outside of it.

In 1993, after the collapse of the USSR, the first public Soviet statistics of losses during World War II appeared, created under the leadership of General Grigory Krivosheev on the orders of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Here is an article by the St. Petersburg amateur historian Vyacheslav Krasikov about what the Soviet military leader's genius actually calculated.

The topic of Soviet losses in World War II still remains taboo in Russia, primarily due to the unwillingness of society and the state to look at this problem in an adult way. The only "statistical" study on this topic is the work published in 1993 entitled "The classification is removed: Losses of the USSR Armed Forces in wars, hostilities and military conflicts." In 1997, the English-language edition of the study was published, and in 2001, the second edition of "Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Military Operations and Military Conflicts" appeared.

If you do not pay attention to the shamefully late appearance in general of statistics on Soviet losses (almost 50 years after the end of the war), the work of Krivosheev, who headed the team of employees of the Ministry of Defense, was a big furor in the scientific world did not produce (of course, for the post-Soviet autochthons, it became a balm for the soul, since it brought Soviet losses on a par with German ones). One of the main sources of data for the team of authors under the leadership of Krivosheev is the General Staff fund in the central archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (TsAMO), which is still classified, and where access to researchers is closed. That is, it is objectively impossible to verify the accuracy of the work of military archivists. For this reason, in the West, the scientific community, which has been dealing with the problems of losses in World War II for almost 60 years, reacted coolly to the work of Krivosheev and they simply did not even notice it.

In Russia, there have been repeated attempts to criticize Grigory Krivosheev's research - critics reproached the general for methodological inaccuracies, the use of unverified and unproven data, purely arithmetic inconsistencies, and so on. As an example, you can see. We want to offer our readers not so much another criticism of Krivosheev's work itself, but an attempt to put into circulation new, additional data (for example, party and Komsomol statistics), which will shed more light on the size of the total Soviet losses. Perhaps this will contribute to their further gradual approach to reality and the development of a normal, civilized scientific discussion in Russia. The article by Vyacheslav Krasikov, which contains all the links, can be downloaded in full. All scans of the books he links to are

Soviet historiography: how many are unforgotten?

After the war, civilized countries usually comprehend the course of battles, subjecting them to critical discussion in the light of the enemy's documents that have become available. Such work, of course, requires maximum objectivity. Otherwise, it is simply impossible to draw the right conclusions so as not to repeat past mistakes. However, the works that were published in the USSR in the first post-war decade cannot be called historical research even with great stretch. They consisted mainly of clichés on the inevitability of victory under the leadership of the Bolshevik party, the initial superiority of Soviet military art and the genius of Comrade Stalin. Memoirs during the lifetime of the "leader of the peoples" were almost never published, and the little that came out of print looked more like fantastic literature. In such a situation, the censorship had no serious work to do. Unless to identify those who are not diligent enough in the work of worship. Therefore, this institution turned out to be completely unprepared for the surprises and metamorphoses of Khrushchev's hectic "thaw".

However, the information explosion of the 50s is not the merit of Nikita Sergeevich alone. The above described blissful idyll was destroyed by banal human ambition.

The fact is that in the West the process of comprehending the recent hostilities proceeded in a normal civilized way. The generals talked about their achievements and shared smart thoughts with the public. The Soviet military elite, of course, also wanted to participate in such an interesting and exciting process, but the "Kremlin highlander" did not like this kind of activity. But after March 1953, this obstacle disappeared. As a result, the Soviet censorship was immediately ordered to publish translations of some works on the Second World War, written by former opponents and allies. In this case, they limited themselves to only cuts of particularly unpleasant pages and editorial comments that helped Soviet readers to "correctly" understand the work of foreigners "prone to falsification". But when, after this, a large number of their own gold-run authors were allowed to publish their memoirs, the process of "comprehension" finally got out of control. And led to completely unexpected results for its initiators. Many events and figures became public knowledge, which, complementing and clarifying each other, formed a completely different mosaic than the previous picture of the war. Just one threefold increase in the official figure of the total losses of the USSR from 7 to 20 million people.

Of course, the writers themselves understood "what's what" and tried to keep silent about their own failures. But something was reported about such moments in the combat path of former associates. In this connection, there were also side effects. Such as the public scandal with written complaints against each other in the Central Committee of the CPSU of Marshals Zhukov and Chuikov, who did not share the victory laurels. In addition, any seemingly pleasant fact can destroy the myth that has been created over the years in one fell swoop. For example, the information that was flattering to high-ranking "home front workers" that Soviet industry was constantly producing more equipment than German, inevitably cast doubt on the general's bragging about victories "not by number, but by skill."

Thus, military-historical science has made, on the scale of the Soviet Union, a giant step forward. After that, it became impossible to return to Stalinist times. Nevertheless, with the coming to power of Brezhnev, they again tried to streamline matters in the field of coverage of the events of the Great Patriotic War.

Thus, by the mid-1980s, the intellectual environment of the Russian historiography of World War II was finally formed. Most of the specialists who are developing this topic today are nourished by its traditions. It cannot, of course, be said that all historians continue to cling to the stereotypes of "the times of Ochakov and the conquest of Crimea." Suffice it to recall the "perestroika" euphoria of revelations, which ended in a grandiose scandal in 1991, when, to appease the generals from history, who literally went into "protective" hysteria, the editorial board was purged with a new 10-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War", since its authors wanted to rise to objective analysis carried out according to Western scientific standards. As a result, the “rootless cosmopolitans” were excommunicated from the archives, as well as the corresponding organizational conclusions. Head of the Institute military history General DA Volkogonov was relieved of his post, and most of his young assistants were dismissed from the army. Control over the work on the preparation of the 10-volume edition was tightened, for which the tried and tested marshals and generals were involved in it. Nevertheless, a fairly large amount of statistical information on this topic during the post-war decades managed to break through the archival doors. Let's try to systematize it.

Official Soviet figures

If we closely follow the history of how the “numerical equivalents” of the victims of World War II changed in the USSR, we will immediately find that these changes were not in the nature of disorderly digital chaos, but obeyed an easily traceable relationship and strict logic.

Until the end of the 80s of the last century, this logic boiled down to the fact that propaganda, albeit very, very slowly, gradually gave way to science - albeit overly ideologized, but based on archival materials. Therefore, Stalin's 7,000,000 total military losses of the USSR under Khrushchev turned into 20,000,000, under Brezhnev in "more than 20,000,000", and under Gorbachev in "more than 27,000,000". The figures of the losses of the Armed Forces danced in the same direction. As a result, already in the early 60s, it was officially recognized that more than 10,000,000 soldiers died at the front alone (not counting those who did not return from captivity). In the 70s of the last century, the figure “more than 10,000,000 killed at the front” (not counting those killed in captivity) became generally accepted. She was quoted in the most authoritative publications of the time. As an example, suffice it to recall the article by Colonel-General of the Medical Service E.I. Smirnov, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, published in the collection, which was prepared jointly by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and saw the light in the publishing house Science ".

By the way, in the same year another "landmark" book was presented to the readers' judgment - "The Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", where the numbers of army losses and Red Army soldiers killed in captivity were published. For example, in German concentration camps alone, up to 7 million civilians (?) And up to 4 million Red Army prisoners perished, which gives a total of up to 14 million Red Army soldiers (10 million at the front and 4 million in captivity). Here, apparently, it is also appropriate to remind that at that time in the USSR each such figure was official-state - it necessarily passed through the strictest censorship "sieve" - \u200b\u200bit was repeatedly checked and often reproduced in various reference and information publications.

In principle, in the USSR in the 70s, in fact, it was recognized that the losses of the army who died at the front and in captivity in 1941-1945 amounted to approximately 16,000,000 - 17,000,000 people. True, the statistics were published in a somewhat veiled form.

Here in the 1st volume of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (article "Combat losses") it says: " So, if in the 1st world war about 10 million people were killed and died from wounds, then in the 2nd world war only the losses killed at the fronts amounted to 27 million people". These are precisely army losses, since the total number of those killed in World War II in the same publication is determined at 50 million people.

If we subtract from these 27,000,000 losses of the Armed Forces of all participants in the Second World War, except for the USSR, then the remainder will be about 16-17 million. It is these figures that are recognized in the USSR as the number of soldiers killed (at the front and in captivity). It was then possible to count “everyone except the USSR” using Boris Urlanis’s book “Wars and the Population of Europe”, which was first published in the Union in 1960. Now it is easy to find it on the Internet under the title "History of War Loss".

All of the above statistics on army losses were repeatedly reproduced in the USSR until the end of the 80s. But in 1990, the Russian General Staff published the results of its own new "refined" calculations of irrecoverable army losses. Surprisingly, they somehow mysteriously turned out not more than the previous "stagnant" ones, but less. Moreover, less cool - almost in 2 times... Specifically - 8 668 400 people. The answer to the puzzle is simple - during the period of Gorbachev's perestroika, history was once again politicized to the limit, becoming a propaganda tool. And the "big stripes" from the Ministry of Defense decided to improve the "patriotic" statistics in this manner "on the sly".

Therefore, no explanation for such a strange arithmetic metamorphosis followed. On the contrary, soon these 8,668,400 (again, without explanation) were “detailed” in the “Secrecy Discontinued” handbook, which was then supplemented and republished. And what is most striking - the Soviet figures were instantly forgotten - they simply quietly disappeared from the books published under the patronage of the state. But the question to the logical absurdity of such a situation remains:

It turns out that in the USSR for 3 decades they tried to "blacken" one of their most important accomplishments - the victory over Nazi Germany - they pretended that they fought worse than they actually did and published for this false data on army losses, overestimated by two times.

And the real "beautiful" statistics were kept under the heading "secret" ...

A secrecy stamp that eats the dead

Analyzing all the amazing data of Krivosheev's "research", you can write several solid monographs. Various authors are most often carried away by examples of parsing the results of individual operations. These are, of course, good visual illustrations. However, they question only partial figures - against the background of general losses, they are not very large.

Krivosheev hides the bulk of his losses among the “re-called”. In the "Vulture of secrecy" he indicates their number as "more than 2 million", and in "Russia in the wars" he generally throws out from the text of the book an indication of the number of this category of conscripts. He simply writes that the total number of mobilized people is 34,476,700 - excluding those recruited again. The exact number of re-conscripts - 2,237,000 people - was named by Krivosheev in only one article published in a small-circulation collection sixteen years ago.

Who are Re-called? This, for example, when a person was seriously wounded in 1941 and after a long treatment was "written off" from the army "for health." But, when in the second half of the war, human resources were already coming to an end, the medical requirements were revised and lowered. As a result, the man was again recognized as fit for service and drafted into the army. And in 1944 he was killed. Thus, Krivosheev takes this person into account in the mobilized only once. But from the ranks of the army he “takes out” twice - first as a disabled person, and then as a killed person. Ultimately, it turns out that one of the "withdrawn" is hiding from the account in the amount of total irrecoverable losses.

Another example. The man was mobilized, but soon transferred to the NKVD troops. A few months later, this part of the NKVD was transferred back to the Red Army (for example, on the Leningrad Front in 1942, an entire division was transferred from the NKVD to the Red Army at once - they simply changed the number). But Krivosheyev takes this soldier into account in the initial transfer from the army to the NKVD, but does not notice the return transfer from the NKVD to the Red Army (since those recruited from him are excluded from the list of mobilized). Therefore, it turns out that the person is again "hidden" - in the army of the post-war period, in fact, is, and Krivosheev is not taken into account.

Another example. The man was mobilized, but in 1941 he disappeared without a trace - he remained surrounded and "got accustomed" to the civilian population. In 1943, this territory was liberated, and the "Primak" was again drafted into the army. However, in 1944 his leg was blown off. As a result, disability and write-off "clean". Krivosheev subtracts this person from 34,476,700 as many as three times - first as a missing person, then among 939,700, called up in the former occupied territory of the encircled people, and also as a disabled person. It turns out that it "hides" two losses.

It can take a long time to list all the tricks used in the reference book to "improve" statistics. But it is much more productive to recalculate the figures that Krivosheev proposes as baselines ourselves. But to count in normal logic - without "patriotic" craftiness. To do this, we will again turn to the statistics that the general indicated in the already mentioned small-circulation collection of losses.

Then we get:
4.826.900 - the number of the Red Army and the RKKF on June 22, 1941.
31.812.200 - The number of mobilized (together with re-called) for the entire war.
In total - 36,639,100 people.

After the end of hostilities in Europe (at the beginning of June 1945), there were 12,839,800 people in the Red Army and the RKKF (along with the wounded in hospitals). From here you can find out the total losses: 36.639.100 - 12.839.800 \u003d 23.799.300

Next, let's count those who, for various reasons, left the Armed Forces of the USSR alive, but not at the front:
3.798.200 - charged for health reasons.
3.614.600 - transferred to industry, MPVO and VOKHR.
1.174.600 - transferred to the NKVD.
250.400 - transferred to the allied army.
206,000 - expelled as unreliable.
436.600 - convicted and sent to places of detention.
212.400 - no deserters found.
Total - 9.692.800

Let's subtract these "living" ones from the total losses and thus find out how many people died at the front and in captivity, and were also freed from captivity in the last weeks of the war.
23.799.300 – 9.692.800 = 14.106.500

To establish the final number of demographic losses incurred by the Armed Forces, it is necessary to subtract from 14,106,500 those who returned from captivity, but did not get into the army again. Krivosheev deducts 1,836,000 people registered by the repatriation authorities for a similar purpose. This is another trick. In the collection "War and Society" prepared by the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Institute russian history published an article by V. N. Zemskov, "Repatriation of Displaced Soviet Citizens", which reveals in detail all the constituent figures of prisoners of war of interest to us.

It turns out that 286,299 prisoners were released on the territory of the USSR before the end of 1944. Of these, 228,068 people were re-mobilized into the army. And in 1944-1945 (during the period of hostilities outside the USSR), 659,190 people were released and mobilized into the army. Simply put, they have already been taken into account among the re-called.

That is, 887.258 (228.068 + 659.190) former prisoners at the beginning of June 1945 were among the 12.839.800 souls who served in the Red Army and the RKKF. Consequently, from 14,106,500, it is necessary to deduct not 1.8 million, but approximately 950,000 freed from captivity, but not mobilized a second time into the army during the war.

As a result, we get no less than 13,150,000 soldiers of the Red Army and the Red Army, who died in 1941-1945 at the front, were taken prisoner and were among the "defectors". However, this is not all. Krivosheev also "hides" the losses (killed, died in captivity and defectors) among those written off for health reasons. Here, "The classification has been removed" p. 136 (or "Russia in the wars ..." p. 243). In the figure of 3.798.158 discharged disabled people, he also takes into account those who were sent on leave for injury. In other words, people did not leave the army - in fact, they were included in its ranks, and the reference book excludes them and thus “hides” at least several hundred thousand killed.

That is, if we proceed from the figures that Krivosheev himself proposes as the initial basis for calculations, but to handle them without generals' tampering, then we will get not 8,668,400 dead at the front, in captivity and "defectors", but about 13,500. 000.

Through the prism of party statistics

However, the data on the number of those mobilized in 1941-1945, which Krivosheev declared as the "base" figures for calculating losses, also seem to be underestimated. A similar conclusion suggests itself if you check the directory with information from the official statistics of the CPSU (b) and the Komsomol. These calculations are much more accurate than army reports, since in the Red Army people often did not even have documents and even posthumous medallions (the Interpreter's blog partially touched upon the related topic of tokens in the Red Army). And the Communists and Komsomol members were taken into account incomparably better. Each of them necessarily had a party card in hand, regularly participated in party meetings, the minutes of which (indicating the number of the "cell") were sent to Moscow.

These data went separately from the army data - along a parallel party line. And this figure in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev USSR was published much more willingly - the censorship treated it more leniently - as indicators of ideological victories, where even losses were perceived as proof of the unity of society and the people's devotion to the socialist system.

The essence of the calculation boils down to the fact that the losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in terms of the Komsomol and Communists are known quite accurately. In total, by the beginning of the war in the USSR, there were a little less than 4,000,000 members of the CPSU (b). Of these, 563,000 were in the Armed Forces. During the war years, 5,319,297 people joined the party. And immediately after the end of hostilities, about 5,500,000 people were in its ranks. Of which 3,324,000 served in the Armed Forces.

That is, the total losses of the members of the CPSU (b) amounted to more than 3,800,000 people. Of which about 3,000,000 died at the front in the ranks of the Armed Forces. In total, about 6,900,000 communists (out of 9,300,000 in the party during the same period of time) passed through the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1941-1945. This figure consists of 3,000,000 killed at the front, 3,324,000 who were in the Armed Forces immediately after the end of hostilities in Europe, as well as about 600,000 disabled people who were discharged from the Armed Forces in 1941-1945.

It is very useful here to pay attention to the ratio of the killed and disabled people 3.000.000 to 600.000 \u003d 5: 1. And Krivosheev has 8.668.400 to 3.798.000 \u003d 2.3: 1. This is a very eloquent fact. We repeat once again that Party members were taken into account incomparably more thoroughly than non-Party members. They were required to be issued a party card, in each unit (up to the company level) its own party cell was organized, which took into account each newly arrived party member. Therefore, the party statistics were much more accurate than the usual army statistics. And the difference in this very accuracy is clearly illustrated by the ratio between the killed and the disabled among non-party people and communists in official Soviet figures and in Krivosheev's.

Now let's move on to the Komsomol members. As of June 1941, the Komsomol had 1,926,000 people from the Red Army and the RKKF. Still, at least several tens of thousands of people were registered in the Komsomol organizations of the NKVD troops. Therefore, it can be assumed that by the beginning of the war, there were about 2,000,000 Komsomol members in the USSR Armed Forces.

More than 3,500,000 Komsomol members were drafted into Military establishment during the war years. In the Armed Forces themselves, over 5,000,000 people were accepted into the ranks of the Komsomol during the war years.

That is, in total, more than 10,500,000 people passed through the Komsomol in the Armed Forces in 1941-1945. 1,769,458 of them joined the CPSU (b). Thus, it turns out that in total no less than 15.600.000 Communists and Komsomol members passed through the Armed Forces in 1941-1945 (about 6.900.000 Communists + more than 10.500.000 Komsomol members - 1.769.458 Komsomol members who joined the CPSU (b)).

This is approximately 43% of the 36,639,100 people who, according to Krivosheev, passed through the Armed Forces during the war years. However, the official Soviet statistics of the 60-80s do not confirm this ratio. It states that at the beginning of January 1942, there were 1,750,000 Komsomol members and 1,234,373 Communists in the Armed Forces. This is slightly more than 25% of the total armed forces, which numbered about 11.5 million people (including the wounded who were being treated).

Even twelve months later, the share of Communists and Komsomol members was no more than 33%. At the beginning of January 1943, there were 1,938,327 Communists and 2,200,200 Komsomol members in the Armed Forces. That is, 1,938,327 + 2,200,000 \u003d 4,150,000 Communists and Komsomol members from the Armed Forces, which had approximately 13,000,000 people.

13,000,000, since Krivosheev himself claims that since 1943 the USSR has supported the army at the level of 11,500,000 people (plus about 1,500,000 in hospitals). In mid-1943, the share of communists and non-party people did not increase very noticeably, reaching only 36% in July. At the beginning of January 1944, there were 2,702,566 communists and about 2,400,000 Komsomol members in the Armed Forces. I have not yet found a more accurate figure, but in December 1943 it was exactly 2,400,000 - the highest number in the entire war. That is, in January 1943 there could be no more. It turns out - 2.702.566 + 2.400.000 \u003d about 5.100.000 Communists and Komsomol members from the army of 13.000.000 people - about 40%.

At the beginning of January 1945, there were 3,030,758 communists and 2,202,945 Komsomol members in the Armed Forces. That is, at the beginning of 1945, the share of communists and Komsomol members (3,030,758 + 2,202,945) of the army was about 13,000,000 people, again about 40%. It is also pertinent to recall here that the bulk of the losses of the Red Army and the RKKF (respectively, the number of those mobilized to replace them) fell on the first year and a half of the war, when the share of the CPSU (b) and the Komsomol was less than 33%. That is, it turns out that the average share of communists and Komsomol members in the Armed Forces during the war was no more than 35%. In other words, if we take as a basis the total number of Communists and Komsomol members (15,600,000), then the number of people who passed through the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1941-1945 will amount to approximately 44,000,000. And not 36.639.100, as indicated by Krivosheev. The total losses will increase accordingly.

By the way, the total losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR for 1941-1945 can also be roughly calculated if we start off from the official Soviet data on losses among communists and Komsomol members, published in the 60-80s. They say that the army organizations of the CPSU (b) lost about 3,000,000 people. And the Komsomol organization is about 4,000,000 people. In other words, 35% of the army lost 7,000,000. Consequently, the entire Armed Forces lost about 19,000,000 - 20,000,000 souls (killed at the front, perished in captivity and became "defectors").

1941 losses

Analyzing the dynamics of the number of communists and Komsomol members in the Armed Forces, one can quite clearly calculate the Soviet front-line losses over the years of the war. They are also at least two times (more often more than two) higher than the data published in the Krivosheevsky reference book.

For example, Krivosheev reports that in June-December 1941 the Red Army irrevocably lost (killed, missing, dead from wounds and diseases) 3,137,673 people. This figure is easy to verify. The encyclopedia "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" reports that by June 1941, there were 563,000 communists in the army and navy. It is further indicated that in the first six months of the war, over 500,000 members of the CPSU (b) were killed. And that on January 1, 1942, there were 1,234,373 party members in the army and navy.

How do you know what meaning is hidden under "above"? In the twelfth volume of "History of the Second World War 1939-1945" it is stated that in the first six months of the war, more than 1,100,000 communists joined the army and naval organizations from "civilian life". It turns out: 563 (on June 22) + "more" 1,100,000 (mobilized) \u003d "more" 1.663,000 communists.
Further. In the sixth volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" from the plate "Numerical growth of the party" you can find out that military party organizations admitted 145,870 people to their ranks in July-December 1941.

It turns out: "More" 1.663.000 + 145.870 \u003d "more" 1.808.870 communists were involved in the Red Army in June-December 1941. Now we subtract from this amount the amount that was on January 1, 1942:
"More" 1.808.870 - 1.234.373 \u003d "more" 574.497

We got the irrecoverable losses of the CPSU (b) - killed, prisoners, missing.

Now let's decide on the Komsomol members. From the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" you can learn that in the army and navy at the beginning of the war there were 1,926,000 members of the Komsomol. The encyclopedia "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" reports that in the first six months of the war, over 2,000,000 Komsomol members were drafted into the army and navy and indicates that in addition 207,000 people were admitted to the Komsomol already in the ranks of the Red Army and the RKKF. In the same place we see that by the end of 1941 the Komsomol organizations in the Armed Forces numbered 1,750,000 people.

We calculate - 1.926.000 + "over" 2.000.000 + 207.000 \u003d "over" 4.133.000. This is the total number of Komsomol members who passed through the Armed Forces in 1941. Now you can find out the irrecoverable losses. From the total, we subtract what was available on January 1, 1942: "Over" 4.133.000 - 1.750.000 \u003d "over" 2.383.000.

We got the killed, missing, prisoners.

However, here the figure should be slightly reduced - by the number of those who left the Komsomol by age. That is, about one tenth of the remaining in the ranks. It is also necessary to take away the Komsomol members who joined the CPSU (b) - about 70,000 people. Thus, according to a very conservative estimate, the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army and the RKKF among the Communists and Komsomol members amounted to at least 2,500,000 souls. And Krivosheev has the figure 3.137.673 in this column. Of course, together with non-party people.

3.137.673 - 2.500.000 \u003d 637.673 - this remains for non-party people.

How many non-party people were mobilized in 1941? Krivosheev writes that by the beginning of the war there were 4,826,907 souls in the Red Army and the Navy. In addition, there were 805,264 more people at the training camp in the ranks of the Red Army at that time. It turns out - 4.826.907 + 805.264 \u003d 5.632.171 people by June 22, 1941.

How many people were mobilized in June - December 1941? We find the answer in an article by General Gradoselsky, published in the Military Historical Journal. From the analysis of the figures given there, we can conclude that during the two mobilizations of 1941, more than 14,000,000 people came to the Red Army and the Red Army Corps (excluding the militias). And in total, 5,632,171 + more than 14,000,000 \u003d approximately 20,000,000 people were involved in the army in 1941. This means that from 20,000,000 we subtract "more" 1,808,870 communists and about 4,000,000 Komsomol members. We get about 14,000,000 non-party people.

And, if you look at these figures through the statistics of losses from the Krivosheevsky reference book, it turns out that 6,000,000 communists and Komsomol members have irrevocably lost 2,500,000 people. And 14,000,000 non-party 637,673 people ...

Simply put, the losses of non-party people are underestimated at least six times. And the total irrecoverable losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941 should not amount to 3,137,673, but 6-7 million. This is according to the most minimal estimates. Most likely more.

In this regard, it is useful to recall that the German Armed Forces in 1941 lost about 300,000 people on the Eastern Front in killed and missing. That is, for each of their soldiers, the Germans took at least 20 souls from the Soviet side. Most likely, more - up to 25. This is about the same ratio with which the European armies of the XIX-XX centuries beat African savages in the colonial wars.

The difference in the information that the governments gave to their peoples is similar. Hitler, in one of his last public appearances in March 1945, announced that Germany had lost 6,000,000 men in the war. Now historians believe that this did not differ much from reality, determining the final result of 6,500,000-7,000,000 dead at the front and in the rear. Stalin in 1946 said that Soviet losses amounted to about 7,000,000 lives. Over the next half century, the number of human losses in the USSR increased to 27,000,000. And there is a strong suspicion that this is not the limit.

“According to the results of calculations, over the years of the Great Patriotic War (including for the campaign in the Far East against Japan in 1945), total irrecoverable demographic losses (killed, missing, captured and did not return from it, died from wounds, diseases and accidents) of the Soviet Armed Forces together with the Border and Internal Troops amounted to 8 million 668 thousand 400 people. " Ratio with Germany and its allies 1: 1.3

Every time another anniversary approaches Great Victory, the myth of our unthinkable losses is activated

Every time, knowledgeable and authoritative people with numbers in their hands convincingly prove that this myth is an ideological weapon in the information and psychological war against Russia, that it is a means of demoralizing our people. And for each new anniversary, a new generation is growing up, which should hear a sober voice, to some extent neutralizing the efforts of manipulators.

WAR OF NUMBERS

Back in 2005, literally on the eve of the 60th anniversary of Victory, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army Makhmut Gareev, who in 1988 headed the Defense Ministry's commission on assessing losses during the war, was invited to Vladimir Pozner's TV show "Vremena". Vladimir Pozner said: "This is an amazing thing - we still do not know exactly how many of our soldiers, soldiers and officers died in this war."

And this despite the fact that in 1966-1968, the calculation of casualties in the Great Patriotic War was carried out by a commission of the General Staff, headed by General of the Army Sergei Shtemenko. Then, in 1988 - 1993, a team of military historians was involved in the mixing and verification of the materials of all previous commissions.

The results of this fundamental study of the losses of personnel and military equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces in hostilities for the period from 1918 to 1989 were published in the book “The classification has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces in Wars, Military Operations and Military Conflicts ”.

This book says: “According to the results of calculations, during the years of the Great Patriotic War (including the campaign in the Far East against Japan in 1945), total irrecoverable demographic losses (killed, disappeared, were captured and did not return from it , died from wounds, diseases and as a result of accidents) of the Soviet Armed Forces together with the Border and Internal Troops amounted to 8 million 668 thousand 400 people. " The ratio of casualties between Germany and its allies on the Eastern Front was 1: 1.3 in favor of our enemy.

In the same telecast, a well-known front-line writer entered the conversation: "Stalin did everything to lose the war ... The Germans lost a total of 12.5 million people, and we lost 32 million in one place, in one war."

There are people who, in their "truth," bring the scale of Soviet losses to absurd and absurd levels. The most fantastic figures are given by the writer and historian Boris Sokolov, who estimated the total number of deaths in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941-1945 at 26.4 million people with German losses on the Soviet-German front at 2.6 million (that is, with loss ratio 10: 1). And he counted 46 million Soviet people who died in the Great Patriotic War.

His calculations are absurd: for all the years of the war, 34.5 million people were mobilized (taking into account the pre-war number of servicemen), of which about 27 million people were direct participants in the war. After the end of the war in Soviet army there were about 13 million people. Of the 27 million participants in the war, 26.4 million could not have died.

They are trying to convince us that "we filled the Germans with the corpses of our own soldiers."

LOSSES, BATTLE, NON-RETURNABLE AND OFFICIAL

Irrecoverable combat losses include those killed on the battlefield, who died from wounds during sanitary evacuation and in hospitals. These losses amounted to 6329.6 thousand people. Of these, 5226.8 thousand were killed and died from wounds during the stages of sanitary evacuation and 1102.8 thousand people died from wounds in hospitals.

Irrecoverable losses also include missing persons and prisoners. There were 3396.4 thousand of them. In addition, in the first months of the war there were significant losses, the nature of which was not documented (information about them was collected later, including from German archives). They amounted to 1162.6 thousand people.

The number of irrecoverable losses also includes non-combat losses - those who died from illness in hospitals, who died as a result of emergencies, who were shot according to the sentences of military tribunals. These losses amounted to 555.5 thousand people.

The sum of all these losses during the war amounted to 11 444.1 thousand people. From this number, 939.7 thousand servicemen were excluded, who were recorded at the beginning of the war as missing, but were recruited into the army for the second time in the territory liberated from the occupation, as well as 1836 thousand former military personnel who returned from captivity after the end of the war - 2775 in total 7 thousand people.

Thus, the actual number of irrecoverable (demographic) losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR amounted to 8668.4 thousand people.

Of course, these are not final figures. The RF Ministry of Defense is creating an electronic database, which is constantly being updated. In January 2010, Major General Alexander Kirilin, head of the Russian Defense Ministry's Department of Defense for perpetuating the memory of those killed in the defense of the Fatherland, told the press that official data on the losses of our country in the Great Patriotic War would be made public by the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory. The general confirmed that at present the Ministry of Defense estimates the losses of servicemen of the Armed Forces in 1941-1945 at 8.86 million people. He said: "By the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory, we will finally come to the official figure that will be fixed in the government's regulatory document and communicated to the entire population of the country in order to stop speculation on the figures of losses."

Close to real information about losses is contained in the works of the outstanding Russian demographer Leonid Rybakovsky, in particular, one of his last publications - "Human losses of the USSR and Russia in the Great Patriotic War."

Objective studies are also appearing abroad. Thus, the well-known demographer Sadretdin Maksudov, who works at Harvard University and studied the losses of the Red Army, estimated the irrecoverable losses at 7.8 million people, which is 870 thousand less than in the book "The secrecy stamp has been removed." He explains this discrepancy by the fact that the Russian authors did not exclude from the number of losses those servicemen who died a "natural" death (this is 250-300 thousand people). In addition, they overestimated the death toll of Soviet prisoners of war. Of these, according to Maksudov, it is necessary to subtract the "naturally" dead (about 100 thousand), as well as those who remained after the war in the West (200 thousand) or returned to their homeland, bypassing the official channels of repatriation (about 280 thousand people ). Maksudov published his results in Russian in the article "On the front-line losses of the Soviet Army during the Second World War."

PRICE OF EUROPE'S SECOND COMING TO RUSSIA

In 1998, a joint work of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation “The Great Patriotic War. 1941 - 1945 "in 4 volumes. It says: "Irrecoverable human losses of the armed forces of Germany on the Eastern Front are equal to 7181.1 thousand troops, and together with the allies ... - 8649.3 thousand." If we count according to the same method - taking into account prisoners of war - then "the irrecoverable losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR ... exceed the enemy's losses by 1.3 times."

This is the most reliable this moment loss ratio. Not 10: 1, like other “seekers of truth”, but 1.3: 1. Not ten times more, but 30% more.

The main losses of the Red Army were at the first stage of the war: in 1941, that is, over 6 months of the war, 27.8% of the total number of deaths during the entire war accounted for. And for 5 months of 1945, which accounted for several large operations, - 7.5% of the total number of victims.

Also, the main losses in the form of prisoners fell on the beginning of the war. According to German data, from June 22, 1941 to January 10, 1942, the number of Soviet prisoners of war was 3.9 million. At the Nuremberg trials, a document was read out from the Alfred Rosenberg apparatus, which reported that out of 3.9 million Soviet prisoners of war by the beginning of 1942 years remained in the camps of 1.1 million.

The German army was objectively much stronger at the first stage.

And the numerical advantage at first was on the side of Germany. On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht and the SS troops deployed against the USSR a fully mobilized and combat experience army of 5.5 million people. The Red Army had western districts 2.9 million people, a significant part of whom have not yet completed mobilization and training.

It should also not be forgotten that, in addition to the Wehrmacht and the SS troops, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of Germany's allies - Finland, Hungary and Romania - immediately joined the war against the USSR. On June 22, their soldiers made up 20% of the invading army. Then they were joined by Italian and Slovak troops, and by the end of July 1941 the troops of the German satellites totaled about 30% of the invasion forces.

In fact, there was a European invasion of Russia (in the form of the USSR), in many respects similar to the invasion of Napoleon. A direct analogy was drawn between these two invasions (Hitler even granted the "Legion of French Volunteers" the honorable right to start a battle on the Borodino field; however, with one major shelling, this legion immediately lost 75% of its personnel). Divisions of the Spaniards and Italians, divisions "Netherlands", "Landstorm of the Netherlands" and "Nordland", divisions "Langermack", "Wallonia" and "Charlemagne", division of Czech volunteers "Bohemia and Moravia", division of Albanians "Skanderberg" fought with the Red Army , as well as separate battalions of the Belgians, Dutch, Norwegians, Danes.

Suffice it to say that in the battles with the Red Army on the territory of the USSR, the Romanian army lost more than 600 thousand soldiers and officers in killed, wounded and captured. Hungary fought with the USSR from June 27, 1941 to April 12, 1945, when the entire territory was already occupied by Soviet troops. On the Eastern Front, the Hungarian troops numbered up to 205 thousand bayonets. The intensity of their participation in battles is evidenced by the fact that in January 1942, in the battles near Voronezh, the Hungarians lost 148 thousand people killed, wounded and captured.

Finland for the war with the USSR mobilized 560 thousand people, 80% of the conscript contingent. This army was the most trained, well-armed and resilient among the allies of Germany. From June 25, 1941 to July 25, 1944, the Finns pinned down large forces of the Red Army in Karelia. The Croatian legion was small in size, but had a combat-ready fighter squadron, the pilots of which shot down (according to their reports) 259 Soviet aircraft, losing 23 of their aircraft.

Slovaks were different from all these allies of Hitler. Out of 36 thousand Slovak soldiers who fought on the Eastern Front, less than 3 thousand were killed, and more than 27 thousand soldiers and officers surrendered, many of whom joined the Czechoslovak army corps formed in the USSR. At the time of the start of the Slovak National Uprising in August 1944, all Slovak military aviation flew to the Lvov airfield.

In general, according to German data, 230 thousand people were killed and died as part of foreign formations of the Wehrmacht and the SS on the Eastern Front, and in the army of the satellite countries - 959 thousand people - only about 1.2 million soldiers and officers. According to a certificate from the USSR Ministry of Defense (1988), the irrecoverable losses of the armed forces of the countries officially at war with the USSR amounted to 1 million people. In addition to the Germans, among the prisoners of war taken by the Red Army there were 1.1 million citizens european countries... For example, there were 23 thousand French, 70 Czechoslovakians, 60.3 Poles, 22 Yugoslavs.

Perhaps even more important is the fact that by the beginning of the war against the USSR, Germany had occupied or actually brought under control the entire continental Europe. The territory of 3 million square meters was united by common power and purpose. km and a population of about 290 million people. As the English historian writes, "Europe has become an economic whole." All this potential was thrown into the war against the USSR, whose potential by formal economic standards was about 4 times less (and decreased by about half in the first six months of the war).

At the same time, Germany received through intermediaries also significant assistance from the United States and Latin America. Europe on an enormous scale supplied German industry with labor, which made it possible to carry out an unprecedented military mobilization of the Germans - 21.1 million people. During the war, about 14 million foreign workers were employed on the German economy. On May 31, 1944, there were 7.7 million foreign workers in the German war industry (30%). All large, technically advanced enterprises in Europe carried out military orders from Germany. Suffice it to say that only the Skoda factories in the year before the attack on Poland produced as much war production as the entire British war industry. On June 22, 1941, a military vehicle with an unprecedented amount of equipment and ammunition broke into the USSR.

The Red Army, only recently reformed on a modern basis and has just begun to receive and master modern weapons, had in front of her a powerful adversary of a completely new type, which was not found either in the First World War or in Civil wars, not even in the Finnish war. However, as events showed, the Red Army had an extremely high ability to train. She showed rare resistance in the most difficult conditions and quickly strengthened. The military strategy and tactics of the high command and officers were creative and had a high systemic quality. Therefore, at the final stage of the war, the losses of the German army were 1.4 times greater than those of the Soviet Armed Forces.

World War II in numbers and facts

Ernest Hemingway, from the foreword to Farewell to Arms!

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Leaving the city, half the way to the front headquarters, we immediately heard and saw desperate firing across the horizon with tracer bullets and shells. And they realized that the war was over. It could mean nothing else. I suddenly felt bad. I was ashamed in front of my comrades, but in the end I had to stop the Jeep and get out. I started having some kind of spasms in my throat and esophagus, I began to vomit with saliva, bitterness, and bile. I don’t know why. Probably from a nervous discharge, which was expressed in such an absurd way. All these four years of war in different circumstances, I tried very hard to be a restrained person and, it seems, really was one. And here, at the moment when I suddenly realized that the war was over, something happened - my nerves lost. The comrades did not laugh or joke, they were silent.

Konstantin Simonov. "Different days of the war. A Writer's Diary"

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Japan surrender

The terms of Japan's surrender were set forth in the Potsdam Declaration, signed on July 26, 1945 by the governments of Great Britain, the United States and China. However, the Japanese government refused to accept them.

The situation changed after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the USSR entered the war against Japan (August 9, 1945).

But, even so, the members of the Supreme Military Council of Japan were not inclined to accept the terms of surrender. Some of them believed that the continuation of hostilities would lead to significant losses of Soviet and American troops, which would make it possible to conclude a truce on favorable terms for Japan.

On August 9, 1945, Japanese Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki and a number of members of the Japanese government asked the emperor to intervene in order to quickly accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. On the night of August 10, Emperor Hirohito, who shared the Japanese government's fear of the complete destruction of the Japanese nation, ordered the Supreme Military Council to agree to unconditional surrender. On August 14, the emperor's speech was recorded, in which he announced the unconditional surrender of Japan and the end of the war.

On the night of August 15, a number of officers of the Ministry of the Army and employees of the Imperial Guard attempted to seize the imperial palace, take the emperor under house arrest and destroy the recording of his speech in order to prevent the surrender of Japan. The mutiny was suppressed.

On the afternoon of August 15, Hirohito's speech was broadcast. This was the first address by the emperor of Japan to ordinary people.

Japan's surrender act was signed on September 2, 1945 aboard the American battleship Missouri. This put an end to the bloodiest war of the 20th century.

LOSS OF SIDES

Allies

USSR

From June 22, 1941 to September 2, 1945, about 26.6 million people died. Total material losses - $ 2 trillion 569 billion (about 30% of all national wealth); military expenditures - $ 192 billion in 1945 prices. 1,710 cities and towns, 70 thousand villages and villages, 32 thousand industrial enterprises were destroyed.

China

From September 1, 1939 to September 2, 1945, from 3 million to 3.75 million military personnel and about 10 million civilians were killed in the war against Japan. In total, during the war with Japan (from 1931 to 1945), according to official Chinese statistics, China's losses amounted to more than 35 million military and civilians.

Poland

From September 1, 1939 to May 8, 1945, about 240 thousand servicemen and about 6 million civilians were killed. The territory of the country was occupied by Germany, resistance forces were operating.

Yugoslavia

From April 6, 1941 to May 8, 1945, according to various sources, from 300 thousand to 446 thousand military personnel and from 581 thousand to 1.4 million civilians were killed. The country was occupied by Germany, resistance units were operating.

France

From September 3, 1939 to May 8, 1945, 201,568 servicemen and about 400 thousand civilians were killed. The country was occupied by Germany, there was a resistance movement. Material losses - $ 21 billion in 1945 prices

Great Britain

From September 3, 1939 to September 2, 1945, 382,600 soldiers and 67,100 civilians were killed. Material losses - about 120 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

USA

From December 7, 1941 to September 2, 1945, 407,316 servicemen and about 6 thousand civilians were killed. The cost of military action is about 341 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

Greece

From October 28, 1940 to May 8, 1945, about 35 thousand servicemen and from 300 to 600 thousand civilians were killed.

Czechoslovakia

From September 1, 1939 to May 11, 1945, according to various estimates, from 35 thousand to 46 thousand military personnel and from 294 thousand to 320 thousand civilians died. The country was occupied by Germany. Volunteer units fought as part of the Allied armed forces.

India

From September 3, 1939 to September 2, 1945, about 87 thousand servicemen were killed. The civilian population did not suffer direct losses, but a number of researchers believe that the deaths of 1.5 to 2.5 million Indians during the famine of 1943 (caused by the increase in food supplies to the British army) were a direct consequence of the war.

Canada

From September 10, 1939 to September 2, 1945, 42 thousand servicemen and about 1 thousand 600 seamen of the merchant fleet were killed. Material losses amounted to about 45 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

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I saw women, they cried for the dead. They cried because we lied too much. You know how the survivors return from the war, how much they take up space, how loudly they boast of their exploits, how terrible death is portrayed. Still would! They might not come back too

Antoine de Saint-Exupery. "Citadel"

Hitler's coalition (axis countries)

Germany

From September 1, 1939 to May 8, 1945, according to various sources, from 3.2 to 4.7 million soldiers were killed, civilian losses ranged from 1.4 million to 3.6 million people. The cost of military action is about 272 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

Japan

From December 7, 1941 to September 2, 1945, 1.27 million servicemen were killed, non-combat losses - 620 thousand, 140 thousand were wounded, 85 thousand people were missing; loss of civilian population - 380 thousand people. Military expenditures - USD 56 billion at 1945 prices

Italy

From June 10, 1940 to May 8, 1945, according to various sources, from 150 thousand to 400 thousand servicemen were killed, 131 thousand were missing. Civilian losses - from 60 thousand to 152 thousand people. Military expenditures - about 94 billion US dollars in 1945 prices.

Hungary

From June 27, 1941 to May 8, 1945, according to various sources, from 120 thousand to 200 thousand servicemen were killed. Losses of the civilian population - about 450 thousand people.

Romania

From June 22, 1941 to May 7, 1945, according to various sources, from 300 thousand to 520 thousand military personnel and from 200 thousand to 460 thousand civilians were killed. Romania was initially on the side of the "axis" countries; on August 25, 1944, declared war on Germany.

Finland

From June 26, 1941 to May 7, 1945, about 83 thousand servicemen and about 2 thousand civilians were killed. On March 4, 1945, the country declared war on Germany.

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Until now, it is not possible to reliably estimate the material losses suffered by the countries on whose territory the war was going.

For six years many large cities, including some capitals of states, have undergone total destruction. The scale of the destruction was such that after the end of the war, these cities were practically rebuilt. Many cultural values \u200b\u200bhave been irretrievably lost.

RESULTS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, US President Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (left to right) at the Yalta (Crimea) conference (TASS photo chronicle)

The allies in the anti-Hitler coalition began to discuss the post-war world order at the height of hostilities.

August 14, 1941 on board a warship in the Atlantic Ocean near about. Newfoundland (Canada) US President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed the so-called. Atlantic Charter- a document declaring the goals of the two countries in the war against Nazi Germany and its allies, as well as their vision post-war device the world.

On January 1, 1942, Roosevelt, Churchill, as well as the USSR Ambassador to the United States, Maxim Litvinov, and the Chinese representative, Sun Tzu-wen, signed a document that later became known as "Declaration of the United Nations". The next day, the declaration was signed by representatives of 22 other states. Commitments were made to make every effort to achieve victory and not to conclude a separate peace. It is from this date that the United Nations Organization maintains its chronicle, although the final agreement on the creation of this organization was reached only in 1945 in Yalta during a meeting of the leaders of the three countries of the anti-Hitler coalition - Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. It was agreed that the UN will be based on the principle of unanimity of the great powers - permanent members of the Security Council with a veto right.

In total, three summits took place during the war.

The first took place in Tehran November 28 - December 1, 1943... The main issue was the opening of the second front in Western Europe... It was also decided to involve Turkey in the anti-Hitler coalition. Stalin agreed to declare war on Japan after the end of hostilities in Europe.