Features of storage of engineering ammunition in the troops. Requirements for storage places of weapons extinguishing fires in rooms with electrical installations

Signs of pregnancy after implantation of the embryo

Science and Military Security No. 1/2006, p. 26-29

UDC 623.001.5.

Colonel N.I. Lazechikov,

head of Department

Research Institute

Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus,

doctor of Technical Sciences, Associate Professor

Lieutenant colonel Yu.I. Anikeev,

head of the Cycle Department of Device and Operation

rocket and Artillery Armament

Military Academy of Belarus

Ensuring the safety and protection of the population, economy facilities, as well as the territory of the Republic of Belarus from emergency situations is an important socio-economic and environmental problem. The development of science and technology, industrial production and technological processes leads to the fact that the extent of use in the society of dangerous goods is expanding. Experience shows that the greatest number Emergencies related to the use of dangerous goods, including explosives and ammunition, occurs when they are stored and transport. There are permanent attention to the organization of transportation of dangerous goods in the literature. At the same time, storage issues, primarily ammunition and explosives (explosives), are not fully disclosed. The functioning of potentially hazardous production facilities is associated with a global applied problem, the external sign of which is the increase in the number of accidents, disasters, other emergencies of natural and man-made nature, increase their scale and consequences

For example, an explosion 4.06.1988 at the Arzamas station of three cars with industrial explosives. Then 91 people died, more than 900 were injured by varying severity, 151 residential house were destroyed, destroyed 250. In Russian Federation 1977 - 1995. In warehouses with explosive substances and ammunition, more than 40 major fires occurred, about 10 thousand ammunition cars or 200 thousand tons of explosive were destroyed. Material damage amounted to more than 35 billion rubles. . The number of emergencies during the storage of explosive materials, ammunition, their possible consequences show the relevance of this issue not only for the Republic of Belarus, but also for all former republics of the USSR (Table 1).

The analysis of the organization of storage of ammunition on arsenals, bases and warehouses (storage facilities) has shown that providing their survivability is currently carried out by implementing specific organizational and technical events. These activities are based on theoretical developments of the 1970s - 1980s, do not allow to take into account changes in the conditions of storage, construction, sensitivity of the explosives, technical status Ammunition and other factors. The situation is obvious: the scientific and theoretical substantiation of practical activities in this area is clearly not enough. Actual applied tasks are:

comparative analysis of the survivability of ammunition storage facilities;

identifying critical elements on each object;

substantiation of rational ways to ensure the survivability of the objects under consideration;

optimization of the consumption of financial and material resources;

reducing resource-intensity, improving the performance of ammunition storage mode.

To successfully solve the specified tasks, it is advisable to use methods of mathematical modeling. It should take into account the distinctive features (features) of the storage of ammunition and the properties of the survivability.

1. The storage facilities of ammunition are a complex organizational and technical system consisting of n.elements. Elements of objects are structures with deposits placed in them. These structures (storage facilities, open-storage sites, etc.) may have additional engineering equipment (fancy, technical means of protection) and vary in the degree of security from adverse external influences. The degree of security and sensitivity of ammunition to external influences determines the state of elements of intermediates storage facilities in the development of emergency situations. The condition of the elements is characterized by the volume of ammunition on them and the use of ammunition, the possibilities for their shipment.

2. For these objects, it is characteristic of the external impact on any of its elements of the occurrence of secondary consequences leading to the emergence and development of the Domino effect. Under the "Domino" effect, an avalanche-like development of an emergency at an ammunition storage facility, leading to the destruction and (or) destruction of its elements or the entire object as a whole.

3. Under the vitality of the storage facilities of the ammunition, it is advisable to understand their property to maintain and restore the ability to fulfill completely or partly the functions of the storage and supply of ammunition for a specified period of time in extreme conditions of their operation. At the same time, under the extreme conditions of operation, such when as a result of the impacts of the enemy, natural disasters, man-made disasters, the "human factor" and others are the danger of the emergence of the "Domino" effect.

4. The objects under consideration are designed to store stocks of ammunclatures. For a comprehensive assessment of the survivability of ammunition storage facilities, a probabilistic assessment of the ability to maintain the required number of elements and ensuring the specified amount of ammunition supplies to troops is required. Consequently, the development of two groups of survivability indicators is necessary: \u200b\u200bas of the results of the fulfillment of the task of ensuring troops by ammunition.

5. In general, unfavorable external influence may be subjected to any of pelements of the object. For the case when the external influence is exposed m-th element object calculates the appropriate thosedistribution of probabilities of the number of destroyed elements of the object where to -the number of affected elements.

Considering the marked features, we justify the indicators of the vitality of the storage facilities of ammunition as a state (first group of survivability indicators). As initial information, we accept probability distribution The number of destroyed elements of an ammunition storage facility. The specified distribution is determined by solving the corresponding system of differential equations, to determine which the previously developed model of survivability is designed as a state. Indexes t.and to(hereinafter), respectively, denote the number of the element subjected to external influence and the number of affected elements. Due to the fact that any of the initial external influence can be exposed to pelements of the elements of the storage of ammunition, then in the general case it is necessary to consider pthe probability distributions of the number of elements destroyed. Therefore, the injected indicators are called private. These indicators include:

mathematical expectation (can) of the number of affected elements - M;

the interval assessment of the consuming volume of BB -W;

interval estimates of can be destroyed by the volume of ammunition of each nomenclature - Q.

Each of the input indicators is calculated for the case when the first external influence is subjected to 1st, 2nd, .... n-th element of this or that object under consideration. Therefore, for each indicator, we have a set of private indicators, the number of which is and, so as each indicator the calculation of the totality

pthere are no particular indicators in principle from each other. Therefore, the introduced upper index t.(The number of the element subjected to initial external influence) will not specify.

Consider the appropriate analytical expressions.

Mathematical expectation of the number of affected elements

The total number of possible combinations of the number of affected elements of the ammunition storage facility

For each I-th combination, i \u003d.1, s, find destroyed elements Wi -We can the volume of destroyed BB (such a calculation is easily performed, as the destroyed elements are known as a result of external influence). Determine

Then we have the second survivability indicator: the interval assessment of the volume of destroyed

By analogy with the interval estimate obtained for each combination of the number of affected elements, the total number of which is equal s,we find a volume of destroyed ammunition for the Z-th nomenclature of ammunition, the results of the calculation will be presenting in the form of a matrix. The element of the matrix q,standing at the intersection of the i-th line and the j-th column shows where the volume of destroyed ammunition j-th Nomenclature in the case the destruction of the i-th Combinations of elements of an ammunition storage facility. Perform operations

As a result, we obtain the interval estimates of the volume of destroyed ammunition for each nomenclature

As a result, the third private survival rate is defined.

We will fulfill the rationale for the overall indicators of the survivability of ammunition storage facilities as of state.

Mathematical expectation (can) of the number of affected elements - M.

Interval assessment of can be destroyed volume of explosives (explosives) - W.

Interval estimates of can be destroyed by the volume of ammunition of each nomenclature - Q.

Consider hypotheses:

H1 -the 1st element is exposed to external influence, i.e. t.= 1;

H2 -the external influence is the 2nd element, i.e. t.= 2;

NP -n-th element is exposed to external influence, i.e. t \u003d p.

Probability distribution determined by the above-mentioned OCH features.

As an event AKwe will take the following: not more affected toelements of the elements of the storage of ammunition. Then the likelihood of an event AKsubject to the offensive Ni.determined by expression

where As in the calculation of private survivability indicators, the probability distribution of the number of destroyed elements of the OCH is.

Thus, as a general indicator of the vitality, the likelihood of no more than k elements is taken as a common indicator of

By analogy with the private indicators discussed above, the interval assessment of the volume of destroyed explosives and interval estimates of the ammunition volume of each nomenclature are determined. The total number of possible combinations of affected elements of the ammunition storage facility for each I-th combination, destroyed elements we find the volume (Vi)destroyed explosives As a result, we have evaluation For which we define the minimum and maximum elements. Ultimately, we have a desired interval assessment

Index toshows that evaluation of the case received when it is destroyed no more toelements of the object. Thus, it can be argued that with probability RKthe volume of destroyed BB will be in the interval

In some cases, it is advisable to consider instead of event: not more affected toelements of ammunition storage facility Other events. Consider, for example, an event VC,the consistent with what was destroyed exactly toelements of the elements of the storage of ammunition. In this case, using probability distribution

Then, a number of destroyed elements will be

As a result, in contrast to the private indicators of the vitality, a point estimate can be obtained by the number of destroyed elements of the ammunition storage facility. However, the point estimates of can be destroyed volumes of explosives and ammunition for each nomenclature is not possible. This is due to the existence of uncertainty regarding the combination of the elements of the object, which are destroyed. Therefore, for the remaining two general indicators, the calculation scheme is similar to the survivability considered for private indicators. Thus, a combination of private and general indicators of the survivability of intermediates storage facilities is considered as of state. Let's justify and introduce the second group of survivability indicators.

Extensibility indicators of ammunition storage facilities according to the results of the task.

The vitality of the storage facilities of ammunition based on the results of the task is characterized by their ability not only to resist emergency situations, but also successfully fulfill the task. In this case, an object having a structure S0performs the task over time t.After external influence, a new structure may occur Sicomprising subsets of workable, partially and fully inoperative elements. At the end of the external influence, the object with the new structure should begin to perform the task for a specified period of time.

As indicators of the survivability on the results of the task are considered:

the conditional probability of performing the task of ensuring the troops by ammunition with the storage object for a specified period of time (0, τ);

the coefficient of survivability in one-time exposure;

the coefficient of survivability at a stable exposure.

Conditional probability of the task of providing troops by ammunition with a storage facility with a structure (Si),preserved after external influence for a specified period of time

The survivability coefficient of ammunition storage facility based on the results of the task in one-time Determined by expression

and represents the relationship of the conditional probabilities of tasks to the object with the new P (T / S0)and initial structure P (T / S0).

Performing the task of the storage object of ammunition can be carried out after one-, two -, ..., multiple external influences. therefore the coefficient of survivability of an ammunition storage facility according to the results of the task of the task at twofold exposureit can be designed:

where - the conditional probability of performing the task of an ammunition storage facility with the initial (S0)and with the structure after one- (S1),twofold (S2)external influence, respectively.

The coefficient of survivability of an ammunition storage facility based on the results of the task with N-multiple exposure

where P (T / S0), P (T / SN) -the conditional probability of performing the task of the object under consideration with the initial structure and with the structure after and-multiple of external influence, respectively. To calculate the survivability indicators according to expressions (1-4), it is necessary to determine the likelihood of the task of the object under consideration. (1st set structure. To do this, the mathematical model of the survivability proposed in one of the copyright works can be used ..

The proposed indicators system allows the most complete, with a high degree of accuracy to find specific scientifically based solutions of these applied tasks. The presence of a set of private and general indicators relating to two groups, the need to have a system of indicators reflects from a systemic point of view the complexity of the object of research (the property of the survivability of the arsenals, bases and ammunition warehouses). At the same time, the advantages of the proposed system of indicators of the survivability should be attributed

1. Clear physical meaning and simple interpretation of calculation results.

2. Adequate reflection of the properties of the subject of the subject - the survivability of an ammunition storage facility.

3. Relatively simple mathematical expressions for calculating the input indicators.

4. Universal approach when calculating the vitality of ammunition storage facilities for different system levels.

5. The ability to assess the number of elements of the objects under consideration, the volume of explosives, as well as the volumes of destroyed ammunition for each nomenclature destroyed as a result of external influences.

Thus, it should be concluded that the proposed system of survivability indicators and the results of the work allow us to solve the applied tasks marked in the first paragraph of this article.

LITERATURE

1. Volterra V. Mathematical theory of struggle for existence. - M.: Science, 1976.

2. Rudenko B.N., Ushakov I.N. Reliability of energy systems. - M.: Science, 1986. - 252 p.

3. Ryabinin I.A. Reliability, vitality and safety of ships // Sea Collection. - 1987. - № 8.

4. Cherkesov G.N. Methods and models for evaluating the survivability of complex systems. - M.: Knowledge, 1987. - 55 p.

5. Shkurko M.D., Pryikina.s., Filin N.N., Malkov S.I. Basics of the device, service and safe life of the bases of ammunition: Tutorial. - Penza: PAII, 2002. - 205 p.

6. Anikeev Yu.I. Mathematical model of the survivability of the storage facilities of dangerous goods class 1 // News of the Belarusian Engineering Academy No. 1 (17) / 1. MN:, 2004. - C.238 - 240.

7. Anikeev Yu.I. Justification of the survivability of ammunition storage facilities according to the results of the task // Bulletin of the Military Academy No. 2 (3). MN: VA RB, 2004. - C.16 - 20.

8. Schukin Yu.G., Kutuzov B.N., Tatishchev Yu.A. Industrial explosives based on recycled ammunition. - M.: Subraz, 1998. - 315 p.

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The artillery warehouse of ammunition must be located on the distance from separate residential and economic buildings not less than 400 m,from the warehouse of fuel, parking tanks with combustible, fleets and parks of combat vehicles, repair shops and boiler houses, railway highways, industrial enterprises, power lines, shooting and polygons - at least 1000 m, and the shooting director should pass from the warehouse. The distances between the storage locations of the ammunition must be:

  • disdicted - not less than 50 m,
  • not disdicted - not less than 100 m.

The ammunition warehouse should be equipped with access paths providing unhindered entrance by all types of transport. At a distance, no closer to 50 m from the warehouse territory is equipped with platforms for waiting loading (unloading) and for the loaded transport forming in columns. All storage locations must be equipped. lightning protection and fireproof.

Security, defense and equipment of the artillery warehouse of ammunition are organized in accordance with the requirements of the charter of the garrison and guard services of the Russian Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Between the inner and external fence should be a plowing strip of 5-6 m wide. Responsibility for the condition of equipment of posts, alarm and communication equipment, the fencing of artillery warehouses is assigned to the deputy commanders for the armament, the rear and the relevant commanders of the parts (divisions) of material support.

If stocks of several parts of one garrison (compound) are placed on a separate common area, by order of the head of the garrison (commander of the compound) to a responsible person for maintaining a general order and compliance with fire safety requirements on its territory of the warehouse is appointed head of the United Warehouse Connection, in the case of its absence, the senior by title - the head of the Ravo military unit, the reserves of which are posted on this territory.

When placing troops in camps, the storage of ammunition and rockets is organized in accordance with the requirements set forth in the Risk Operation Manual 1, but it is allowed to equip the fencing of warehouses (storage sites) from one row of wire. In the absence of storage camp in accordance with the requirements of this manual, ammunition is allowed to store under a canopy, in open areas, in the pittal, dug in dry ground.

5.1. Organization of storage of weapons and ammunition in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, ATC, the unit must provide:

5.1.1. Reliable preservation and inaccessibility for unauthorized persons.

5.1.2. Maintaining their qualitative condition.

5.1.3. Ease of getting, issuing, control, emergency export or evacuation.

5.1.4. Storage conditions specified for this type of weapon.

(PP. 5.1.4 introduced by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of 20.03.1997 N 167)

5.1.5. Ease of placement of weapons, monitoring him and maintain it in good condition.

(PP. 5.1.5 introduced by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of 20.03.1997 N 167)

To fulfill the specified requirements, all warehouses for storing weapons and ammunition must have reliable walls, gender and ceiling. Warehouses with weapons and ammunition are provided by round-the-clock armed guard, equipped with fire and security alarms with an output to the center of centralized security. The doors of the premises are rude by a metal sheet and equipped with reliable constipation. In the premises of the warehouse or next to them (no further than 20 meters) are the means of fire extinguishing. Humidity and temperature should ensure the safety of the qualitative state of weapons and ammunition.

5.2. For storage of weapons and ammunition, dry rooms must be settled that meet the requirements of storage conditions and fire safety.

Premises must be stone with concrete floors. There should be no gaps between the roof and the walls.

5.3. Warehouses are equipped with double doors (the inner door in the form of a metal lattice with a rod thickness of at least 15 mm). When the warehouse is located on the first floor or in the semisillary room, the windows, except grilles from the inside, are equipped with locking shutters.

The storage doors should open out or be sliding. On the doors of the storage facilities should be reliable internal constipation and two outdoor locks that are annually replaced. In order to eliminate free penetration into a warehouse with weapons and ammunition, equip the lattice tambura, in which employees who arrived for receiving or passing materials.

(paragraph introduced by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of 20.03.1997 N 167)

Windows, ventilation holes to equip metal lattices, securely fixed from the inside. Ceiling, doors, ventilation holes Block electromechanical or ultrasonic signaling sensors from the inside.

(paragraph introduced by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of 20.03.1997 N 167)



Around the warehouse of weapons to equip the forbidden zone, which includes: the main fencing of three meters high with a signal barrier visor at the top and locking of the canvas; The fencing of the inner forbidden zone of the height of one and a half meters, made of metal mesh. Signals from all sensors of detection of the forbidden zone and placement of the warehouse to be displayed to the center of centralized protection and duty on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Central Internal Affairs Directorate, the Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of Internal Affairs of Russia. The violation of the blocking of the weapon warehouse must be accompanied by a beep. On the line of the main fence to equip security lighting, providing a sufficient overview at night. In the forbidden zone, install the gate with the gate for the passage of transport and passage of people. Gate and gate closure to the castle. On the main fence at a distance of 10 - 15 m one from the other and at an altitude of 1.5 m to install well-visible in the day and night pointers with the inscription "Forbidden zone", "pass (passage) is prohibited." Accounting for the operation of the technical means of detection established in the weapon warehouse, lead in the hardware journal on the duty. Responsibility for equipment warehouse weapons to be entrusted to deputies of the Minister (headquarters chiefs, rear), Deputy Heads of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Health of the Department of Internal Affairs, Depstrates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia (headquarters chiefs, rear), deputy headquarters of the heads of educational institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

(paragraph introduced by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of 20.03.1997 N 167)

The serviceability of the alarm is checked daily by the head of the warehouse, as well as on duty on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Central Internal Affairs Directorate, the Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

(paragraph introduced by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of 20.03.1997 N 167)

Doors warehouse warehouses at the end of work, as well as in the intervals, close and sealed. Crab storage doors on locks from the inside is not allowed.

(paragraph introduced by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of 20.03.1997 N 167)

Electrical lighting, subject to compliance with fire safety measures, is allowed in all rooms, with the exception of premises with explosives, explosion tools and lubricants; In these rooms it is necessary to use electric lamps or equip indoor data electric lighting With a voltage in the network, no more than 36 volts in explosion-proof execution. In rooms with other types of ammunition, electric lighting should be performed in explosion-proof performance.

Use in the warehouse of kerosene lamps, torches, candles and other light-flame lighting devices and the use of liquid combustible substances is prohibited.

Places of warehouses with electrical lighting are equipped with outer choppers for de-energization.

5.4. All storage facilities must have appropriate documentation (passport, instructions in the head of the warehouse, the inventory of internal equipment, inventory and the tool) and be provided with wooden linings with a height of at least 10 cm, which are stacked with armament and ammunition boxes.

In the warehouse of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Department of Internal Affairs must be a portable staircase with a platform, tools for packaging and opening containers, a brush and scoop for cleaning, electrical battery or pocket lights, sealing seal.

Indoors where it is required to maintain a constant temperature and relative humidity Air, there must be thermometers, psychrometers and flow charts of temperature and humidity.

5.5. In premises with weapons and ammunition, storage of combustible and flammable materials are not allowed.

It is forbidden to clutter working and viewing passages and access roads to it.

The warehouse put barrels with water and sandboxes. The premises are provided by fire inventory according to existing standards.

5.6. The keys to the premises, metal cabinets with pistols (revolvers) and ammunition in the placer at the end of the working day are rented in a sealed penalty on duty on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Central Internal Affairs Department of Internal Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of Internal Affairs of Russia, the Educational Institution of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for storage. On the time of passing the keys on duty is made in the key reception book. Printing (seal) remains on the hands of the warehouse head. Samples of printing and seals are stored in the Secretariat (Office) of the internal affairs organ.

The second sets of keys from the weapon warehouse, cabinets with pistols and ammunition are stored in sealed polarms in the Secretariat of the Internal Affairs Authority. The issuance of them is made only by order of the Minister, the head of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs educational institution Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

VN 21-01-98 *
---------------------
MO RF

Departmental construction norms

The design standards of the arsenals, bases and warehouses of missiles and ammunition. Requirements Fireburster Safety


Date of introduction 2008-02-01

Preface

1. Developed FSUE "26 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation".

2. Made by the military-scientific committee of the quartering service and arrangement of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

3. The head of the quartering service and arrangement of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on January 22, 2008 was enacted.

4. Instead of the Russian RF 21-01-98 / MO "The standards of design of Arsenalov, Bases and warehouses of ammunition. Requirements of fire-proof", orders of the head of the quartering service and arrangement of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation dated June 9, 2006 N 75 "On compensation activities in designing objects Within the framework of the federal target program "Restructuring of reserves of rockets, ammunition and explosive materials, bringing the system for storing and operating in an explosion-free state for 2005-2010", dated December 19, 2006 N 132 "On introducing changes and additions to the order of the chief of the SRIO of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Dated June 9, 2006 N 75 "On compensation activities in the design of objects under the federal target program" Restructuring of reserves of rockets, ammunition and explosive materials, bringing the system for storing and operating in an explosion-safe state for 2005-2010. "

1 area of \u200b\u200buse

1 area of \u200b\u200buse

1.1 These departmental construction norms establish the basic requirements of fire and explosion and explosion safety, compulsory for the design of newly under construction and reconstructed Arsenals, bases and warehouses (hereinafter referred to as the bases) of the types of armed forces and labor of troops, where assembly, repair, maintenance and storage of ammunition are held , action or behavior of the fire is based on the use of explosion energy (combustion) of conventional explosives, powder, products from them and pyrotechnic agents.

1.2 The requirements of these norms apply to production and warehouse premises, buildings and structures in which rockets and ammunition are stored or work with them.

1.3 When using these norms, follow the following requirements: The provisions of section 5 are common to all bases; Section requirements 6-11 are clarifying for separate species Bases.

1.4 Requirements have a mandatory nature for ordered, design, operational organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, fire supervision authorities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, organizations of other departments involved in the design of the bases of missiles and ammunition.

1.5 To implement the objectives of the federal target program "Restructuring of reserves of rockets, ammunition and explosive materials, bringing the system for storing and operating in an explosion-free state for 2005-2010" to bring the database storage and operation systems in accordance with the established regulatory requirements, before the extraction of additional cash The means allowed to design the bases in accordance with the Annex A to these standards.

2 Terms and Definitions

This document provides the following terms with the relevant definitions:

ammunition: Some of the weapons intended to defeat the goals and the fulfillment of other combat and educational tasks.

hoist surface: The surface in the enclosing structures of the building (room) in the form of opening, open or filled with lightly graded design.

day surface of the earth: The surface of the landscape of this area.

built-in building (construction): The building (construction), the upper mark of the internal volume of which is located below the ground level at a depth of more than 1 m.

restricted area: The band, adjacent to the outside to the security perimeter of the technical territory and the sorting platform, in which the population accommodation is prohibited, as well as the construction and placement of objects not provided for by the General Plan.

forbidden area: The strip of the terrain, adjacent to the external fence of the base, in which it is forbidden to build construction and carry out work capable of creating a database security threat.

protective courtyard: Protective structure suitable before the wanted surface of a special cabin to localize the affixing effect of the explosion.

category of risk of ammunition: The combination of indicators characterizing the behavior of ammunition in a fire, such as: the ability to ignite from external ignition sources, burn (explode) during the fire, spread fire foci.

lightweight design: The design that fills the bad surface and is capable of discharged or collapse under the action of overpressure or an air shock wave.

ground building (construction): The building (construction), all the floors of which are located above the day surface of the Earth.

distribution building (construction): The building (construction) around which the protective shaft is constructed (system of protective shafts).

official building (construction): The building (construction), the enclosing structures of which are covered with a layer of soil with a thickness of at least 1 m.

underground facility: Construction, made without opening the day surface of the Earth.

fire-safety: The state of the object, in which the possibility of a fire (explosion), its transition to the explosion (in a fire) and the impact on people of dangerous factors of fire and explosion, is eliminated by the possibility of a fire (explosion) and exposure to people of dangerous factors of fire and explosion.

semi-breeded building (construction): The building (construction), the fencing designs of which are located in the ground, and the upper mark of the internal volume of the building (structures) is above the ground surface or is located below it at a depth of 1 m.

jet ammunition: Ammunition containing a jet engine.

sorting platform: The territory intended for the reception, safety check, sorting, temporary storage of ammunition 3 category *, including hazardous in circulation, as well as all ammunition, gils and containers coming from troops.
________________
* To the ammunition 3 categories include ammunition that are not suitable for combat use to be disposed of.


special cab: Protective construction designed to localize explosive technological operations.

technical territory: The territory intended for receiving, sending, storing, assembling, repair, cutting, disposal, maintenance of missiles and ammunition.

3 Regulatory references

This document uses references to the following interstate standards:

GOST 30244-94 Building materials. Furnishing Test Methods

GOST 16363-98 Fire retardant products for wood. Method for defining flame retardant properties

GOST 12.1.044-89 SSBT. Fire-safety substances and materials. Nomenclature of indicators and methods for their definition

4 designations and abbreviations

This document adopted the following general designations and abbreviations:

ADS: Autonomous diesel station

Gas station: Gas station

Asp: Aviation means of lesion

AUPC: Automatic fire alarm installation

AUPT: Automatic installation of fire extinguishing

BB: Combat Blocks

BB: Explosives

Zip: Spare Tools and Accessories

Zur: Anti-aircraft controlled rockets

GJ: Fuel fluids

GC: Head parts

GSM: Fuel and lubricants

EDD: Liquid jet engines

Kil: Control and measuring laboratory

Kip: Measuring instruments

PPC: Checkpoint

CRR: Corps of regulatory work

CRT: Components of rocket fuel

LVZ: Flammable liquids

Mick: Mounting and Testing Case

NIITS PB Armed Forces: Research Test Center for Fire Safety of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Answer: Fire extinguishes

Pad: Powder aviation engines

PRP: Powder jet engines

Ptur: Anti-tank managed rockets

SV: Blasting means

Sowe: On NPB 104-03

TRT: Solid rocket fuel

UVK: Universal camouflage kamora

JBP: Nuclear ammunition

5 General Requirements Fire Safety During the Design of Arsenals, Bases and Amusement Warehouses

5.1 Rules for determining the categories of risk of buildings, structures and premises

5.1.1 The hazard categories of buildings, structures and premises are determined by the categories of risk of ammunition located in these buildings, facilities and premises. The determination of the categories of risk of buildings, structures and premises should be carried out independently of the number of rockets, ammunition, explosives, powders and products of them, located in these buildings, facilities and premises.

5.1.2 The hazard categories of buildings, structures and premises defined in accordance with these standards should be applied in the development of technical solutions regarding development planning, determining the area of \u200b\u200bfire compartments, as well as buildings, structures and premises, placing premises, selection of design solutions and engineering Equipment (electrical installations, communications and alarm, ventilation, air conditioning, sewage, water supply and heating).

5.1.3 Rockets and ammunition are divided into categories of hazards E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, B, D. Definition of categories of risk of ammunition should be carried out by consistently checking their affiliation to the hazard categories shown in Table 1, from the highest ( E1) to the lower (e).


Table 1 - Danger categories Rocket and ammunition

Characteristics of missiles I.
Ammunition located in the building, facilitation, room

Name of missiles and ammunition

Dangerous in relation to fire and explosion. Particularly dangerous in relation to the separation and distribution of fire foci for considerable distances with possible explosions

In the production of rocket and ammunition (components and components of rocket and ammunition products) containing an equipped jet engine in their composition when working with which:

Powder (solid propellant) engine charge is available for direct contact with an external ignition source;

Powder (solid propellant) engine charge is not available for direct contact with an external inflammation source

Dangerous in relation to fire and explosion. Particularly dangerous in relation to mass dividers and distribution of fire foci for significant distances with possible explosions

The storage of missiles and ammunition (components and components of rocket and ammunition products) containing an equipped jet engine in its composition. Powder (solid propellant) engine charge is not available for direct contact with an external inflammation source

Ballistic solid fuel rockets, winged and anti-aircraft rockets, equipped starting and marching solid fuel engines of ballistic, winged and anti-aircraft missiles, fully prepared zur of all types, ptur and ready-made shots with them. Jet ammunition (ready-made reactive shells, reactive anti-tank grenades, ready-made jet grenaderate shots, active reactive shells and mines, ready-made shots with them, cutting jet engines). Reaction charges of demining charges, reactive pop-up mines, rockets with relocation

Dangerous in relation to fire and explosion. Particularly dangerous in relation to the spread of fire foci in industrial premises

Explosives, powder and products from them, solid fuels, pyrotechnic compositions located in the production premises of workshops outside the shell, containers (packaging) or in a shell, container (packaging), the design of which does not prevent direct contact with the external ignition source

Explosives and products from them. Smoky powder and products from them. Smokeless powder scratch and charges of them in bundles, bags, cards and sleeves with a combustible body. Charges from ballistic, mixture and other solid fuels (powder) for march and starting jet engines of various purposes. Tracers without a shell

Dangerous in relation to fire and explosion. Particularly dangerous in relation to the possibility of the destruction of elements of the construction of the building and technological equipment

Explosives, powder and products of them, solid fuels, pyrotechnic compositions located in the production premises of workshops or on the traught platforms in the shell, container (package), the design of which prevents direct contact with the external inflammation source

Finally and non-confidently cutting shells, mines (except for active reactive), ready-made shots with them. Combat parts missiles. Head (combat) parts of jet shells (except inert). Charges in sleeves, fuses, capsule and electrode sleeves, tracers in the shell. Powder, solid fuels and charges of them in container

Dangerous in relation to fire and explosion. Particularly dangerous in relation to the simultaneous explosion in the mass of the stack with the formation of a strong shock wave or greater thermal radiation

Explosives, powder, solid fuel

Finally and unexpusively equipped withdrawal fugasic, fuzasny, cassette, concrementary shells and caliber mines of more than 152 mm, ready-made shots with them. Martial parts of rockets, head (combat) parts (except inert) Caliber reaction chargers more than 140 mm. Caliber shots 23-37 mm (except shots with projectiles in inert equipment). Means of initiation (except inflammation means). Explosives without shells and products from them. Smoky porch, products of them without means of initiation (ignitions, ignition and ignition charges, ignition devices, ignition tubes, explosives, fireproof cords, etc.). Smokeless powder scattering, charges of them in beams, bags and cards. Charges from ballistic, mixture and other solid fuels (powder) for march and starting jet engines of various purposes. Engineering mines, demining charges, subversive charges and charges special purpose, volume-detonating bombs and refilled incendiary tanks

Dangerous in relation to fire and explosion. Particularly dangerous in relation to single and group explosions

Implementing ammunition

Finally and non-unconditionally equipped fragmentation, fragant-cassette, fragantic fugasal, fugasny, armor-piercing, concrequity, cumulative, incendiary, lighting, smoke, with ready-made skin-affected elements, targeting, target and target projectiles and caliber mines from 37 to 152 mm inclusive, ready-made Shots with them. Throwing charges in the sleeves, incl. Free shots. Ready shots with practical, agitation shells and shells in inert equipment of all calibers. Head (combat) parts (except inert) jet shells up to 140 mm caliber inclusive. Pyrotechnic agents (except for products that include only smoky powder, powder pulp and fireproof cord without initiation means). Manual grenades with climb (included) or without them. Elements of dynamic protection

Dangerous in relation to fire and explosion. Particularly dangerous in relation to group explosions

Implementing ammunition

The fuses (with the exception of the fuses, which include only smoky powder), explosive devices, sinks to manual grenades, cartridges of small arms, means of ignition

Fire hazard

Rockets and ammunition (components and components of rocket and ammunition), not containing explosives, powder, pyrotechnic compositions and products from them. Rockets and ammunition (elements of rockets and ammunition) containing combustible substances and materials or not containing those in the combustible container (packaging)

Practical and inert equipment shells without tracers, mines in inert gear without ignition charges, head (combat) parts in inert equipment of jet shells, sleeves, silent fuses and capsule sleeves, splashes, phlegmatizers, categories, cardboard and cork products, housings and others Metal elements of ammunition, camera jet engines, educational missiles and ammunition

Inadequate

Rockets and ammunition (component parts and components of rocket and ammunition), not containing explosives, powder, pyrotechnic compositions and products from them, combustible substances and materials and in the non-governmental container (packaging)

Practical and inert equipment shells without tracers, mines in inert equipment without ignition charges, head (combat) parts in inert equipment of jet shells, sleeves, softening fuses and capsule sleeves, splashes, hulls and other metallic elements of ammunition, jet engines, training chambers Rockets and ammunition

5.1.4 Buildings, facilities and premises that lack missiles and ammunition or there are rockets and ammunition that do not contain explosives, powder, pyrotechnic compositions and products from them are divided into categories A, B, B1-B4 and D on the explosion and explosion and Fire hazard in accordance with the NPB 105-03.

5.1.5 If in the room there are ammunition of various categories, the cost of the danger of the room is determined by the highest category of ammunition in it.

On the technical territory it is prohibited to place buildings, structures and premises of the category of fire hazard on the NPB 105-03.

5.1.6 If in the premises, along with ammunition, there are combustible gases, flammable or combustible fluids, as well as substances and materials that can explode and burn when interacting with water, air oxygen or each other, then these rooms must be checked for compliance with categories A or B according to the explosion of the NPB 105-03.

If there are combustible gases in the room, flammable fluids with an outbreak temperature of not more than 28 ° C in such a quantity that can form explosive steam outdoor mixtures, with the ignition of which the calculated excessive pressure of the explosion of the explosion is developing exceeding 5 kPa or substances and materials that can explode and explode and To burn when interacting with water, air oxygen or each other in such a quantity that the calculated excessive pressure of the explosion in the room exceeds 5 kPa, then the room should be attributed to the category A along the explosive hazard of NPB 105-03.

If there are combustible dust or fibers in the room, flammable fluids with a flash point of more than 28 ° C, combustible fluids in such a quantity that can form explosive dusty or stead-air mixtures, with the ignition of which the calculated excessive pressure of the explosion in a room is developing exceeding 5 kPa, Such a room should be attributed to the category B on the explosion hazard of the NPB 105-03.

If the explosive mixture can develop the estimated excess pressure of less than 5 kPa, the explosive is considered an explosive area within up to 5 m horizontally and vertically from technological equipment, from which combustible gas, liquids and dust vapors are possible. At the same time, the entire room should be attributed to the category of hazards determined by the highest category of the risk of ammunition in this room.

The buildings in which there are rooms with the categories of E1-E7, as well as premises with categories of explosive danger A and / or B, should be attributed to category A or B in accordance with the rules set forth in the NPB 105-03.

If the building (structure) does not apply to categories a or b in the explosive hazard of the NPB 105-03, then the category of danger of the whole building is determined by the highest category of the dangers of premises in it.

5.1.7 The building should be destined to categories B1-B4 for fire hazard if two conditions are simultaneously met:

- The building does not refer to the categories of danger A, B, E1-E7;

- Requirements of the NPB 105-03 to buildings and facilities of the categories of fire danger B1-B4 are performed.

5.1.8 The building should be attributed to the hazard category D if it does not refer to the categories A, B, B1-B4, G by explosive and fire hazard on the NPB 105-03 and to the categories of danger E1-E7, V.

5.2 General Plans

5.2.1 Distribution areas of the databases are set General Staff The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the submission of the command of the species of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the birth of troops, the main and central administrations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

5.2.2 Base accommodation is not allowed in territories and locations:

- flooded as a result of natural and man-made disasters;

- susceptible to snow avalanches, landslides, selevant flows, moving barren and hollow sands;

- with underground workings or with the presence of minerals;

- having radioactive soil contamination above the established maximum permissible norm;

- classified in accordance with the legislation to the first belt of the sanitary protection zone of resorts and water sources;

- external transport (railway units, sea and river ports, airports);

- in the zones of sanitary protection of sanitary facilities and municipal installations ( claiming facilities, landfills, etc.);

- archaeological and other reserves, in their security zones;

- cultural monuments;

- with seismic activity of more than 8 points;

- located closer than 1 km from landfills and cattle boys, closer than 500 m from cemeteries;

- contacting with peat sediments.

The construction of buildings, structures and communication communications directly above karst formations is not allowed.

5.2.3 In order to ensure security, the base should be placed on a separate territory with respect to external security gaps according to EAS 34-94 and Table 2.

Table 2 - minimum distances from objects to external wire perimeter fencing

Object name

The minimum distance from the object to the outer wire fencing of the security perimeter is not less, km

Airfields and combat management and operational-strategic communication

Civil Air Fleet Tracks *

Nuclear power plants

Hydroelectric power plants, thermal power plants

Objects of the petrochemical industry

Main oil and gas pipes

________________
* Display of the highway of the civil air fleet on the ground to take on air navigation directories issued by the established procedure.

5.2.4 The base includes in accordance with Figure 1:

- technical territory (8) - (11) (composition see clause 5.2.10);

- sorting platform (1);

- the security perimeter of the technical territory and the sorting site (2);

- economic zone (3);

- residential zone (4);

- barrage area (5);

- subversive field or destruction site (6);

- Helicopter (7).

Figure 1 - Typical scheme of the territory of the base

Figure 1 - Typical scheme of the territory of the base

5.2.5 The base of the base should include water intakes and treatment facilities in case there is no possibility of connecting the corresponding communication communications to the plumbing and sewage networks of nearby settlements and industrial facilities.

5.2.6 The distance from the subversive field to the outer wire fence of the security perimeters of the technical territory and the sorting platform, individual residential buildings, iron and highways should be at least 1.5 km, and to the outskirts of settlements (housing and domestic town), plants , factories and them such structures are at least 3 km. As a rule, in relation to the technical territory, the subversive field and the residential area are located on the opposite sides.

5.2.7 The helicopter platform should be removed at a distance of at least 1.2 km from the outer wire fence of the security perimeters of the technical territory and the sorting platform and is associated with the base of roads.

5.2.8 From the outer wire fencing of the security perimeters of the technical territory and the sorting platform of the base are set:

- the forbidden zone - a width of at least 400 m;

- Forbidden area - not less than 3 km width.

5.2.9 On technical territory should include zones - areas of the terrain, on which groups of buildings are located homogeneous in the nature of technological processes. As a rule, the technical territory should include (see Figure 1):

- zone of storage of ammunition categories of danger E7, B, d (8);

- production zone (9);

- storage area of \u200b\u200bammunition categories of danger E5, E6 (10);

- Zone of storage of ammunition categories of danger E2 (11).

The list of these zones is determined by the anclature of ammunition specified in the design task.

5.2.10 Buildings and structures on technical territory It is recommended to be placed in such a way that as they approach the economic and residential zones, the category of danger of these buildings decreased. At the same time, buildings and structures with ammunition of the categories of danger E5, E6 should be placed at a distance of at least 1 km from the residential and barrage.

It is allowed to place buildings and structures with a smaller category of danger in zones with the presence of buildings and structures with a greater hazard category.

5.2.11 In the production area, buildings and facilities of the production appointment should be placed (goals, points of work with rockets and ammunition, trafficking platforms, storerooms).

5.2.12 Mechanized loading and unloading complex and most of the loading and unloading platforms are placed, as a rule, in the storage zone of the hazard category E5, E6, and the mechanized loading and unloading complex should be located, as a rule, closer to the production area and the sorting site .

5.2.13 All terrestrial and semi-brewed buildings and structures of the technical territory and the sorting platform are subject to obfits. Forewing should be performed in accordance with the application B.

5.2.14 Outflowed and overweight buildings and structures, as well as buildings and structures of the categories of danger in, d, cores, traught platforms and storage rooms are allowed not to evolve.

5.2.15 Ground, semi-brewed and blurred buildings, structures on the technical territory, unless emphasized should be placed in compliance with the minimum permissible distances shown in Table 3.

Table 3 - Minimum distances between buildings and structures of various hazard categories

Distances to buildings or categories categories, m, not less

the dangers of ammunition

explosion and fire danger

the dangers of ammunition

5.2.16 The distance between the opposite buildings (structures), except for buildings (structures) of the hazard category E2, as well as between the opposite and underground buildings (structures), allowed to reduce 2 times.

The distance between underground buildings (facilities), except for buildings (structures) of the categories of Hazardous E2, is allowed to reduce 4 times.

The traught consumable pantry categories A and B along the fire hazard is allowed to be placed from buildings and structures of the categories of danger E2, E5, E6 at distances are not closer to 150 m, and from buildings and structures of categories A and b along fire hazard and categories of danger E1, E3, E4 , E7 - no closer than 40 m.

5.2.17 All buildings and structures of technical territory should be placed on the ground so that when an explosion occurs, one of them is the direction of the front of the shock wave and the greatest fragments of the fragments passed by other buildings and structures. At the same time, they should be placed, as a rule, in a checker order.

5.2.18 It is allowed to place buildings and structures with different categories of danger at distances closer than indicated in Table 3, only in cases where the calculations are determined that these distances are safe for the respective buildings and structures.

5.2.19 All buildings and structures of the sorting platform should be placed on buildings and structures of technical territory at a distance of at least 200 m.

5.2.20 The boundaries of the technical territory and the sorting platform are equipped with outer and internal wire fences, located at a distance of at least 50 m from each other. The strip of the area between the outer and inner wire fences is a security perimeter that must be equipped with VNC 160-92 and other regulatory documents.

With the adjacent placement of the technical territory and the sorting platform, their security perimeters should be combined. At the same time, the sorting platform should be separated from the technical territory by one near the wire fence.

5.2.21 In case the guard road is placed on the outside of the outdoor fence, then an additional row of fence to protect the road of protection, provided for in VNI 160-92, is allowed not to arrange.

5.2.22 All buildings and structures of the technical territory and the sorting platform must be placed no closer than 40 m from the inner wire fencing of the security perimeter.

5.2.23 The strip of the security perimeter should be cleaned from trees and shrubs, the grass on it should be crushed, and the tracking band is plowed.

5.2.24 On a security perimeter, it is necessary to equip closed fire ponds (tanks) with a capacity of at least 50 m for every 400 m perimeter.

5.2.25 From the outside of the outer wire fencing of the security perimeter, it is necessary to create a protective fire strip of a width of at least 50 m, plowed on the entire width.

5.2.26 The subversive field is intended for the discharge and destruction of unsuitable and dangerous ammunition and explosive component parts of missiles. The subversive field should have a wire fencing, around which the forbidden zone is installed width of at least 400 m and the forbidden area is at least 3 km.

5.2.27 The economic zone is intended for the placement of buildings and facilities of auxiliary industries, services and warehouses.

The economic zone should be equipped with a fence with the necessary number of gates and checkpoints and conditionally share on:

- a service area in which management buildings should be placed, war teams of fire protection and rescue work, fleets of autotractor equipment, railway depot, laboratories of measuring equipment, etc.;

- production zone in which woodworking, repair and construction, repair and mechanical trains should be placed, reserve power plants, boiler rooms, gas distribution points, etc.;

- a warehouse zone, in which the warehouses of fuel and lubricants should be placed, the warehouses of material resources, utility farm, etc.

In the manufacturing zone of the economic zone, a site should be allocated for storing the containers, linings, fixing sleeves and cardboard products. It is allowed to place the specified area on the technical territory in the zone for the storage of ammunition categories of danger in, D. Plot must have a wire fencing height of at least 2 m.

5.2.28 The guard should be placed on a security perimeter at the entrance to the technical grounds no closer than 70 m from the inner wire fence. The approximate layout of the guard room is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 - Master Placing Scheme

Figure 2 - Master Placing Scheme

5.2.29 All buildings of residential and barracks should be located no closer than 400 meters from the outer wire fencing of the security perimeter of the technical territory and the sorting platform.

5.2.30 For storing special equipment intended for service, loading, unloading and transporting ammunition, storage facilities, canopies, open areas should be provided in accordance with the order of the USSR Defense Minister of September 1, 1977 N 225.

5.2.31 When designing railways, it should be provided for a separate ceased branch for the fire train parking, which should be located in the service area of \u200b\u200bthe economic zone. This branch must connect to the network of railways of the technical territory.

5.2.32 On the technical territory and the sorting platform for road transport should be provided for at least two dispersed entry (exits) of at least 6.5 m wide with a type of road clothing for both major roads with an adjuncing to public roads.

5.2.33 The main roads on the technical territory and the sorting platform should ensure the organization of the ring motion and not pass between the building (construction) and its stuff.

5.2.34 Secondary roads provide direct access to buildings (facilities) of technical territory and sorting platform. Page to buildings (facilities) should be carried out according to the principle: one entrance and one departure without reversal at the building (facilities).

5.2.35 Basic and minor roads should be arranged cement concrete monolithic, national, arm-monolithic, reinforced concrete monolithic and prefabricated.

Passage parts of the main roads must have at least two lanes of motion and be a width of at least 6.5 m.

Passages of secondary roads must be a width of at least 4.5 m.

The design service life of the main and secondary roads to overhaul must be no more than 25 years.

5.2.36 Each firefighter reservoir (tank) must be provided with access areas of at least 12x12 m for installing at least two fire cars so that they do not create obstacles to the main and secondary roads. Driving platforms should be organized by cement concrete monolithic and prefabricated, arm-monolithic, reinforced concrete monolithic or prefabricated.

5.2.37 The fire department should be placed in the economic zone at a distance of at least 70 m from the external wire fencing of the security perimeter of the technical territory and, as a rule, closer to the entrance to the technical territory. The fire depot should be located at a distance of no more than 2.5 km from the buildings and structures of the technical territory and the sorting platform, measured on the road.

5.2.38 Trees (crowns of trees) on the technical territory and the sorting platform should be cut down in the case of their location closer than 10 m from the contour of buildings (structures) protected from lightning damage.

5.3 Subversive fields and destroying sites

5.3.1 Planned work on a subversive field (destroying area), due to the specifics of the base, as well as the norms of the ammunition laying for discharging or destruction must be specified in the design task.

5.3.2 Equipment of subversive fields (destroying sites) should be performed in accordance with these construction norms.

5.3.3 The subversive field must be a plot of land with an area of \u200b\u200bat least 20 hectares. The subversive field is not allowed to place on the territory having underground production. Within a radius of 200 m from the site allocated to the subversive field, there should be no swampy or peat sections, as well as natural reservoirs.

5.3.4 When choosing a land plot for a subversive field (destroying platform), it is necessary to coordinate with the established procedure with the unified air traffic control system coordinates of the forbidden area of \u200b\u200bairspace for the span aircraft Above the subversive field.

5.3.5 Depending on the projected norm of laying powders for burning the territory around the subversive field (destroying sites), it is necessary to clear from trees at a distance of at least:

- at the rate of bookmarks up to 10 tons - 300 m;

- at the rate of bookmarks up to 5 tons - 150 m;

- when the bookmark is a portion rate of up to 5 kg when burning with a continuous method - 50 m.

5.3.6 The territory of the subversive field (destroying platform) should be separated by a single-row wire fence with a height of at least 2 m, mounted, as a rule, on reinforced concrete pillars. With the inner and outdoor side of the wire fencing, low-rise obstacles should be installed.

5.3.7 Around the subversive field (destroying platform) directly behind its fence should create a 50-thyme fire strip, plowed on the entire width, and the territory of the subversive field is purified from trees and shrubs.

5.3.8 Before entering the territory of the subversive field (destroying sites), a closed firefighter reservoir (tank) with a capacity of at least 100 m should be arranged. It is allowed to install two closed firefighters (tanks) 50 m each.

5.3.9 In order to extinguish forest (steppe) fires in the forbidden area of \u200b\u200bthe subversive field on natural or artificial water bodies (tanks), entrances and water intake places of fire vehicles should be equipped. The number of water intake places by firefighters is determined by the customer in the design task.

5.3.10 The subversive field (destroying platform) must be associated with the sorting platform of the base of the automotive or railway, which should be paveled by the settlements no closer than 400 meters from the buildings.

5.3.11 Next to the wicket from the inside of the fence must be equipped with a blockage for the controller of the checkpoint. The blonde must be provided with telephone or radio communication with duty officers, the head of the work and the military team of fire protection and rescue work.

5.3.12 A fire shield installed by primary fire extinguishing equipment should be installed at the controller's airborne.

5.3.13 For databases intended only for the storage of ammunition, it is allowed instead of subversive fields to design destruction sites.

5.3.14 The destruction site is intended for burning gunpowder, burning in the armored vehicles of elements of ammunition and single undermines of ammunition performed by camouflet (without separation of fragments).

5.3.15 Destroying platform - a plot of terrain with an area of \u200b\u200bat least 7 hectares, located at a distance of at least 1000 m from the external wire fencing of the security perimeter of the technical territory and the sorting platform.

5.3.16 On the subversive field (destroying platform), shelter should be equipped (for example, caonial) for a fire truck with a combat calculation.

5.3.17 In contrast to the subversive field when designing destroying sites is allowed:

- provide for only the blocking for the controller of the CAT and working personnel;

- Install only a forbidden zone wide with a width of at least 400 m.

5.4 Buildings and Constructions

5.4.1 The requirements of this subsection apply to warehouse and production buildings and basements of the bases in which rockets and ammunition are stored or work with them.

5.4.2 Designing buildings and structures on technical territory should be carried out in accordance with SNiP 21-01-97 * and these norms.

5.4.3 The degree of fire resistance of buildings and structures of the categories of danger E1-E7 should be accepted not lower than II. It is allowed to take the degree of fire resistance for the mechanized loading and unloading complex, loading and unloading platforms, storages with powders not lower than III.

Wooden designs of buildings and structures should be treated with flame retardant compositions with I group of fire-protecting efficiency according to GOST 16363-98 (NPB 251-98).

The use of materials on a bitumen-based type "Ruberoid" when equipped with floors (shelters) for buildings and structures below II degree of fire resistance is not allowed.

5.4.4 Square and floors of buildings, except for buildings with the hazard category E1-E7, should be determined in accordance with departmental and federal regulatory documents.

5.4.5 Class of constructive fire danger of buildings with the category of danger E1-E7 must be C0 to SNIP 21-01-97 *. The class of fire hazard of building structures of buildings with the Danger category E1-E7 should be accepted on SNIP 21-01-97 *. An error has occurred

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181. The warehouse of the military unit is a territory equipped for storing rocket-artillery weapons and (or) ammunition.

Favoris warehouses are divided into permanent and field.

Permanent warehouses are equipped with permanent deployment points. They represent the territory with capital buildings and structures designed for their long-term use.

Field warehouses are organized and equipped with temporary location military units in the field. They are a territory with natural and artificial disguise, suitable for secretive accommodation and issuing weapons and ammunition.

The artillery warehouse of ammunition should be located at a distance from separate residential and household buildings at least 400 m, from the warehouses of the fodder facilities, tanks of tanks with fuel, fleets and parks of combat vehicles, repair shops and boiler houses, railway highways, industrial enterprises, power lines, shooting and polygons - at least 1000 m, and the shooting director should pass from a warehouse with ammunition or park.

182. Storage ammunition is placed in repositories, under sheds and outdoor sites. All storage locations should be equipped with lightning protection, and in fire ratio, as well as special pointers and signs (Appendix 10). The layout of the elements of the stationary artillery warehouse is given in Appendix 11.

The degree of fire resistance storage facilities should be no lower than II in accordance with the requirements of construction standards and rules (SNiP). Canopy designs must be made of non-aggravated materials. Requirements made to the organization of fire protection of an artillery warehouse, lightning protection places of storage, are given in Art. 208-227 of this manual.

183. For fire extinguishing purposes, each place of storage of ammunition must be provided with water from two hydrants. The volume of water in firefighters should provide a three-hour fire extinguishing at 10 l / s water consumption.

The distance from the edge of the firefighter (hydrant) to the nearest building or structure should be at least 10 m, to the tanks with a flammable - 40 m, up to the storage facilities with ammunition - 50 m, but not more than 125 m for all objects.

For the convenience of traveling to the reservoirs before the latter, it is necessary to arrange platforms connected to the road and designed for the placement of two fire cars. The length of the site should be 9-10 m, the width is 6-7 m. The length of the site placed along the road must be 18-20 m, the width is 3.5 m. The distance from the hydrant to the roadway should be no more than 2.5 m.

In the perimeter of the external fencing of the warehouses of the Ribbon, placed in fire-hazardous areas, it is necessary to provide a device for additional water bodies with a capacity of 50 m 3 for every 400 m of fencing, and for warehouses with ammunition, in addition, an increase in water reserve rate by 25%.

IN winter time Roads and entrances to storage facilities, as well as approach to fire fighting should be constantly cleared.

185. Open areas for storing ammunition are equipped on the territory of the artillery warehouse in accordance with the projects approved in the prescribed manner. The placement of them in each particular case is made on the place in conjunction with other structures and the road network of the warehouse territory, in compliance with safe distances in accordance with the requirements of this manual.

The optimal dimensions of the platforms are determined by their capacity, taking into account the rational placement of ammunition on them (the maximum permissible height of the stacks, methods of laying the stacks, sizes and the location of the working and viewing passages between the stacks) and loading through the explosives.

186. In order to ensure the safety of storage of combat property, as well as other facilities that are not far from it, terrestrial storage facilities are observed with rockets, reactive projectiles, grenaderate shots, pyrotechnic agents and ammunition of all types of storage sites. The windows and ventilation hatches of the remaining storage facilities located on the perimeter side must be equipped with protective screens (armor).

Foreignness of storage places by road (rail) entrance and carrying out loading and unloading works are called traverse, and the dilution from the rest of the parties, as close as possible to the storage location, is a shaft (Figure 4).

For repositors and sites located in the rows, it is allowed to carry out the construction of the construction between the rows of one solid shaft in the middle, if it provides protection of storage sites from the defeat and reducing the volume and cost of work.

Water trays are arranged for drains of water from the space between the shaft (traverse) and the storage location.

The main parameters of the obmissal are:

H is the height of the shaft (traverse);

ΔН - excess of the shaft (traverse) above the stack;

L - Shaft length (traverse) on the ridge;

Y - crest width;

B - the width of the base;

A - distance from the storage facility to the base of the shaft (traverse);

β is the angle of excess shaft (traverse) above the storage object;

γ is the angle of inclination of the breakdown to the base.

Based on research and practical work, it is necessary to accept: β \u003d 3 ° 30 "; γ \u003d 45 °; y > 1m; ΔН. > 1m; BUT > 3 m (from the side that does not have access to transport and not provided for PRT).

The calculation of the width of the shaft base (traverse) should be made by the formula:

Calculation of the excess of the shaft (traverse) above the stack with ammunition should be made by the formula:

ΔH \u003d 0.064 (A + H), where H is the height of the stack with ammunition, m.

The length of the shaft and traverse should be taken as to ensure the overlap of the zone of the lesion of the storage object from horizontally flying fragments and striking the bullet from the security perimeter.

Figure 4 - Storage Foresting Scheme with Ammunition

1 - shaft; 2 - mast lightning protection; 3 - cuvette drainage;
4 - automotive road; 5 - traverse; 6 - storage

187. The ammunition warehouse should be equipped with access paths providing unhindered entrance by all types of transport. At a distance, no closer to 50 m from the warehouse territory is equipped with platforms for waiting loading (unloading) and for the loaded transport forming in columns.

188. Security, defense and equipment of an artillery warehouse of ammunition are organized in accordance with the requirements of the UGCS of the Russian Federation. The area of \u200b\u200bthe warehouse is the equivalent must have an external and internal wire fencing with a height of at least 2 m with a distance between wire threads:

from the surface of the soil up to 50 cm - no more than 5 cm;

from 50 cm to 150 cm - no more than 10 cm;

from 150 cm and above - no more than 15 cm.

In places of intersection of the thread, barbed wire are bonded between themselves aluminum wire. Equipment of the internal perimeter of the fence from the chain grid with a height of at least 2 m is allowed.

Over the fence, gates and wickets are installed "hussaks" with a length of 30 - 45 cm with three rows of barbed wire, which have a tilt of 45 degrees from the object.

Between the inner and external fence should be a plowing strip 5-6 m wide. The distance between the external and internal fences is determined depending on the local conditions and can be 5 m or more. Between the fences, the trail is equipped for the movement of the time and control and trace strip width of at least 3 m, adjacent to the outside of the fence. If necessary, the approach to protected objects is equipped with engineering barriers.

189. Around the objects located outside the territory of the military unit, in coordination with state authorities and local governments, are determined in accordance with the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation forbidden zones and forbidden areas.

Forbidden zones and forbidden areas are established in order to ensure the security of the storage of the IWT and other military property, the protection of the population and objects of industrial, social and domestic and other purposes, as well as ambient In case of emergency situations of technogenic and natural character. The boundaries of the forbidden zone must be marked on the terrain of well-visible pointers with the inscription: "Forbidden zone, passage (travel) is prohibited (closed)." On the establishment of the borders of the forbidden zone (district), the head of the garrison is obliged to notify in a timely manner through the local authorities of state power and the management of the population of the nearest settlements. The borders of the forbidden zones (districts) should not include existing common roads, residential and service buildings, traveled fields, etc. The forbidden zone includes the territory directly adjacent to the territory of the military warehouse. The width of the forbidden zone from the external fencing of the warehouse territory is set:

for warehouses missiles, ammunition and explosives - up to 400 m;

for weapons warehouses and military property - up to 100 m.

When establishing a prohibitive zone with state authorities and local self-government, the equipment of the fire strip (mineralized zone) is required to be coordinated, directly adjacent to the external warehouse fence, within which the cutting of trees and shrubs and plowing throughout its width is carried out. The width of the mineralized zone for the warehouses of ammunition is up to 50 meters, for weapons warehouses - up to 15 meters.

190. For the convenience of observing the approaches to the protected object between the fences (at the external fence), observational tower are installed. Ties are equipped with a bulletproof fence, counter-plants, communications tools, alarm systems, rotating spotlights, tripods for lighting missiles and lightning protection devices, as well as to have a device for emergency leaning in the event of a shelling. The height of the tower should provide observation of the protected object. Under the tower is equipped with a trench (shelter) with a circular sector of shelling.

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