The development of barreled artillery in the post-war years. Artillery and mortars of the XX century. Self-propelled anti-aircraft installations

In the second part of my article, I want to briefly review the development of Soviet self-propelled artillery, including self-propelled mortars, ZSU, as well as flamethrower systems.

The purpose of my article is to briefly highlight controversial military-technical decisions, mistakes made in the development of Soviet self-propelled artillery. Show that sometimes very dubious, illogical decisions were made, due to which, until the 70s, the USSR did not have normal self-propelled artillery.

Then, in some 7 years, perfect samples were created, which are still actively used. I tried to show what could be changed in this industry, taking into account the USSR experience of both NATO designers and Socialist camp specialists. In addition, I will show that some constructive solutions were simply in sight, but for some reason Soviet designers and / or the military did not appreciate them or did not notice them.

To facilitate understanding, I will briefly talk about the structure of the Soviet post-war artillery... As part of the division of the 70-80s, artillery was available at 3 levels: the divisional one itself - an artillery regiment of 3 battalions of 152mm self-propelled guns or howitzers, an MLRS division, as well as an anti-aircraft missile or anti-aircraft artillery regiment, an anti-tank battalion. Regimental level - a division of 122mm howitzers, an anti-aircraft battalion or battery, an anti-tank gun battery, sometimes an MLRS battery was added.

The battalion level was a 120mm mortar company, sometimes some of the mortars were represented by 82mm Cornflowers.

Since the 1980s, the airborne divisions had in each regiment a division of the self-propelled guns "Nona", and at the divisional level, an artillery regiment from the self-propelled guns Nona, D-30 howitzers, an MLRS battery and an anti-tank battalion.

It is clear that in different years the states were different and significantly, there were too many divisions in the USSR. For example, the artillery of the post-war divisions was rather weak: 76-85mm divisional guns and 122mm howitzers, as well as a relatively small number of mortars and MLRS.

Anti-aircraft armament regiment of 24 37mm anti-aircraft guns. The states of the tank division were different: for example, the artillery armament of one of the TDs for 1955: 457, 76, 85 mm guns, 37 122mm howitzers, 4 120mm and 13 160mm mortars, 9 MLRS, 4 ZSU-37, 6 DShK machine guns, 6 ZPU-2, 3 ZPU-4, 2 25-mm, 29 37-mm, 6 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. Honestly, such states shocked me a little, for me the artillery weapons are very weak.

At the level of armies and districts, there were separate artillery divisions and brigades, armed, as a rule, with corps guns, high-power guns, heavy MLRS and mortars.

The importance of artillery of various types is enormous, it is necessary to understand that real combat experience has shown that it is artillery, along with tanks, that is the main striking force of the ground forces, and even the main striking force in general.

The importance of anti-aircraft artillery has fallen, but the ZSU and ZU are confidently occupying their niche, while becoming an important means of fire support for troops. Another advantage of artillery is its conservatism and slow obsolescence.

For example, mortars, and many artillery systems of the Second World War are quite combat-ready for local conflicts of our time, while armored vehicles, especially the pre-war ones, are hopelessly outdated. The 120mm mortar arr. 1938 or the 122mm M-30 howitzer still looks formidable, remaining in service with a number of countries, but the tanks developed in 1938 have survived only in museums.

I also want to note that the purpose of the article is not to dig in the trash, or to savor the mistakes of the Soviet military and designers, the author is a patriot of the USSR and a fan of Soviet weapons, but I still need a separate criticism.

For the convenience of the problem Soviet weapons are considered by types of military equipment. I also think that some systems are masterpieces of military-technical thought that have no analogues so far, for example, 2C7 "Peony", 2C4 "Tulip", 2C6 "Tunguska", TOS-1.

1. Airborne ACS.

The first and most massive airborne self-propelled gun was the ASU-57, adopted by the Airborne Forces in 1951 and produced until 1962. First, the landing division received a division of 35 self-propelled guns (in fact, a battalion), then the self-propelled guns were transferred to the regimental level: each regiment had a battery of 10 self-propelled guns.

The car was compact, fairly reliable, passable. The low weight made it possible to efficiently land it with the advent of the An-8/12, as well as the Mi-6 helicopters. It is clear that the car had weak armor, which protected only from small fragments, as well as ordinary bullets, but this was a price to pay for the small weight. The only question for the ACS, how optimal was the choice of weapons?

The fact is that the self-propelled guns had to solve a whole range of tasks, from the fight against armored vehicles, to the destruction of enemy firing points, the destruction of his infantry. In my opinion, an automatic control system with a 76mm gun would be the optimal tool for solving such problems. Moreover, it was developed simultaneously with the ASU-57, but they chose the system with the 57mm gun, guided by its best armor penetration: the 57mm gun at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000 meters pierced 115/105/95/85 mm of armor with a caliber projectile. and with a post-war subcaliber projectile 155/140/125/100 mm of armor.

For comparison, a 76mm cannon pierced with a 95/80/70 / 60mm caliber projectile, and a 125/110/90 / 75mm sub-caliber projectile. It would seem that the advantage of the ASU-57 is obvious, and there is nothing to discuss, but at the same time you need to remember at least 3 factors: first, that the 57mm cannon, which is 76mm, could not effectively deal with NATO medium tanks M-47/48, Centurion, as well as the first MBT M-60.

If the first modifications of these tanks were still hit by the BPS head-on from 500m, then the subsequent ones were invulnerable in the frontal projection. The sides were confidently hit by shells of both calibers.

Airborne self-propelled guns were not designed for open combat with enemy MBTs, but had to act from ambushes, where the main thing was to confidently penetrate the enemy's tank into the side and have small dimensions for stealth. Secondly, a cumulative projectile was developed for the 76mm gun, penetrating 180-200mm of armor. Thirdly, the mass of the OFS 57mm cannon is only 3.75kg, and the 76mm cannon is 6.2kg, i.e. more than one and a half times heavier, which is especially important for the destruction of infantry targets.

However, there was an even more interesting option, proposed by the designers in the mid-50s, the rearmament of the ASU-57 with a 107mm recoilless gun. By the way, a similar self-propelled gun was created in the USA, "Ontos", armed with 6! 106mm recoilless, it is clear that the Soviet Airborne Forces did not need such a perversion, but it is not clear why the military refused such rearmament?

The B-11 penetrated 380mm armor (that is, it hit any tank of the 50-60s), and its OFS weighed about 8 kg. Thus, such a self-propelled gun could effectively deal with both armored vehicles and non-armored targets. But, for some unknown reason, ASU-107 was also rejected.

The second airborne ACS of the USSR was ACS-85 (officially - ACS-85 or Su-85). In fact, the Soviet "Hetzer", armed with a long-barreled 85mm cannon, i.e. in terms of firepower, he caught up with JagdPanther.

When creating the ACS, the chassis of the PT-76 was used. The battalion of self-propelled guns - 31 pieces was attached to the Airborne Forces. What can you say about this system? It is quite well armed for its mass and is well booked: 90mm of reduced armor on the forehead, 20mm of reduced armor on the side. She had an ACS and an anti-aircraft machine gun, which increased her survivability.

However, the devil is in the details. Let's start with what is not clear, but how was it planned to use the ACS-85 for its intended purpose? The mass of the system is 15.5 tons. Those. An-8, Mi-6 cannot physically lift it, like the first modifications of the An-12. For more advanced modifications of the An-12, it is also too heavy, their maximum carrying capacity is 20 tons, but the mass of the single cargo is less.

So, in reality, the ASU-85 began to be transported by air 8 years after it was put into service, and such a rare aircraft as the An-22, then another Il-76 was able to lift it. So, at the beginning of its service, the ASU-85 was not suitable for the landing force due to its excessive weight.

Was there a way out? Apparently, it was necessary to abandon the creation of the landing "Hetzer", and return to the origins. If the ASU-57/76 was preceded by the development of the war years OSU-76, then the Su-85B (the development of the famous Su-76M) could be taken as the basis for the 85mm amphibious assault rifle.

It is clear that the amphibious variant would be much lighter, due to the reduction of armor, to a bulletproof, denser layout. But the new ACS would have weighed about 8 tons (like the BMD-2) and was fully amphibious.

It is clear that the armor penetration would have dropped: the 85mm gun with post-war shells could penetrate at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000 m, respectively, 135/120/110/100 mm with an armor-piercing projectile and 210/180/150 mm with an APCR. But, firstly, such a self-propelled gun could support our landing, not in theory, but in reality.

Secondly, with the adoption of a cumulative projectile, the armor penetration increased to 250mm, and the capabilities of the BCS do not depend on the length of the barrel, and thirdly, such an ACS should not enter into open battles with the enemy's MBT, but act from ambushes. From 2 km it easily hit any NATO tank in the side, and, for example, the M-48 hit the M-48 in the tower from 1000 m, in the lower frontal part of the hull from 1200 meters or more, and a well-armored forehead from 400 m.

Finally, let me remind you that in service with the artillery regiment of the Airborne Forces, until the mid-80s, there were SD-44, 85mm divisional guns, whose carriage was crossed with a motorcycle, and they became self-propelled. If such a system suited the Airborne Forces, then why is a similar gun worse, only as part of an armored self-propelled gun?
As for the original ASU-85, with a long-barreled 85mm cannon, an interesting reinforced version of this vehicle for the ground forces. But, more on that in the next chapter.

2. Reckless tanks (tank destroyers and assault guns).

ACS of this purpose very clearly showed themselves during the WWII. Thanks to their design features, they made it possible to install more powerful weapons on the chassis of the corresponding tank than the base model had, in addition, such self-propelled guns were cheaper and easier to manufacture tanks.

As the experience of the WWII, especially the German one, showed, it was these vehicles that were the most effective means of anti-tank defense and support for infantry, and tanks as well. The advantages of a tank destroyer over an anti-tank self-propelled gun like the Su-76M or Marder are obvious, tank destroyers are better protected, however, they are significantly heavier and more expensive.

Well, there is no need to talk about towed anti-tank vehicles. Of course, they are much cheaper and more compact, so they outnumbered self-propelled guns many times, but they also suffered huge losses: for example, in 1944-45, the victorious Red Army lost –11700 45 mm guns, 1600 57mm ZIS-2, 16600 76mm guns (although some of them are regiments) and about 100 BS-3. And in total, excluding regimental guns, up to 27,000 anti-tank guns and divisional guns.

Let's add another 8,000 light self-propelled guns, mainly the Su-76. To compare medium and heavy SPGs, 3,800 units were lost. What is the reason for such large losses of towed anti-tank equipment? The thing is that a competent enemy very rarely sent tanks into battle without strong artillery and / or air support, so that a significant part of the anti-tank defense system was destroyed or suppressed without even having time to enter the battle.

And then such an AT, due to the low mobility on the battlefield and the lack of protection, was very vulnerable to return fire from enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. To disable the anti-tank equipment, a close gap of the OFS is enough, while a tank destroyer can be disabled only by a direct hit of a projectile, moreover, either a very powerful one, or into vulnerable spots. It was the German Shtugi and tank destroyers, as well as the Soviet Su-85/100 and heavy Hunters, who cemented the defense best of all.

Unfortunately, this is the direction of development of armored vehicles in post-war USSR frankly died out. Yes, separate samples were created, some, like the SU-122-54, were even produced in a small series, and the ASU-85, which physically could not be amphibious until the end of the 60s, fully met these criteria.

In reality, until the end of 1979, the basis of such equipment remained the Great ACS. Patriotic War- SU-100 and ISU-152. These systems were the best in the world for 1946, and remained adequate until the mid-60s. The thing is that until 1965, the Soviet army actively used the T-34-85, T-44, IS-2/3, to support which these ACS were needed. The released T-54/55 and T-10 tanks were only enough to equip tank divisions, as well as a constant combat readiness MSD. And the rear rifle and motorized rifle divisions were mainly armed with WWII equipment.

It is clear that the ground forces did not need the ACS-85 in its original form. In terms of armament, security, mobility, it was inferior to the good old Su-100. Was it possible to create a tank destroyer worthy of the ground forces? I think yes, here we could anticipate the Bundeswehr, for which they created the Jaguar tank destroyer, armed with a 90mm cannon.

To do this, instead of the ACS-85, it was necessary to create a vehicle weighing up to 20 tons with a reinforced chassis and a powerful V-105-V engine, thanks to which the new ACS could accelerate to 65 km / h, in addition, the possibility of installation in the ACS should have been provided. more powerful promising guns.

But the main thing is to increase the security: the side armor should be strengthened to 25 / 30mm, the upper and lower armor plate, which corresponds to 33 / 30mm of the reduced armor, allowing to protect the sides of the ACS from shrapnel and fire from large-caliber 12.7mm machine guns, and bring the forehead to 70mm of armor , which corresponds to 140mm of reduced armor.

Such an ACS would be somewhat inferior to the SU-100 in firepower (insignificantly, armor penetration is 10mm lower, and OFS power, but it would have been faster of fire). At the same time, the Su-85 would be better protected in the frontal projection (140mm of armor versus 115mm) of the SU-100, at a lower height, although it would have weaker side protection; but surpassed the Su-100 in maneuverability and efficiency.

But this is the first modification of the ACS, a trial one, and the main one could receive as the main armament a 100mm smooth-bore T-19 Rapier cannon, which would allow the ACS to confidently hit all enemy tanks of 1-2 generations. For me, the 100mm tank destroyer is much more effective than the conventional Rapiers carried by AT-P and MTLB armored tractors.

Its survival rate is much higher than that of a towed anti-tank vehicle, and its mobility is higher than that of an MTLB with an attached weapon. Like the German Jaguar, it is also possible to create an ATGM on a similar chassis, for the Phalanx or Shturm-S ATGM. Moreover, such an ATGM would be an order of magnitude better protected, and carried more ammunition.

Medium SPGs on the T-54 chassis were presented by the Su-122-54 small-scale SPG. The fact that this machine did not go into a large series is quite understandable and fair: its armament is a cannon - D-49, modernization of the IS D-25, which, at distances of 500/1000/1500/2000 m, pierced 155/145/135 / 125mm, respectively armor.

That is, the self-propelled gun, created to support a medium tank, had less armor penetration than the main T-54 medium tank at a distance of 500-1000m, while before being adopted by the SU-122-54, a new 100mm BR-412D armor-piercing projectile appeared, which provided greater armor penetration than 122mm at all ranges of fire.

The D-25 simply did not penetrate the American M-47/48 tanks in the forehead. The need for a more powerful OFS is also controversial, since assault guns with 122mm guns were relevant when the main tanks were the T-34-76 and T-34-85.

Their 21 kg shells were several times larger than 76-85mm shells, but the gap between 100 and 122mm shells was only 60%. Then, the self-propelled guns were worse protected, only about 160mm of reduced frontal armor, against 200mm for the T-54. So we are not talking about any quality amplification.

Here it was necessary to decide what to get: a tank destroyer or an assault weapon? If it is an assault weapon, then the easiest way is to make a self-propelled gun based on a 152mm D-1 howitzer, 40 kg OFS was 2.5 times more in weight than a 100mm projectile, and the presence of a concrete-piercing projectile in the ammunition load made it possible to effectively break through the enemy's URs.

Such a self-propelled gun in a modernized version (chassis up to the level of the upgraded T-55, reinforced armor and DZ) would be quite relevant for both Afgan and Chechnya, a powerful 152mm projectile could sweep away militants entrenched in any building, and enhanced protection would cover from fire anti-tank light weapons. In reality, it was necessary to put on direct fire 2S3 "Akatsiya", which is very weakly protected.

If the military needs a tank destroyer, then they should wait until 1957, when the new 122mm M-62 cannon appears. It weighed only 380 kg more than the D-25, but at the same time it penetrated 214mm armor at a distance of 2000m. This armor penetration was enough for all American tanks until the appearance of the M-60A1. She could only hit this tank from 1000m.

When the BKS and BPS were created for the M-62, it was able to effectively strike the M-60A1 in the forehead. So a sub-caliber projectile, for example, pierced 320mm armor at 2000m, i.e. in terms of armor penetration, it practically corresponded to a 125mm projectile, and surpassed the 115mm shells of the late 60s. In the 70s, this self-propelled gun could be re-equipped with a 125mm gun with AZ, which would support Soviet T-54/55 and T-62 with fire.

By the way, it was possible to smoothly switch to the production of vehicles based on the T-55, and, due to the powerful engine, increase the mass of the ACS and improve security. In some ways, these self-propelled guns would be similar to the Swedish reckless tank Strv 103, the firepower of the SU-125-55 is more powerful, the Swede is better in protection, and the mobility is approximately equal.

Where is the place for such an SPG? According to the logic of IT, it looked good as part of tank-self-propelled regiments, where one of the battalions was re-equipped with self-propelled guns. Well, it would be better to concentrate assault guns as part of self-propelled breakthrough regiments, giving them to armies.

Now let's talk about heavy tank destroyers and assault guns. There was no need for new assault weapons, numerous ISU-152s were enough, into which even the ISU-122 was converted.

But the new tank destroyers could well come in handy, the fact is that at the end of WWII the Germans created well-protected tanks and self-propelled guns: the Royal Tiger and the JagdTiger, which were hardly vulnerable in the frontal projection.

After the war, the United States and Great Britain actually abandoned medium tanks, launching into mass production, in fact, heavy "Pattons" and "Centurions", as well as over heavy tanks M-103 and Conqueror. It was extremely difficult to deal with them with ordinary Soviet tank guns.

Interestingly, at the end of the war, a new ISU-130 tank destroyer was created in the USSR, but it was not launched into mass production.

This decision was played by the factor of the end of the war, and the withdrawal from production of the IS-2, and the huge length of the tank barrel, and, finally, the frankly stupid arguments that, they say, the 130mm caliber is alien for the army, there will be difficulties with ammunition, etc. ...

The last argument can be easily dismantled: and what about the 100mm caliber, isn't it naval?
And 85mm caliber appeared so long ago? In fact, of course, the army needed a 130mm self-propelled gun, another question is that the self-propelled guns could be rearranged like Ferdinand, the Su-101, i.e. place the wheelhouse of the gun in the stern of the self-propelled guns, and make the machine itself on the IS-3 chassis.

Use the 130mm S-70 cannon developed for the IS-7 as a weapon. This gun at a distance of 500/1000/1500 / 2000m had armor penetration of 217/207/197 / 188mm, and its OFS were one third heavier than 122mm shells. In addition, it must be understood that these data refer to shells of the 40s, whereas in the 50s, shells with better capabilities were adopted.

So, for example, armor penetration increased to 250/240/225 / 210mm, 180mm armor was struck even at 3 km! But instead of this logical step, they tried to create an SPG - a monster on the IS-7 chassis, object 263. Why the army needed a tank and an SPG with the same cannon is not clear.

A similar 130mm self-propelled gun had to be created on the T-10 chassis, but then it was possible to release an even more powerful self-propelled gun on the T-10M chassis. Ironically, such a self-propelled gun was created on the original T-10 chassis, object 268, armed with a powerful 152mm M-64 rifled cannon.

But for me, it was the T-10M chassis that was best suited, thanks to the powerful engine and perfect chassis, because the release of the initial modifications of the T-10 was coming to an end, and if the ACS entered service, then anyway, it should have been produced on a new chassis.

Such a SU-152-10M would become the most powerful Soviet assault weapon and tank destroyer. In terms of power, the new gun significantly surpassed the ML-20, which was armed with the ISU-152, the military argued that its power was insufficient against the western MBT, but who interfered with the creation of a BPS or BKS for this weapon, and that hitting 43kg OFS is dangerous for any tank , even without breaking through the armor.

The armor protection of the 268M object is also quite strong: the frontal armor is 187-248mm, the armor of the wheelhouse is about 200mm, the side armor is about 110mm. For comparison, the ISU-152 had frontal armor of about 105mm, side armor of 80-90mm, which is just a laugh for the level of anti-tank equipment of the late 50s. And the speed of the 268M object allowed it to move on an equal footing with the T-54/55.

However, there was another option: the creation of a tank destroyer on the T-10M chassis with a completely new cannon - a 152mm M-69 smoothbore gun was developed, which weighed only 200 kg more than 130mm systems.

At the same time, its sub-caliber projectile had a monstrous armor penetration for the late 50s: at a distance of 1000/2000 / 3000m, it pierced 370/340/310 mm of armor, respectively.

Thus, he could hit the M-60A1 from almost 5000m. And the most powerful OFS was dangerous to any MBT. For comparison, the first 125mm BPS penetrated 300mm armor from 2000m.

Accordingly, a 152mm APCR projectile, which would have been adopted in the 70-80s, would have significantly higher armor penetration, surpassing 125mm projectiles.

Unfortunately, they wanted to install this miracle cannon on a weakly armored self-propelled gun - object 120. Object 120 was a typical anti-tank self-propelled gun, with thin anti-fragmentation armor, and would be very vulnerable to NATO MBT fire, 90-120mm guns hit it from almost any range of fire, and 90-155mm OFS were very dangerous in case of a direct hit.

So, unlike the tank destroyer on the T-10M chassis, object 120 was contraindicated to engage in open combat with enemy tanks.

3. Classic self-propelled guns - self-propelled artillery systems.

Almost all modern self-propelled guns belong to this type - self-propelled artillery systems. This is, as a rule, an ordinary howitzer or cannon mounted on a lightly armored chassis and designed for fire support and escorting troops, fires from closed firing positions (with the exception of some anti-tank self-propelled guns).

Unlike reckless tanks, its armor is not able to withstand the impact of shells, but is bulletproof and anti-fragmentation, so that the self-propelled gun carriage should not engage in open combat with enemy armored vehicles.

The first such self-propelled guns were created back in the years of WWI, when heavy guns began to be installed on the chassis of heavy tractors, which is why the USSR produced a small series of 122mm self-propelled howitzer SU-5, on the T-26 chassis. Wheeled self-propelled guns SU-12 were also created. But, the Soviet military did not appreciate the enormous potential of such systems, and this nonsense continued until the end of the 60s.

The mass use of self-propelled artillery systems, or as the Germans also called them self-propelled gun carriages, or self-propelled guns of escort, began in the years of WWII, the Germans and Americans.

The Germans produced a fairly large series of 105mm Vespe howitzers, 150mm Hummel howitzers and 150mm Grille mortars. The Yankees created the following systems: 105mm self-propelled howitzer, 155mm self-propelled howitzers and guns, 203mm howitzers. This was the first generation of American escort self-propelled guns. As we can see, the Germans, in fact, created self-propelled divisional artillery, and the Yankees, in addition, and corps.

The idea of ​​creating such systems is quite logical, and was proposed by Guderian. It was he who proposed the thesis that tank forces only then they become such when, in addition to tanks, they include an aggregate of infantry, reconnaissance, artillery, air defense, sappers, rear services with increased mobility, maneuverability, and, preferably, security.

The advantages of self-propelled guns over towed ones are obvious: they are significantly less vulnerable to enemy fire, thanks to the presence of armor, as well as the ability to quickly take up and then leave firing positions.

It is clear that it is impossible, and not necessary, to completely abandon towed guns, but, of course, it is the self-propelled guns that dominate the battlefield.

Unfortunately, the Yankees realized this very quickly, and during 1943-1963 they changed 3 generations of self-propelled artillery systems, and one of the 3rd generation self-propelled guns M-109 is the most massive self-propelled gun in the world, and is still in service with many countries. and is, by the way, the basis of the US artillery.

In the USSR, until the 70s, there were no such self-propelled guns, the country had the most tanks in the world, but it lagged quite far behind the enemy in saturating the troops with armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery. But in the 70s a whole series of "flowers" was created: "Carnation", "Acacia", "Hyacinth", "Peony", which was the best in the world at the time of creation.

The first post-war self-propelled artillery systems were created in the USSR in 1949: SU-100P and SU-152T. SU-100P, in my opinion, is very interesting for two reasons.

Firstly: the military did not see its enormous potential, considering it as an anti-tank self-propelled gun; secondly: the SU-100P undercarriage was unique for its time, later on its basis were developed ACS "Akatsiya", "Hyacinth-S", "Tulip", as well as a number of machines.

Why didn't the ACS go into production? I will quote Shirokorad: “Despite all the advantages of the SU-100P, one can say about it:“ not a candle to God, not a damn poker ”. As an anti-tank weapon, it did not surpass the T-54 tank, it was not suitable for howitzers, and for a long-range gun it had a short firing range and a weak projectile. "

Is the master right? Yes and no. It is clear that the Soviet army did not need an anti-tank self-propelled gun, medium and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns were enough for these tasks, especially since it was inferior in protection to the SU-76M. The question is, what is the survivability of such an anti-tank SPG if its frontal armor did not exceed 30mm?

Yes, Sherman could hit her from the utmost distance, and through and through. Our ACS was closest to the German Nashorn, it would have appeared in 1943-44, but for post-war tasks it was very necessary. But at the same time, this system could become very relevant.

To do this, it was necessary to stop looking at the SU-100P as a PTO, and make it a self-propelled divisional gun. To begin with, it was necessary to install BS-3 instead of the D-10/50 tank gun, the thing is that the tank gun had a maximum firing range of 15,800m, while the BS-3, due to its large tilt angles, could shoot at 20,600m, which is the long-range Akatsiya ...

As for the weak projectile, let me remind you: in terms of performance characteristics, the BS-3 was superior to the German 105mm corps cannon, with which the Germans fought the entire Second World War.

The SU-152G is even more promising, this is our "Hummel" in general, it is not clear why this modification of the SU-100P, armed with a 152mm D-1 howitzer, was not adopted so much ?!

Logically, it was necessary to revise the armament of the tank and mechanized divisions of the SA, instead of a regiment of 36 towed 122mm howitzers, it was necessary to create a regiment of 24-122mm self-propelled guns, 12 SU-100P, 12 SU-152G. And in the 60s, to make artillery regiments from 24 (36) SU-152G and 12 (18) SU-100P, making all the tank artillery and motorcycle parts rifle divisions self-propelled. At the same time, 122mm self-propelled guns are transferred to the regimental artillery.

The question arises, where to get a 122mm light SPG? Once again, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, but by analogy with the German self-propelled gun "Vespe" to create a system on the SU-85B chassis, which is a development of the SU-76M.

I think that before the appearance of the 122mm D-30 howitzer and the Carnation, such a system would have been very relevant. Then, as an intermediate option, it was possible to build a 122mm ACS with a D-30, on the BTR-50 chassis. By the way, in the DPRK and China they created a whole range of self-propelled guns on the chassis of clones of this armored personnel carrier, including a 122mm howitzer.

In the 50-60s, 152mm self-propelled guns were developed on the reinforced SU-100P chassis, I wrote about object 120 above, the SU-152P is more interesting, for which the M-53 cannon was created, which roughly corresponded to the M-47 in ballistics.

In my opinion, it was necessary to go further and create a whole range of self-propelled guns on a reinforced chassis, the predecessors of the Acatsia and Hyacinth, by installing the Soviet D-20/74 and M-46/47 systems on the self-propelled guns. Such self-propelled guns could go to strengthen tank armies, as well as Soviet troops in Europe and the Western districts.

But the T-54/55 chassis could well have been used to create an SPG of special power: 180mm cannon, this is the Grabin S-23. The firing range of a conventional projectile is 30.4 km, ARS -43.8 km. This formidable system was developed to replace the 152mm high-power BR-2 cannon, but due to Khrushchev's lobbying of missile weapons, the re-armament of the SA with new guns was greatly slowed down, and the heavy guns never went into series.

We resumed the production of such systems in the early 70s for export, so that our allies were able to withstand the American 175mm M-107 self-propelled guns. Our proposed self-propelled guns on the T-55 chassis would be structurally close to the North Korean M-1978 Kokusan, but surpassed its quality of the artillery system and power, our caliber is 180mm, versus 170mm at Kokusan.

As for the M-107, the SU-180-55 would have surpassed its mass of a projectile 88 kg of OFS and 84 kg of ARS, against 66.8 kg for the American system, as well as its range, tk. the American system did not have an ARS, but fired a conventional projectile at 32.7 km. In terms of the power of a conventional OFS, our system also surpasses the American 203mm M110 self-propelled guns, which fired 90.7 kg shells.

It makes no sense to make a 203mm SPG based on the famous B-4: its OFS is only 12 kg heavier than 180mm, and in terms of range it loses more than 1.5 times. In addition, according to the logic of the ACS, it could also use marine 180mm shells weighing up to 97.5 kg.

So it was technically quite possible to create strong self-propelled artillery 15-20 years earlier. It would look like North Korean or Chinese self-propelled artillery of the 70s and 80s. Their systems are essentially our unborn self-propelled guns of the 50-60s.

Soviet self-propelled artillery of the 70-80s was generally optimal, in a fairly short time a whole series of excellent self-propelled guns were created, well, and the Msta-S became the crown of Soviet technical thought and at the time of the creation of the best 6-inch self-propelled gun in the world. Could anything be added to this ACS flower garden?

If we talk about vehicles on tracked chassis, then two systems are interesting. The first is the 2S15 Norov, a 100mm anti-tank self-propelled gun based on the chassis of the famous Carnation, in fact it is a self-propelled Rapira-R equipped with a sophisticated control system. Did such an anti-tank self-propelled gun have a right to exist?

For all my dislike of lightly armored anti-tank self-propelled guns, I must admit that there was a certain reason in creating such a self-propelled anti-tank gun.

Such a self-propelled gun had better fire accuracy than a conventional towed cannon; the permeability was also better than that of the towed version, simply attached to the MTLB, the calculation was at least protected from shrapnel and bullets, which increased its survivability.

Finally, the self-propelled guns could quickly leave the firing position, avoiding the coverage of enemy artillery fire. Unfortunately, work on the creation of this system was started only in 1976, and the prototype was ready already in 1983, the machine was ready for production in 1985, but then the Rapier was already considered outdated.
system and its release was completed, so 9 years of work went to the archives ...

What had to be done? To start developing a duplex of two vehicles at once: a 122mm self-propelled howitzer and a 100mm anti-tank gun immediately after the creation of 2C1, which would allow 2C15 to be accepted for production 10 years earlier. FCS "Rapier-S" to unify, if possible, with the then tanks, for example, T-64B.

Since 1981, release a modification with a radar sight, which in reality was created this year. As for the obsolescence of the Rapier, let me remind you that 30 years have passed since the end of its production, and the anti-tank gun 2A29 is still in service and is firmly included in the states.

But I will not refrain from criticizing the towed gun itself, it is known that the Rapier is a modification of the PTO 2A19, which differed from it only in a new carriage adapted for faster towing. The question arises, why was it not possible to put the anti-tank equipment on the carriage of the legendary D-30A howitzer?

It is interesting that such a PTO was developed by OKB No. 9, but the D-60 lost to 2A29, so who interfered with the creation of a hybrid design, or is it even easier to give a command to unify the carriages of the two mass systems ?!

The most offensive thing is that in the 80s, the Yugoslavs did just that, remaking their anti-tank vehicles for the D-30 carriages (modification of the M87 TOPAZ), in addition to facilitating the operation, the D-30 carriage allows for circular shelling, which is very useful for anti-tank vehicles. A self-propelled 100mm anti-tank self-propelled gun was created by the North Koreans

The second alternative ACS is 122 mm. self-propelled gun, created together with 2S3 "Akatsia", on the basis of the towed D-74. This gun was developed in a duplex with a 152mm howitzer-gun D-20, the new guns were supposed to replace the veterans A-19 and ML-20, but in the 60s and 70s, the 130mm M-47 and 152mm "Hyacinth- B ", so that the D-20 became the main divisional system of the Soviet motorized rifle divisions.

To our great regret, the D-74 was produced in small batches and was mostly exported, and most of all it was produced by the Chinese. It is clear that the need for such a body gun has disappeared, but who prevented the D-74 from being made a divisional gun? By analogy with the D-1 and BS-3, the stereotyped thinking of our generals deprived the divisional artillery of an excellent system.

The main advantage of the D-74 is its huge range by the standards of the 60-70s, 23900m, it shoots 6.5 km further than the D-20 / 2S3 and 3.3 km of the long-range Grad. Even the 152 mm Msta-B howitzer, which appeared 30 years later, shoots only 800 meters further than the D-74, moreover, it weighs 1.5 tons more.

So this is a very relevant system and the creation of an ACS for it similar to the "Acacia". It's sad that a similar system was created, but again our brothers in the socialist camp - in the DPRK, both visually and in terms of characteristics, it resembles a 2S3, but armed with a D-74. This is the M-1991 system.

As for the ACS 2S18 "Pat-S" on the chassis of the BMP-3, then I think the rejection of this ACS is quite reasonable. In this SPG, only excellent chassis are good, but the artillery unit is surprising, the new 152mm howitzer has worse ballistics than the outdated D-20 / Akatsiya, the range does not exceed the D-30 / Gvozdiku, the only advantage is the powerful 152mm projectile.

But in the realities of the late 1980s, the Msta became the main divisional howitzer, and numerous Akatsii were transferred to the regiments, for example, they armed the parade divisions near Moscow.

Now let's talk about wheeled SPGs. For the 50s, the most relevant is the installation of a 107mm recoilless gun on the BTR-40 chassis. I wrote about the advantages of this gun above, it remained to combine it with a fairly successful and cheap armored personnel carrier.

In the next period, the 2S14 "Sting-S" system, a light anti-tank self-propelled gun on the BTR-70 chassis, armed with a unique 85mm 2A62 smoothbore system, is very interesting.

Apparently, it was planned to adopt both a self-propelled and a towed system, which was supposed to solve anti-tank defense tasks at the battalion level in motorized rifle forces and marines, and the towed version was intended for airborne assault brigades. It is believed that "Sting-S" did not go into production due to insufficient armor penetration, which was 1.5 times inferior to a 125mm tank gun.

What can I say here? The armor penetration of Soviet 125mm shells of the 60-70s was in the range of 300-420mm at a distance of 2000m, so that an 85mm shell of the mid-70s could penetrate up to 280mm at the same distance. Thus, he confidently hit all NATO tanks in the forehead at a great distance, except for the latest modifications of the Chieftain.

However, the Soviet military was afraid of the tanks of the 3rd generation: "Abrams", "Leopard-2", "Challenger". Nevertheless, there are still many reasons in defense of the 2S14: firstly, 85mm shells would be improved, reaching 360-400mm, while the rate of fire of the ACS was 2 times higher than that of the MBT.

Secondly, for some reason, the military likes to take extreme situations, just like that, hordes of "Abrams" or "Leo-2" are seen going to the poor "Sting-S", in fact, even in 1990. In the armament of NATO countries, tanks of the 1-2 generation dominated, and the PLA was represented mainly by clones of the T-54/55 and light tanks.

Then, why should a light SPG conduct open battles with modern MBTs? Her destiny is ambush actions, the defeat of NATO carcasses in the side and stern. Thirdly, for "Sting-S" there were many tempting targets in addition to tanks - infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armored vehicles.

Personally, in this system, I am only confused by the need to adopt new types of ammunition and weapons. Can this be avoided? Yes, of course: the SPG had to be armed with the good old Rapier.

Is it possible? Previously, I considered such a move to be a gamble, but again the decisions were suggested by the brothers in the Socialist camp, now Cubans. The Cubans created a self-propelled gun on the BTR-60 chassis, installing on them ... 100mm guns from the T-54/55, of course, modernizing them.

If the Cuban "Kulibins" succeeded in this, then what prevented our most powerful military-industrial complex from installing a lighter 100mm smooth-bore Rapier on the more powerful BTR-70/80 chassis?

I think only the lack of imagination. What is the place of a similar self-propelled gun or cannon armored car? Logically, this is a strengthening of motorized rifle battalions, the inclusion of platoons of such machines, in addition, the reconnaissance battalion could be included in the company "Sting-S", there is also a reason to transfer to these ACS some anti-tank units from the motorized rifle brigades, as well as to strengthen marines.

Now let's consider self-propelled wheeled vehicles on a car chassis. The first self-propelled gun, which, in fact, could become the base is the famous Czech "Dana", in the USSR it was tested and limitedly adopted by the TsGV.

Moreover, GRAU opposed the adoption of this system into service, not seeing the advantages of "Dana" over "Akatsia". For me, the advantages of "Dana" for the European theater of operations are obvious:

- "Dana" had a higher speed and power reserve than "Acacia", therefore, was much more mobile, which is important for a rapid breakthrough to the English Channel. The worst permeability is not critical, the roads of Central and Western Europe by Soviet standards, they are simply incomparable.

And in the shroud of Africa, such a self-propelled gun is preferable. Then, for some reason, no one discusses the patency of Soviet MLRS, after all, they are all wheeled, but at the same time they somehow served in all climatic zones and are now successfully serving.

- "Dana" has a significantly higher rate of fire than "Akatsia", 8 w / m, compared to 3 w / m in our self-propelled gun.

- "Dana" is significantly cheaper and more economical to operate. It consumes 65 liters of fuel per 100 km, while the Akatsia consumes 165 liters. Finally, the resource of the undercarriage of wheeled vehicles is much higher than that of tracked vehicles.

Of course, there were also advantages of our Akatsia, its undercarriage is stronger, it can withstand heavy loads more easily, its cross-country ability is higher, its ability to fire shells supplied from the ground is not unimportant, and the Tatra chassis is still alien to our army.

For me, it was necessary to organize a barter with the Czechs, in order to supply a large number of self-propelled guns for parts of Soviet troops in Europe in exchange for the supply of air defense systems and tanks, and "Akatsia"
save for the troops on the territory of the USSR and seriously approach the creation of self-propelled guns on Soviet chassis.

V real story one brigade of 120 "Dan" was formed as part of the CGV. But for me this is a wrong decision: some artillery formations were armed with more powerful systems, and "Dana" is still a divisional self-propelled gun.

The Soviet automobile self-propelled gun began to be created in the mid-80s, based on the Msta-B howitzer and the KrAZ-6130 or KamAZ-5320 chassis, officially these works were carried out for 2 years (1985-87), but in fact they began in 1983 year.

Why was all work stopped in 1987? Here is the reluctance of the Ministry of the Automotive Industry to deal with new chassis, making changes to existing designs, and the indifference of the military to this topic.

For me, the retrograde of our military and officials was clearly manifested here, having an example of a successful "Dana" they did not bother to create its Soviet counterparts. Work should have begun back in 1980, with the maximum use of Czech design solutions, subject to the due persistence of military customers, by 1987 our Msta-K variants should be ready for serial production, which would be a serious addition to towed and tracked option.

The advantages over the tracked ones are the same as those of "Dana" over "Akatsia". Cheap chassis, with many times high mileage before overhaul; great mobility - a speed of 85 km / h and a cruising range of 1000 km, versus 60 km / h and 500 km for Msta-S, and finally, efficiency - fuel consumption of 45 liters per 100 km versus… 260 liters for the tracked version.

The most offensive thing is that many countries subsequently created their wheeled self-propelled guns: G6 - South Africa, Nora-B Yugoslavia, Caesar France, Archer Sweden, SH1 China. Fortunately, there is great hope that a wheeled Coalition will be formed.

At the end of this topic, I want to say that it made sense to create a 122mm wheeled SPG based on the Ural-4320 chassis. Such a self-propelled gun would occupy an intermediate niche between a towed howitzer and a tracked self-propelled gun. Already in our time, such a system was created jointly by Israel and Kazakhstan, however, on the KAMAZ-63502 chassis.

You may ask, is it easier to tow the D-30? The advantage of such an installation is the ability to quickly open fire on the enemy and quickly leave the position before the return fire.

A towed howitzer takes about 3 minutes to deploy and return to the stowed position. Then on the ACS, it is possible to provide automation of some processes, which would increase the rate of fire and accuracy of fire.

4. Self-propelled mortars and combined guns.

Mortars are the cheapest, lightest with the same caliber, easy to use and at the same time very effective artillery pieces.

Due to their low cost, lightness and simplicity, they penetrated many military levels: from the armament of the company to the equipment of the units of the RGK.

The USSR was in the lead in the creation of mortars: during the Second World War, its 120mm was so good that the Germans simply copied it, but 160mm mortars simply had no analogues (except for the German 150mm infantry gun, but these are different systems, a German mortar gun), after the war there were a new type of 160mm mortar and a heavy-duty 240mm mortar were created.

Unfortunately, because of Khrushchev, the development of mortars was abandoned. In the 70-80s, the situation somehow improved, an automatic 82mm mortar "Vasilek" and the first self-propelled mortar "Tulip" appeared, but at the same time there was complete stagnation with conventional mortars, the army used 120mm mortars from the Second World War, 160mm were gradually removed from service, and 82mm mortars of the war years were replaced by "Cornflowers" and automatic grenade launchers.

Only when the "cock pecked", or rather Afghan began, appeared new 82mm and 120mm mortars. Unfortunately, apart from the Tulip, the Soviet Army did not receive self-propelled mortars, although its NATO opponents used 81 and 106mm, and then 120 self-propelled mortars, on the chassis of armored personnel carriers. Moreover, self-propelled mortars appeared in the years of WWII in Germany and the United States, on the chassis of half-tracked mortars.

What kind of self-propelled mortars could be created in the USSR? V post-war years most urgent of all is the creation of a whole range of mortars.

For an 82mm mortar, the BTR-40 chassis is most convenient, while a 160mm mortar is more reasonable to install on the SU-85B chassis, for a 240mm one is the SU-100P installation (especially since the Tulip will be created on these chassis in 20 years). the airborne forces were armed with a 107mm mountain mortar, the ASU-57 chassis would be suitable for it, the most effective 120mm mortar remained, the BTR-50 chassis would be guaranteed to fit it, but the main question, of course, was the installation of this mortar on the BTR-152 chassis.

Outwardly, it may seem that this mortar for the BTR-152 is too heavy, since only 81mm mortars were placed on half-tracks, on the other hand, much heavier ZPU-2, and even ZPU-4, were installed on the BTR-152. Well, the Cubans created a modification of the 120mm mortar on the chassis of the much lighter BRDM-2, so that by strengthening the chassis of this armored personnel carrier, you can get a completely perfect 120mm self-propelled mortar.

In the 60s, it was possible and necessary to create 120mm self-propelled mortars on the BTR-60 and MTLB chassis. By the way, in 1981 in Bulgaria they created and launched into mass production a 120mm self-propelled mortar on the MTLB Tundzha chassis. ...

Obviously, they planned to equip the Soviet army with combined self-propelled guns, so such a cheap and simple self-propelled mortar was not needed. But such self-propelled guns began to enter service with motorized rifle units only in recent times ACS 2S34 "Hosta", and our motorized rifles did not receive a 120mm self-propelled mortar for several decades.

I think there is no need to prove that when receiving the assignment, our designers created a similar mortar 10 years earlier than the Bulgarians, and a mortar on the BTR-60 chassis back in the 60s. In the 2000s, in Russia, for some reason, they created an 82mm self-propelled mortar 2K32 "Deva".

To me, it looks like a mockery of common sense, stupidity to install such a weak mortar on the MTLB chassis. The brothers created a similar mortar 30 years earlier, only it shoots pood mines, although it has a slightly smaller ammunition load of 60 minutes, instead of 84 for the "Deva", but a smaller crew - 5 people instead of 6.

In the 70s in the USSR, they tried to create a 120mm mortar on the BMP-1 chassis, and in 2 versions - the usual - muzzle-loading, and breech-loading, with installation in the tower. But the first, simple version for some reason did not go into the series, although it directly asks to be armed with a mortar company of a motorized rifle battalion on an infantry fighting vehicle, and a combined weapon was preferred to a breech-loading mortar.

And here the question arises, why were not self-propelled mortars based on the "Vasilka" created? Usually, ersatz self-propelled guns were created, on the MTLB or BTR-D chassis, where "Vasilek" stood openly on the roof of the vehicle.

Logically, a self-propelled company mortar should have been created, respectively, on the chassis of the BMP-1, BTR-70, BRDM-2 and BMD-1, with the installation of "Vasilka" in the tower. It turns out a mini-Nona, but such a mortar is not a replacement for it, but an addition, 2 self-propelled automatic mortars per motorized rifle company would greatly increase it combat capabilities, especially in the fight against entrenched enemy personnel. Such a machine is very relevant today.

Now let's move on to our unique combo weapons. I believe that the 120mm "Nona" was a masterpiece of design thought, and only the inertness of the military did not allow correctly assessing its universal capabilities.

This self-propelled gun is at the same time a light howitzer, and its OFS have a very strong high-explosive effect thanks to a powerful explosive charge of 4.9 kg, surpassing a 122mm howitzer projectile, as well as cluster, volume-detonating and other projectiles. At the same time, "Nona" is also a mortar capable of using all 120mm mines.

And, finally, it can play the role of a PTO, having cumulative shells in its ammunition load. All these capabilities "Nona" has at a low weight, its towed version weighs 1200 kg, 2.5 times less than the D-30, which facilitates its installation on different chassis.

In 1981, "Nona-S" on the chassis of the BTR-D entered service with the Airborne Forces and went into mass production, becoming the basis of airborne artillery, the Airborne Forces required 72 new self-propelled guns.

The ground forces and the marines quickly appreciated the new system, enthusiasts suggested starting a wide range of R&D to saturate motorized rifle battalions with Nona batteries, at the rate of 6 self-propelled guns, instead of 8-120mm towed mortars.

Work began on the "Nona" on the chassis 2S1 "Carnations", BRM-1K and BTR-70, the so-called. 2С17, 2С17-2 and "Nona-SV". But, unfortunately, the first two machines were not even created in metal, the second was ready for mass production by 1984, but it was decided to develop a new system "Nona-SVK" on the chassis of the new BTR-80. Why didn't these excellent systems go into series? The principle “The best is the enemy of the good” worked.

It was decided to create a new generation combined gun, with improved ballistics and automated. This system was to be created on the chassis from the future BMP-3 and BMD-3 systems.

As a result, all the work dragged on for a long time, new systems were created by 1995 and 1990, respectively! The system for the Airborne Forces "Compression" remained in a single copy, the 2S31 "Vienna" was brought up for a long time, but it has not really entered service with the army so far. Instead, a simplified 2C34 "Host" system based on the 2C1 was recently developed.

Logic suggests that the GRAU, on the contrary, should have given the task of creating new combined self-propelled guns, as soon as the process of adopting the "Nona-S" entered the home stretch, i.e. since 1980, and in 3 versions at once, to equip motorized rifle battalions armed with the appropriate type of armored vehicles.

Already in 1984, it was possible to launch into mass production 2S17, 2S17-2 and Nona-SV, and they could be produced until the collapse of the USSR, regularly modernizing, the only thing is that the production of Nona-SV would smoothly go into production. Nony-SVK ​​", already in 1987.

Soviet, and then Russian, motorized riflemen and marines, these self-propelled guns would be very useful in Afghanistan and Chechnya, but in the 2000s the army would have received various modifications of the "Vienna".

5. Flamethrower systems.

By flamethrower systems, we mean flamethrower tanks and flamethrower MLRS. It should be noted that it was the USSR that was the leader in the creation of flamethrower tanks; before the war, the Red Army was armed with more than 1000 flamethrower tanks on the T-26 and T-37 chassis.

During the Second World War, medium flamethrower tanks OT-34 and OT-34-85 appeared, as well as heavy KV-8, and 1640 Soviet flamethrower tanks were produced, more than any other country.

Soviet flamethrower tanks favorably differed from their German and American counterparts in maintaining the main cannon armament. In the post-war years, for explainable reasons, the value of flamethrower armored vehicles began to decline, although in local conflicts it was sometimes used very actively.

This was due to the strengthening of the anti-tank weapons of the infantry: if the range of flamethrowing remained within 200 m, then the saturation of the infantry with RPGs and recoilless guns made the use of flamethrower tanks quite difficult, however, for counter-guerrilla operations, flamethrower tanks were very effective, but again the appearance and massive use of napalm , sent them to supporting roles.

In the United States, after the war, they created the M-67 (based on the M-48) and M-132 (based on the M-113 armored personnel carrier), built in small series, flamethrower tanks, they did not perform badly in Vietnam, but very few of them were produced, and the massive appearance of the RPG-7 made it difficult to use, so after this war they quickly disappeared from the scene.

In the USSR, flamethrower tanks OT-54 and TO-55 were created. And here the riddles begin: these machines were released very few. As I wrote above, the main difference between Soviet flamethrower tanks and American tanks was the presence of standard cannon armament, was placed instead of a coaxial machine gun.

So our vehicles were versatile and could fight like ordinary tanks, which is especially important when breaking through the enemy's line of defense or fighting in populated areas, and they could fight on equal terms with enemy tanks. Therefore, nothing prevented the creation of starting the creation of strong flamethrower units in each tank and motorized rifle unit.

Logically, it was possible to have in each tank or motorized rifle division a company of 10-13 flamethrower tanks, but as part of the armies to form tank flamethrower regiments of breakthrough. Such units could effectively interact together with heavy tanks and self-propelled guns, when breaking through the enemy's front. Well, light flamethrower companies could have flamethrower armored personnel carriers based on the BTR-152 and BTR-60, armed with a TPO-50 flamethrower.

It would be a very versatile weapon, equally good in the case of throwing into the English Channel, grinding hordes of Chinese infantry, or destroying dushmans. However, only 110 OT-54 units were produced, which means that about 300-400 flamethrower tanks remained for the entire army, taking into account OT-34-85, despite the fact that an order of magnitude more was needed. TO-55 produced much more, but also not enough, only 830 vehicles.

Although it was necessary and could have been released 2-3 times more. At the same time, taking into account the increased engine power compared to the original T-54 tank, as well as the fact that the flamethrower tank is a weapon for a methodical breakthrough, it was necessary to bring the mass of the tank to 40 tons, adding 3.5 tons of armor.

This would make it possible to bring the reduced frontal protection up to 300mm, which would make the tank invulnerable to the use of RPG-2 and 82mm recoilless guns, and the first modifications of the RPG-7 would pierce the TO-55M at the limit.

The vulnerability would also decrease from the fire of tank guns, especially 90mm. The first combat test of OT-54 could be carried out in Budapest-56, greatly demoralizing the local salashists, of course, our OT-54 and TO-55M tanks could effectively show themselves in Damansky and in Afghanistan, and in other local conflicts as well.

They would also be useful in Chechnya (of course, with reinforced engines and DZ), by the way, ordinary T-55 and T-62 fought on our side in the Second Chechen Company, and it was these tanks that stormed Grozny in 2000. It seems that additional flamethrower armament would not have hindered them. But in reality, our OT-54 and TO-55 were decommissioned in 1993.

However, this is all a clue. In the 70s, a new flamethrower weapon began to be developed in the USSR: a heavy flamethrower system. In fact, this is an armored MLRS on the T-72 chassis, firing at short distances missiles with incendiary or thermobaric filling.

The predecessor of this system can, to some extent, be considered the Sturmtiger, whose 380mm gun was a rocket launcher that fired 350 kg rocket bombs, stuffed with 125 kg of TNT. It is clear that in street battles, this monster could sweep away entire neighborhoods.

The Germans were let down by excessive booking, the self-propelled gun was overloaded and often broke down, but it was a couple of years late.

In our country, they took a different path, and created a 30-charging MLRS on the chassis of a mass tank. Surprisingly, already in 1980, TOS-1 successfully completed military tests and was recommended for serial production. And silence…

The unique combat model was forgotten at the training ground for several years! They bothered to release the first experimental batch only in 1987, and one car was sent to combat tests to Afghanistan, next year 1988.

To be honest, these facts shocked me: by 1981 the USSR had perfect weapon counter-guerrilla warfare, but they forgot about it for 7 years, and threw it into battle at the end of the war, then, despite successful tests, they did not launch it into mass production. Why?

Here, in my opinion, two factors played a role: to create a new weapon for the war, with some dushmans they considered it superfluous, ordinary equipment should have been enough; for the war with NATO and the PLA, this weapon was considered superfluous, it was planned to break through their defenses with tactical strikes nuclear weapons, masses T-64/72/80. Why else, some kind of CBT?

Little interest in the Soviet army local wars and could not overcome stereotypes. Then, the range of the TOS-1 is only 3500m, in order to suppress the enemy's positions, it had to approach 2000-3000m, which made it vulnerable to enemy ATGM and MBT fire, but it was not taken into account that the terrain often does not allow a direct shot further 1500-2000m, while the TOS-1 is capable of firing from closed positions.

Yes, and in an urbanized area, especially with an ATGM at maximum ranges, you cannot shoot, and for supporting the assault of a settlement, the TOS is ideal. In Afghanistan, the TOS-1 had simply unique capabilities: the spooks practically did not use ATGMs, from 2000-2500 m RPGs and recoillessness are practically not dangerous, armor at the T-72 level made it generally less vulnerable, but a volley of 30 OD or incendiary missiles demolished any village with the militants.

It is clear that TOS had to be applied massively, with batteries for each regiment or brigade. Due to the late adoption, the TOS did not get into the First Chechnya, and only in the Second Chechnya did they finally deserve recognition.

But they could be mass-produced and used since 1981, and they could also be exported. I think that TOS-1 would have played a big role in the Iran-Iraq war, Eritrea, Angola. By the way, for export it was possible to create a lightweight system based on the T-55 chassis. But it's just a shame that this car was stolen from the army for almost 20 years.

6. Anti-aircraft self-propelled units.

ZSU is a fairly massive and effective air defense weapon, and, unlike an air defense system, it is universal, since it can be effectively used to support infantry and tanks, combat enemy manpower, firing points and armored vehicles. Especially anti-aircraft self-propelled guns are effective during operations in mountainous areas, as well as during the assault on a settlement.

During the war years, the USSR had only anti-aircraft guns and machine guns installed on trucks or armored trains. Real ZSU were in service with the Reich, the USA and Great Britain, both on the chassis of tanks and armored personnel carriers, half-track tractors.

Lend-Lease anti-aircraft self-propelled guns based on half-tracks were very popular in the Red Army.

In the first post-war years, for reasons that are difficult to explain to me, the Soviet army did not receive a sufficient number of ZSU on tank chassis. Only 75 were released! ZSU-37 on the SU-76M chassis.

It's not clear what prevented them from releasing 10 times more? The SU-76 was well studied by the troops, and there should be no problems with the operation, the 37mm 61-K anti-aircraft gun also fully justified itself, moreover, in the post-war years, it accounted for hundreds of downed American aircraft in Korea and Vietnam. So why wasn't this symbiosis mass-produced?

It can be assumed that it was decided to curtail the production of the chassis, the army was reduced and received mainly medium and heavy tanks. But then what prevented us from making a large number of SPAAGs on the T-34-85 chassis, or even easier, to convert into self-propelled guns part of the large number of remaining T-34-76, produced in 1943-44, which are still outdated and went mainly to tractors or melting ?!

In the 60s, the PRC, and from China to the DPRK and Vietnam, received ZSU type "63", which were a rework of the serial T-34, with the installation of a twin 37mm V-11 cannon on them. These systems have shown themselves well in Vietnam War, I think that nothing prevented them from being created in the USSR 15 years earlier and tested in Korea and Budapest. But, unfortunately, until 1955 in the USSR there was no mass tracked anti-aircraft self-propelled gun, moreover, it was extremely necessary.

In 1955, the relatively mass production of the ZSU-57-2 on the T-54 chassis was finally launched, about 830 of them were produced, which was enough to create a regimental air defense of tank divisions, 4 vehicles for each tank and motorized rifle regiment, as well as arm part of the tank regiments of motorized rifle divisions.

Ideally, of course, there were all the tank regiments of the MSD, and, if possible, motorized rifle regiments, as well as think over the issues of modernizing the ZSU-57-2. The issue of its effectiveness is controversial, the accuracy of fire on jet aircraft was small, there was no radar, on the other hand, for 1955 it was a completely perfect anti-aircraft gun.

You need to understand that in addition to her division, many anti-aircraft weapons were covered: an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a ZPU on an armored personnel carrier (about them below) and, finally, heavy machine guns on armored vehicles, and infantry fire at low altitudes is very dangerous. Then, you need to take into account the power of the Soviet fighter aircraft.

However, the ZSU-57-2 was considered insufficiently effective, its production was stopped in 1960, before the Shilka was launched into production, although it was possible to continue production on the T-55 chassis for another 3 years, having carried out the modernization according to the 520 project.

The modernization consisted in the installation of 57-mm cannons SV-68 "Berezina" and small-sized radio-optical instrument complexes of autonomous fire control "Desna". "Desna" combined optical sighting of the target - and a radar system for measuring the range and flight parameters of the aircraft, with automatic correction of the position of the gunners' sights.

It is clear that the accuracy of fire of such a machine is several times higher than its predecessor, and it could dramatically increase the capabilities of divisional air defense. And there, as an option, giving the ZSU-57-2 battery a mobile radar.

Such machines could already be produced for quite a long time, right up to the 80s, both for the SA and for export. With the advent of Shilka, the ZSU-57-2M had to be transferred to the anti-aircraft artillery regiments to replace the towed S-60s, anyway, their accuracy and security was higher. But, unfortunately, such modernization was not carried out and most these machines were handed over to the allies in the Socialist camp and countries of socialist orientation. By the way, the firing range of 57mm ZSU 6000m, which allowed them to hit helicopters of the 70s, equipped with ATGM, the only question is in target designation.

Now let's talk about wheeled ZSU of the 50s. There are no questions about the BTR-40A, this is a successful anti-aircraft installation, as the main armament is a 2x14.5mm machine gun ZPTU-2, it's a pity that they weren't released enough, but questions arise about the older brother of the BTR-152A.

Why is the armament of a twice as heavy armored personnel carrier the same as that of its light counterpart? After all, a version of this machine with a ZPTU-4 was being developed, but for some unknown reason it did not go into series. Could it be possible to double the mass of armament of our anti-aircraft armored personnel carrier?

We are looking at the neighbors of the Czechs, they created their own ZSU Prague-53/59 on a chassis close to our ZIS-151 / ZIL-157, only the armament of the Czech vehicle is a 30mm twin cannon, whose towed version weighed the same as our quad anti-aircraft gun ... Well, the Arabs and Vietnamese installed a quad setup based on the DShK without any problems, which is not much lighter. So, the BTR-152A should be armed with a 4x14.5mm installation.

Other weapon options are also possible: for example, a 2x25mm anti-aircraft gun, based on the 2M-3 ship system, but the quad ZPU is still more interesting, due to the higher rate of fire, the mass of a second salvo in ZPU-4 is only 10% less than the 2M-3, armor piercing almost the same. But the probability of hitting 40 bullets per second is higher than that of 10 shells.

By the way, similar systems were developed on the BTR-50 chassis, for example, the BTR-50P4, armed with a ZPU-4. The air defense version of the division looks like this: a tank division has 4 ZSU-37-2 or ZSU-57-2 in each regiment, as well as 4 BTR-152A-4 or BTR-50A-4, and the anti-aircraft regiment is armed with 32 57mm C- 60. In the MSD, only the tank regiment is so armed, and 3 MRPs each have 4 BTR-152A-4 and 4 BTR-40A, and the anti-aircraft regiment of the division is equipped with 32 37mm 61-K anti-aircraft guns. The airborne division has an anti-aircraft division of 18 BTR-40A.

The next interesting ZSU are "Shilka" and "Yenisei". If "Shilka" is well known, then it is worth talking about "Yenisei". This is a twin 37mm anti-aircraft self-propelled gun, created on the SU-100P chassis. In terms of firepower, the Yenisei is more powerful than the best western SPAAG Gepard.

It was planned that the "Yenisei" would become the basis of the air defense of tank divisions, and the "Shilka" - for motorized rifle divisions, and the ZSU-37-2 variant should cover the "Circle" air defense system, blocking their dead zones. "Shilka" has advantages in shooting at targets flying at low altitude, up to 1000m, as well as less weight and cost. The "Yenisei" has the best range and reach in height, 4 times heavier shells, in addition, it is faster by 10 km / h.

For me, the rejection of the "Yenisei" was far-fetched, both ZSU had the right to exist and complemented each other. But there was also a more reasonable, compromise option, the creation of a SPAAG based on the Shilka, but with the artillery unit of the excellent naval mount AK-230.

Her 30mm shell weighed 390g. against 190g. in 23mm Shilki assault rifles, the range of fire was not much inferior to the capabilities of the Yenisei, and the AK-230 could be immediately installed on the ZSU-23-4 chassis, which, by the way, was done in the DPRK. The mass of a second salvo is the largest for the AK-230 (13 kg), why is the Yenisei (12.8 kg), for the Shilka 10.8 kg. I think that such a ZSU would deserve fame and respect even more than the original "Shilka".

However, the 23mm caliber would not have been forgotten either: the thing is that in 1960 in the USSR an even more legendary ZU-23-2 system was created. This system, with a mass of about 1 ton, had a rate of fire of 2000 v / m, i.e. her second volley of 6.3 kg! For comparison, the twice as heavy installation ZPU-4 had a second salvo of 2.56 kg.

Almost Soviet anti-aircraft guns of those years lost the ZU-23. At the same time, the system turned out to be quite reliable and easy to manufacture. The ZU-23 was actively exported, but in the Soviet army it played a small role, being, in fact, a regular anti-aircraft gun only for the Airborne Forces, as well as covering anti-aircraft missile units.

Glory came to ZUshka in Afghanistan, it quickly became clear that Soviet armored vehicles were not very suitable for a war in the mountains, the tilt angles of the BMP-1, BMD-1, BTR-60, BRDM-2 guns and machine guns did not allow them to effectively hit targets on mountain peaks , because of the small elevation angle.

In a somewhat better situation were only the BTR-60, and the T-62, which had anti-aircraft machine guns. In addition, the constant task of defending automobile convoys arose. So I had to use Shilka and ZU-23 for these tasks. Anti-aircraft guns installed on trucks of all types turned out to be a necessary weapon, moreover, ZU-23 were actively installed on MT-LB, BTR-D, BTR-60P, in fact, the army received hundreds of ersatz ZSUs. V modern wars, this anti-aircraft gun is used massively, and often on both front lines.

It turned out to be a very versatile weapon, even in the not modernized version of the ZU-23, they shot down a lot aircraft, they are especially dangerous for helicopters and medium-sized UAVs. But at the same time, the 23mm anti-aircraft gun became the most important means of dealing with manpower and light armored vehicles of the enemy, being a de facto battalion gun.

Almost all ZSU based on it have a serious drawback: the calculation and the installation itself are poorly protected, or are generally located openly. Logic suggests that from the very beginning, the ZU-23 could and should have been installed on the BTR-152A / BTR-40A instead of the ZPU-2.

I already wrote in the first part of the article that, in my opinion, the production of these armored personnel carriers, as well as machines based on them, was discontinued prematurely. The SA lost a large number of cheap and very capacious armored personnel carriers, and therefore the ZSU on their chassis.

For me, such vehicles are better than conventional non-armored trucks with anti-aircraft guns in the back. As an option, this is the release of simple anti-aircraft self-propelled guns on the BTR-60/70 chassis, MTLB and BTR-D equipped with ZU-23-2, but this is precisely a specialized ZSU, with the installation of anti-aircraft guns in the body of the armored vehicle, with a crew and ammunition covered with armor, with additional equipment for air defense missions.

This can be a tablet for lighting the air situation, like in MANPADS calculations and a direction finder like in Strela-10. It is not excluded, and the classic installation of the ZU-23-2 on a truck. The only question is the number of used ZU-23 and their place in the military air defense. In my opinion, ideally it was necessary to have an anti-aircraft platoon of 4 ZSU-23-2 as part of each motorized rifle battalion, as well as the engineer and reconnaissance battalions of the division.

In addition, the battery (8 ZU-23) should be attached to the anti-aircraft regiment of the division and the automobile supply battalion. MSD in this version receives 64 ZSU / ZU-23-2, Panzer division 48 anti-aircraft guns. The Airborne Division should receive a battery of 6 ZSU-23-2 on the BTR-D chassis in each airborne regiment and division of 18 such self-propelled guns per division.

Moreover, the ZUshki of motorized rifle battalions should be placed on armored chassis. This will strengthen the air defense of the division (they write that the probability of hitting a target is 0.023% in one flight, with a target speed of up to 50 m / s.), I think that there was a mistake in the text, the target speed is 250 m / s, not 50 m / s , the accuracy of fire on helicopters is several times higher.

Then, barrage fire from dozens of ZU / ZSU-23-2 is capable of disrupting enemy raids at low and ultra-low altitudes, forcing enemy aircraft to rise above 2-2.5 km, which will reduce the accuracy of strikes and increase losses from the use of air defense systems. In addition, the massive use of these installations was equally dangerous for the motorized NATO armies, that for the masses of the PLA infantry, that for the militants like dushmans.

The only drawback of the ZU-23 is its rather weak armor penetration: at a distance of 500 / 1000m, only 25 / 20mm. But there is already a question for the military-industrial complex, which was supposed to give our army powerful armor-piercing shells for 23mm guns.

Even before the collapse of the USSR, such shells were created first in Finland, they hit 40mm armor from 500m, then Bulgaria, whose shells pierced 40mm from 1000m. It is clear that with such projectiles, the 23mm cannon became a dangerous enemy of any NATO or PLA light armored vehicles.

So the mass of the ZSU-23-2 would become an important aid to Soviet motorized riflemen, paratroopers, and marines. By the way, in the divisions of the Bundeswehr there were from 50 to 144 20-mm twin anti-aircraft guns, and the illogical ZU-23 (Rh202 system). I think that a similar approach would not have hurt the Soviet army.

Conclusions.

It should be objectively recognized that the Soviet post-war self-propelled artillery reached a very high level, first anti-aircraft, then the rest, being the best in the world in a number of parameters.

Even 24 after the collapse of the USSR, Soviet self-propelled artillery serves and fights in many countries of the world, remaining very common. Well, CBTs are experiencing a real heyday.

It is clear that there were shortcomings, which were both objective and subjective. Objective shortcomings include the imprisonment of the SA for waging a global war with the massive use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction; therefore, the army was not prepared for local conflicts, the fight against partisans or rebels.

Another drawback was the bias in favor of the production of tanks, until the 70s, the rest of the armored vehicles were produced on a leftover basis, which slowed down the equipping of the SA with self-propelled artillery and armored vehicles.

Subjective factors include the decision of Khrushchev and his entourage to stop developing self-propelled artillery, which slowed down its development for many years. Although even earlier, the Soviet military did not bother to correctly assess the experience of the Wehrmacht and the allies in the creation of self-propelled artillery systems and SPAAGs.

It is very difficult to explain the refusal to adopt the object 268 heavy assault gun to replace the ISU-152, or the inability to deploy the production of combined guns on different chassis, in the hope that a new generation combined gun will be created.

As a result, it was only in the 2010s that our army received what it could have had already in the 80s. Similarly, only subjective factors can explain the neglect of light ZSUs or the refusal to modernize the ZSU-57-2.

And finally, there is no justification for the delay in adopting the TOS-1, which was already ready for production at the very beginning of the Afghan war.

It remains only to shrug, and be sad that our army did not receive so many interesting samples of self-propelled artillery, or received it with a great delay, or this weapon was created by the more backward allies of the USSR, and the superpower used primitive or weak samples.

For hundreds of years, artillery has been an important component of the Russian army. However, it reached its power and flourishing during the Second World War - it is no coincidence that it was she who was called "the god of war." An analysis of a long-term military campaign made it possible to determine the most promising areas of this type of troops for decades to come. As a result, today the modern artillery of Russia has the necessary power both for the effective conduct of hostilities in local conflicts and for repelling massive aggression.

Legacy of the past

New models of Russian weapons "trace their genealogy" from the 60s of the XX century, when the Soviet army leadership set a course for high-quality rearmament. Dozens of leading design bureaus, where outstanding engineers and designers worked, laid the theoretical and technical basis for the creation of the latest weapons.

The experience of previous wars and the analysis of the potential of foreign armies clearly showed that the stake should be placed on mobile self-propelled artillery and mortar installations. Thanks to decisions made half a century ago, Russian artillery has acquired a solid fleet of tracked and wheeled missile and artillery weapons, the basis of which is the "flower collection": from the brisk 122-mm howitzer "Carnation" to the formidable 240-mm "Tulip".

Barrel field artillery

Barrel artillery of Russia has a huge number of guns. They are in service with artillery units, units and formations of the Ground Forces and represent the basis of the firepower of units of the Marine Corps and Internal Troops. Barrel artillery combines high firepower, accuracy and accuracy of fire with simplicity of design and use, mobility, increased reliability, flexibility of fire, and is also economical.

Many samples of towed guns are designed taking into account the experience of the Second World War. They're in Russian army are gradually being replaced by self-propelled artillery guns developed in 1971-1975, optimized for performing fire missions even in a nuclear conflict. The towed guns are supposed to be used in fortified areas and in secondary theaters of military operations.

Samples of weapons

Currently, the cannon artillery of Russia has the following examples of self-propelled guns:

• Floating howitzer 2S1 "Carnation" (122 mm).
• Howitzer 2SZ "Akatsiya" (152-mm).
• Howitzer 2S19 "Msta-S" (152 mm).
• Cannon 2S5 "Hyacinth" (152 mm).
• Cannon 2S7 "Peony" (203 mm).

A self-propelled howitzer with unique characteristics and the ability to shoot in a "barrage of fire" 2S35 "Coalition-SV" (152-mm) mode is being actively tested.

For fire support of combined arms units, the 120-mm self-propelled guns 2S23 "Nona-SVK", 2S9 "Nona-S", 2S31 "Vena" and their towed analogue 2B16 "Nona-K" are intended. A feature of these guns is that they can perform the functions of a mortar, mortar, howitzer or anti-tank gun.

Anti-tank artillery

Along with the creation of highly effective anti-tank missile systems, considerable attention is paid to the development of anti-tank artillery weapons. Their advantages over anti-tank missiles lie primarily in their relative cheapness, simplicity of design and use, and the ability to fire around the clock in any weather.

The anti-tank artillery of Russia is following the path of increasing power and caliber, improving ammunition and sighting devices. The pinnacle of this development was the MT-12 (2A29) Rapier 100-mm smooth-bore anti-tank gun with an increased initial projectile velocity and effective firing range of up to 1,500 m. 660 mm.

The towed PT 2A45M "Sprut-B", which is in service with the Russian Federation, also has even greater armor penetration. Behind ERA, it is capable of hitting armor up to 770 mm thick. Self-propelled artillery Russia in this segment is represented by the 2S25 Sprut-SD self-propelled gun, which has recently entered service with the paratroopers.

Mortars

Modern Russian artillery is inconceivable without mortars for various purposes and calibers. Russian models of this class of weapons are extremely effective means of suppression, destruction and fire support. The troops have the following samples of mortar weapons:

• Automatic 2B9M "Cornflower" (82 mm).
• 2B14-1 "Tray" (82 mm).
• Mortar complex 2S12 "Sani" (120-mm).
• Self-propelled 2S4 "Tulip" (240 mm).
• M-160 (160-mm) and M-240 (240-mm).

Characteristics and features

If the mortars "Tray" and "Sleigh" repeat the designs of the models of the Great Patriotic War, then "Vasilek" is a fundamentally new system. It is equipped with automatic reloading mechanisms, allowing to fire with an excellent rate of fire of 100-120 rds / min (compared to 24 rds / min for the "Tray" mortar).

Russian artillery can rightfully be proud of the Tulip self-propelled mortar, which is also an original system. In the stowed position, its 240-mm barrel is mounted on the roof of an armored tracked chassis, in the combat position it rests on a special plate resting on the ground. In this case, all operations are carried out using the hydraulic system.

Coastal troops in the Russian Federation as a kind of independent forces of the Navy was formed in 1989. The basis of its firepower is made up of mobile missile and artillery systems:

• "Redoubt" (rocket).
• 4K51 "Frontier" (rocket).
• 3K55 "Bastion" (rocket).
• 3K60 "Ball" (rocket).
• A-222 "Shore" (artillery 130-mm).

These complexes are truly unique and pose a real threat to any enemy fleet. The newest "Bastion" has been on alert since 2010, equipped with Onyx / Yakhont hypersonic missiles. During the Crimean events, several "Bastions", demonstratively deployed on the peninsula, thwarted plans for a "show of force" by the NATO fleet.

The newest Russian coastal defense artillery A-222 "Bereg" effectively works against small high-speed vessels moving at a speed of 100 knots (180 km / h), and medium surface ships (within 23 km from the complex), and ground targets.

Heavy artillery in the Coastal Forces is always ready to support powerful complexes: the Hyacinth-S self-propelled gun, the Hyacinth-B howitzer cannon, the Msta-B howitzer cannon, the D-20 and D-30 howitzers, and MLRS.

Multiple launch rocket systems

Since the Second World War, the rocket artillery of Russia, as the successor to the USSR, has a powerful group of MLRS. In the 50s, a 122-mm 40-barreled system BM-21 "Grad" was created. The RF Ground Forces have 4,500 such systems.

BM-21 Grad became the prototype of the Grad-1 system, created in 1975 to equip tank and motorized rifle regiments, as well as the more powerful 220-mm Uragan system for artillery units of the army level. This line of development was continued by the long-range system "Smerch" with 300-mm shells and the new MLRS of the divisional link "Prima" with an increased number of guides and high-power rockets with a detachable warhead.

The procurement of a new MLRS "Tornado" - a bicaliber system mounted on the MAZ-543M chassis, is underway. In the Tornado-G version, it fires 122-mm rockets from the Grad MLRS, three times as effective as the latter. In the Tornado-S version, designed for firing 300-mm rockets, it surpasses the Smerch by 3-4 times in terms of combat effectiveness. "Tornado" strikes targets with a salvo and single high-precision missiles.

Flak

Russian anti-aircraft artillery is represented by the following self-propelled small-caliber systems:

• Shilka quadruple self-propelled gun (23 mm).
• Self-propelled twin unit "Tunguska" (30-mm).
• Self-propelled twin installation "Pantsir" (30-mm).
• Towed twin installation ZU-23 (2A13) (23 mm).

Self-propelled units are equipped with a radio device complex, which ensures the capture and auto-tracking of the target, the generation of data for guidance. Automatic aiming of guns is carried out using hydraulic drives. The Shilka is an exclusively artillery system, while the Tunguska and Pantsir are also armed with anti-aircraft missiles.

During the war, BS-3 was produced in small quantities and could not play a large role. At the final stage of the war, 98 BS-3s were attached as a means of strengthening five tank armies... The gun was in service with the light artillery brigades of the 3-regimental composition.

In the artillery of the RGK, as of January 1, 1945, there were 87 BS-3 cannons. At the beginning of 1945, in the 9th Guards Army, as part of three rifle corps, one cannon artillery regiment, 20 BS-3 each, was formed.

Basically, due to the long firing range of 20650 m and a fairly effective high-explosive fragmentation grenade weighing 15.6 kg, the gun was used as a hull gun to counter enemy artillery and suppress long-range targets.

BS-3 had a number of disadvantages that made it difficult to use it as an anti-tank. When firing, the gun jumped strongly, which made the gunner's work unsafe and knocked down the sighting installations, which, in turn, led to a decrease in the practical rate of aimed shooting - quality for a field anti-tank gun very important.

The presence of a powerful muzzle brake with a low height of the line of fire and flat trajectories, typical for firing at armored targets, led to the formation of a significant smoke and dust cloud that unmasked the position and blinded the crew. The mobility of the gun weighing more than 3500 kg left much to be desired, transportation by the crew on the battlefield was almost impossible.

After the war, the gun was in production until 1951, a total of 3816 BS-3 field guns were produced. In the 60s, the guns underwent modernization, this primarily concerned sights and ammunition. Until the early 60s, the BS-3 could penetrate the armor of any western tank. But with the advent of: M-48A2, Chieftain, M-60 - the situation has changed. New sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles were urgently developed. The next modernization took place in the mid-1980s, when the 9M117 Bastion anti-tank guided projectile entered the BS-3 ammunition load.

This weapon was also supplied to other countries, took part in many local conflicts in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, in some of them it is still in service today. In Russia, BS-3 cannons, until recently, were used as a coastal defense weapon in service with the 18th machine-gun and artillery division stationed in the Kuril Islands, and there is also a fairly significant number of them in storage.

Until the late 60s and early 70s of the last century, anti-tank guns were the main means of fighting tanks. However, with the advent of an ATGM with a semi-automatic guidance system, which only requires keeping the target in the sight of the sight, the situation has changed in many ways. The military leadership of many countries considered metal-intensive, bulky and expensive anti-tank weapons an anachronism. But not in the USSR. In our country, the development and production of anti-tank guns continued in significant numbers. Moreover, at a qualitatively new level.

106 mm M40 recoilless gun

Recoilless guns, designed to destroy enemy personnel, firing points and armored vehicles, were used already during the Second World War, but they became widespread in the armies of various countries of the world only in the post-war period. Due to their high armor penetration, small size and mass, guns of this type are used mainly in anti-tank units of troops.

In Western countries, the most widespread was the M40 recoilless gun, which was adopted by the US Army in 1953. It has a rifled barrel and a piston valve with 4 outlet nozzles. The guidance mechanisms allow you to fire both direct fire using a telescopic sight, and from closed positions using an artillery panorama. For firing at tanks, a 12.7 mm sighting machine gun is installed on top of the gun. After "hitting" the target with tracer bullets, the crew opens fire with special shaped-charge projectiles weighing 7.9 kg each. In addition to them, the M40 ammunition also includes high-explosive armor-piercing (with plastic explosives), high-explosive fragmentation and smoke shells.

The gun carriage is equipped with three sliding beds, one of which is equipped with a wheel, and the other two are equipped with folding handles. In the American army, M40 recoilless guns were often installed on Jeep cars and armored personnel carriers. In this case, they were placed on machines and could conduct a circular attack. The M50 Ontos tank destroyer on the chassis of the M59 amphibious armored personnel carrier was created especially for the US Marine Corps. Three M40 guns with a total ammunition of 18 rounds were placed on both sides of the vehicle.

106-mm M40 recoilless guns are in service with the armies of more than 30 countries around the world. In some states, licensed production of weapons was established. Pakistan, for example, produced similar non-rollbacks for export, having mounted them on "jeeps".

Tactical and technical data

Designation: М40

Type: recoilless weapon

Caliber, mm: 106

Weight in firing position, kg: 219

Calculation, people, 3

Initial projectile velocity, m / s: 503

Rate of fire, rds / min: 5

Max. firing range, m: 7000

Armor penetration at a distance of 1100 m, mm: 450

Projectile weight, kg: 7.9

155-mm howitzer М198

The use of towed artillery in complex climatic conditions Vietnam was the reason for the order for the American army of a 155-mm howitzer, superior in firing range and rate of fire to the M114A-1 howitzer. The new weapon was intended to provide fire support to infantry, airborne forces and the United States Marine Corps. The project was developed by Rock Island Arsenal, which soon produced several prototypes for testing. At the end of the 70s, the howitzer, designated M198, was put into production and is still being produced.

Like other guns of its time, the M198 howitzer has an autofreted monoblock barrel equipped with a two-chamber muzzle brake. The shutter is wedge, semi-automatic. Rollback brake hydraulic with variable rollback length, hydropneumatic recoil brake. The aiming of the gun is carried out using hydraulic drives. The sighting devices are equipped with glowing capsules with a radioactive substance to illuminate the scales and crosshairs at night. In the combat position, the howitzer is installed on a pallet, while the wheels are hung out. The tool does not have an auxiliary engine for independent movement, and is transported over long distances by a 5-ton vehicle. If necessary, M198 can be airlifted by transport aircraft or Chinook helicopter. In the stowed position, the barrel of the howitzer is rotated 180 ° and is fixed above the beds.

Ballistic characteristics of the M198 howitzer are standardized with other 155-mm guns. Western countries and can fire all NATO standard 155mm ammunition. The ammunition load of separate loading shots includes, in addition to the usual, nuclear shells, cluster shells equipped with anti-tank or anti-personnel mines, fragmentation and cumulative striking elements, as well as guided Copperhead shells with a semi-active laser seeker, in the case of which there is electronic control equipment that generates tail planes.

Tactical and technical data

Designation: М198

Type: field howitzer

Caliber, mm: 155

Weight in firing position, kg: 6920

Barrel length, calibres: 39

Angle GN, city: 45

HV angle, degree: -5; +72

Muzzle velocity, m / s: 827

Rate of fire, rds / min: 4

Max. firing range, m: conventional projectile - 22,000, active-rocket projectile - 30,000

Projectile weight, kg: 43.88

In the mid-50s, self-propelled artillery systems took a firm place in the US field artillery. However, America's participation in numerous military conflicts unleashed around the world, and the appearance of nuclear weapons in the socialist countries, caused new requirements for the development of self-propelled guns. For quick airlift to any destination the globe self-propelled guns were supposed to be small in size and weight. In order to protect the crew from damaging factors nuclear weapons provided for full armoring of machines and their equipment with filtering and ventilation installations. Not the last place in the list of requirements was occupied by overcoming water obstacles by swimming, good maneuverability of the self-propelled guns due to the use of a special chassis and an increased horizontal firing sector through the use of a rotating turret.

In 1961, the US Army entered service with the 155-mm self-propelled gun mount M109, the body of which was welded from sheets of aluminum armor that protected the crew from bullets and shrapnel and significantly reduced the weight of the vehicle. The 155-mm howitzer was housed in a rotating turret in the rear of the hull and was guided in a vertical plane over a range of angles from -3 ° to 75 °. The maximum firing range of the gun was 14.7 km. A modernized version of the self-propelled howitzer, designated M109A1, appeared in the American army in the early 70s. It was distinguished by a barrel extended by 2.44 m, a more efficient muzzle brake, improved suspension and an easier loading mechanism. After the introduction of an enhanced charge, the firing range of a conventional projectile increased to 18.1 km, and when using an active-rocket projectile - to 24 km. The ammunition load of 36 separate cartridge-loading rounds also included nuclear projectiles and M712 "Copperhead" guided cumulative projectiles with a laser seeker. Subsequent versions of the M109 self-propelled gun were developed with the aim of further increasing the firing range and automating the fire control system. In total, about 4,000 M109 self-propelled gun mounts were manufactured. Currently, they are in service with the armies of more than 25 countries around the world.

Tactical and technical data

Designation: М109А2

Type: self-propelled howitzer

Crew, pers .: 6

Combat weight, t: 24.95

Length, m: 9.12

Width, m: 3.15

Height, m: 2.8

Armament: 155 mm howitzer, 12.7 mm M2 machine gun

Engine: Detroit Diesel 405 hp

Max. speed, km / h: 56

Cruising in store, km: 349

The 175-mm M107 artillery unit entered service with the US Army in 1961 and was developed as a powerful self-propelled gun adapted for air transport. Before loading it was disassembled: on one plane they carried the chassis, on the other - the artillery unit.

The base for the M107 was the T249 universal tracked chassis, on which the M110 self-propelled howitzer was also produced. In an open fighting compartment, located in the rear of the vehicle, a 175-mm M126 cannon was mounted on a pedestal carriage. A screw-on breech with a piston bolt was attached to a 10.7 m long barrel, which is a monoblock barrel or a pipe with a replaceable plug-in liner. To facilitate loading, there was a lift and rammer with a hydraulic drive. The horizontal aiming angle of the gun was 60 °, the vertical aiming angle was in the range from -2 ° to + 65 °. Guidance mechanisms are hydraulic and manual. The self-propelled body was welded from armor plates of differential thickness. In its rear part there were two openers - in the combat position, they were lowered to the ground using a hydraulic drive and ensured the stability of the ACS when firing at low elevation angles. The ammunition carried mainly consisted of shots of separate cap-loading with a high-explosive fragmentation projectile weighing 67 kg.

The M107 self-propelled guns received their baptism of fire during the Vietnam War, where the low survivability of the guns was unexpectedly revealed. At the usual rate of 700 rounds, the barrels of the guns burned out and became unusable after 300. The rate of fire of the self-propelled guns did not exceed 2 rounds per minute. In the early 70s, the Americans modernized the M107, equipping it with a gun with a new autofreted barrel with greater survivability and an improved loading mechanism. Nevertheless, the numerous design flaws of the self-propelled gun led to the fact that, since 1978, the M107 began to be replaced in the US forces. self-propelled howitzers M110. 175-mm self-propelled guns were also supplied to NATO countries and are in service with the armies of Greece, Turkey, Israel and other states.

Tactical and technical data

Designation: М107

Type: self-propelled gun

Crew, pers .: 5 + 8

Combat weight, t: 28.17

Length, m: 11.25 (with the gun forward)

Width, m: 3.15

Armament: 175 mm M126 cannon

Max. firing range, m: 32700

Engine: Detroit diesel 8V71Р 405 hp

Max. speed, km / h: 55

Cruising in store, km: 730

By the beginning of the war on the Korean Peninsula, the air defense of the US Army had a small number of self-propelled anti-aircraft guns M16 and M19. Large-scale fighting showed the high efficiency of vehicles of this type, which were also used to combat enemy light armored vehicles. Therefore, the Americans began to develop a new ZSU on the chassis of the light tank M41 "Walter Bulldog", which was popular at that time. In an open top rotating turret mounted two paired 40-mm automatic cannon L / 60 "Bofors" with spring-hydraulic recoil devices. To aim the guns, a manual or hydraulic drive was used, and the vertical aiming angle was in the range from -3 ° to + 85 °. The composition of the ammunition consisted of 480 high-explosive and armor-piercing tracer shells placed around the perimeter in the tower, in the wing boxes and in the bow of the hull. The total rate of fire of the guns reached 240 rounds per minute. The fire control system included an anti-aircraft sight with a calculating device.

Self-propelled M42 units, also known as "Duster", began arriving at American units in Korea in 1953, being used primarily for the defense of Air Force bases and other important facilities. During operation, significant shortcomings of the self-propelled gun were revealed: due to the lack of Radar control fire, it was ineffective in the fight against high-speed low-flying targets, the carburetor engine limited the range, and the open turret did not protect the crew from air attacks. The effective slant range of the ZSU against air targets was 2000–3000 m.

In 1956, the M42 went through the modernization process and, after installing a more powerful and economical engine with direct fuel injection, they began to be designated M42A1. In total, until 1956, American factories produced more than 3,700 40-mm Duster SPAAGs, which were in service with the US National Guard until the early 1980s.

Tactical and technical data

Designation: М42

Crew, pers .: 6

Combat weight, t: 22.45

Length, m: 6.35

Width, m: 3.22

Height, m: 2.84

Armament: two 40-mm guns L / 60, 7.62-mm machine gun

Engine: "Continental" 500 hp

Maximum speed, km / h: 72

Cruising in store, km: 160

81-mm mortar М29

The 81-mm M29 mortar, which entered service in 1951, was developed at the request of the command of the US Army to increase the firepower of infantry companies. However, the fighting in Vietnam showed that its use did not provide mortar units with sufficient maneuverability during the execution of a combat mission. First of all, due to the rather large weight of the mortar and the relatively short range of its firing. So, to carry the M29 in combat conditions, almost the entire crew was required, as a result of which the wearable ammunition was reduced from 40 to 18 minutes, which significantly reduced the company’s fire capabilities. In this regard, in the American troops in Vietnam, 81-mm M29 mortars were gradually replaced by 60-mm M19 mortars during World War II.

The design of the M29 is classic. The mortar consists of a smooth barrel, a two-legged gun carriage, sighting devices and a base plate with a central rotating unit that provides circular fire without rearranging the plate. On the outer surface of the barrel there are annular grooves to increase the cooling surface during intensive shooting. The ammunition load includes three types of high-explosive fragmentation mines, two types of smoke mines and a lighting mine. The M374 high-explosive fragmentation mine, specially designed for this mortar, has an increased firing range of up to 4.5 km and a more powerful explosive. The US Army also has a self-propelled version of an 81-mm mortar on the chassis of an M113 armored personnel carrier. He received the designation M125A-1. In the early 80s, American units began to replace the M29 with a more modern 60-mm company mortar M224.

Tactical and technical data

Type: company mortar

Caliber, mm: 81

Weight in firing position, kg: 48

The initial speed of the mine, m / s: 268

Rate of fire, rds / min: 25-30

Firing range, m: 4730

Mine weight, kg: 3.2-5.1

106.7 mm M30 mortar

The American army, unlike the British, did not abandon the use of heavy mortars, although they, with a mass of more than 300 kg, are too heavy for mortar crews to manage with them without vehicles. Therefore, usually such weapons are installed on armored personnel carriers or fire from them from stationary positions.

The 106.7-mm M30 mortar, adopted by the US Army in 1951, consists of a rifled barrel with a breech, a front support with guidance mechanisms, two shock absorbers, spring recoil devices, a base plate with a rotating central part, a bracket connecting the plate to the front support, and sight. For transportation over short distances by the forces of calculation or on pack animals, the M30 mortar is disassembled into six parts.

In a combat position, a 106.7-mm mortar is served by 5-6 people. Due to the presence of a rotating part of the base plate, it can conduct a circular horizontal attack. The mortar ammunition includes three types of high-explosive fragmentation mines, smoke, chemical and lighting mines. In flight, mines are stabilized by rotation, like artillery shells so they don't need the stabilizers found on conventional mines.

At present, the production of the M30 in the United States has been discontinued, but it still remains the heavy standard mortar in the American army. The weapon was widely exported to various countries of the world and is still in service with the armies of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Greece, Iran, the Netherlands, Norway, Aman, South Korea, Turkey and Zaire.

Tactical and technical data

Designation: М30

Type: heavy mortar

Caliber, mm: 106.7

Weight in firing position, kg: 305

Barrel length, calibres: 14.3

The initial speed of the mine, m / s: 293

Max, rate of fire, rds / min: 18

Max, firing range, m: 5650

The history and heroes of the elite type of troops born during the Great Patriotic War

The fighters of these units were envied and - at the same time - sympathetic. "The trunk is long, life is short", "Double salary - triple death!", "Farewell, Motherland!" - all these nicknames, hinting at a high mortality rate, went to the soldiers and officers who fought in the destroyer anti-tank artillery (IPTA) of the Red Army.

The crew of the anti-tank gun of senior sergeant A. Golovalov is firing at German tanks. In recent battles, the crew destroyed 2 enemy tanks and 6 firing points (battery of senior lieutenant A. Medvedev). The explosion on the right is a return shot from a German tank.

All this is true: the salaries increased by one and a half to two times for the subdivisions of the IPTA, and the length of the barrels of many anti-tank guns, and the unusually high mortality among the artillerymen of these units, whose positions were often located nearby, or even in front of the infantry front ... But the truth is and the fact that the share of anti-tank artillery accounted for 70% of the destroyed German tanks; and the fact that among the artillerymen who were awarded the title of Hero during the Great Patriotic War Soviet Union, every fourth is a soldier or officer of anti-tank destroyers. In absolute numbers, it looks like this: out of 1,744 artillerymen - Heroes of the Soviet Union, whose biographies are presented in the lists of the Heroes of the Country project, 453 people fought in anti-tank fighter units, the main and only task of which was direct fire at German tanks ...
Keep up with the tanks

The very concept of anti-tank artillery as a separate kind this kind of troops appeared shortly before the Second World War. During the First World War, conventional field guns were quite successful in fighting sedentary tanks, for which armor-piercing shells were quickly developed. In addition, the armor of tanks until the early 1930s remained mainly bulletproof and only with the approach of a new world war began to increase. Accordingly, specific means of combating this type of weapons were required, which anti-tank artillery became.

In the USSR, the first experience in creating special anti-tank guns came at the very beginning of the 1930s. In 1931, a 37 mm anti-tank gun appeared, which was a licensed copy of a German gun designed for the same purpose. A year later, a Soviet semi-automatic 45 mm gun was installed on the carriage of this gun, and thus the 45 mm anti-tank gun of the 1932 model - 19-K appeared. Five years later, it was modernized, resulting in a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model - 53-K. It was she who became the most massive domestic anti-tank weapon - the famous "forty-five".

Calculation of the M-42 anti-tank gun in battle. Photo: warphoto.ru

These guns are the main means of fighting tanks in the Red Army in the pre-war period. It was with them that, from 1938, anti-tank batteries, platoons and divisions were armed, until the fall of 1940 were part of rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry battalions, regiments and divisions. For example, the anti-tank defense of a rifle battalion of the pre-war state was provided by a platoon of 45-mm guns - that is, two guns; rifle and motorized rifle regiments - a battery of "forty-five", that is, six guns. And as part of the rifle and motorized divisions, since 1938, a separate anti-tank division was provided - 18 45 mm cannons.

Soviet artillerymen prepare to open fire with a 45-mm anti-tank gun. Karelian front.

But the way the fighting began to unfold in World War II, which began on September 1, 1939 with the German invasion of Poland, quickly showed that anti-tank defense at the divisional level may not be sufficient. And then the idea came up to create anti-tank artillery brigades of the Reserve of the High Command. Each such brigade would be a formidable force: the standard armament of a unit of 5322 people consisted of 48 76 mm guns, 24 107 mm guns, as well as 48 85 mm anti-aircraft guns and 16 more 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. At the same time, there were no proper anti-tank guns in the staff of the brigades, however, non-specialized field guns, which received standard armor-piercing shells, more or less successfully coped with their tasks.

Alas, by the beginning of World War II, the country did not have time to complete the formation of the anti-tank brigades of the RGK. But even under-formed, these units, which came to the disposal of the army and front-line command, made it possible to maneuver them much more efficiently than anti-tank units in the state of rifle divisions. And although the beginning of the war led to catastrophic losses in the entire Red Army, including in the artillery units, due to this, the necessary experience was accumulated, which pretty soon led to the emergence of specialized anti-tank units.

The birth of the artillery special forces

It quickly became clear that the standard divisional anti-tank weapons were not able to seriously resist the tank wedges of the Wehrmacht, and the lack of anti-tank guns of the required caliber forced them to roll out light field guns for direct fire. Moreover, their calculations, as a rule, did not have the necessary training, which means that sometimes they acted insufficiently efficiently even in favorable conditions for them. In addition, due to the evacuation of artillery factories and the massive losses of the first months of the war, the shortage of main guns in the Red Army became catastrophic, so they had to be disposed of much more carefully.

Soviet artillerymen roll 45-mm anti-tank guns M-42, following in the ranks of the advancing infantry on the Central Front.

In such conditions, the only correct decision was the formation of special reserve counterparts. tank units, which could not only be put in defense along the front of divisions and armies, but maneuvered by them, throwing them at specific tank-hazardous areas. The experience of the first war months spoke of the same thing. And as a result, by January 1, 1942, the command of the active army and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had one anti-tank artillery brigade operating on the Leningrad front, 57 anti-tank artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery divisions. Moreover, they really did exist, that is, they actively participated in the battles. Suffice it to say that five anti-tank regiments were awarded the title of "Guards", which had just been introduced in the Red Army, following the results of the battles in the autumn of 1941.

Soviet artillerymen with a 45 mm anti-tank gun in December 1941. Photo: Museum engineering troops and artillery, St. Petersburg

Three months later, on April 3, 1942, a decree was issued State Committee defense, which introduced the concept of a fighter brigade, main task which became the fight against Wehrmacht tanks. True, its staff was compelled to be much more modest than that of a similar pre-war unit. The command of such a brigade had three times less people at its disposal - 1795 fighters and commanders against 5322, 16 guns of 76 mm against 48 in the pre-war state and four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns instead of sixteen. True, twelve 45-millimeter guns and 144 anti-tank guns appeared in the list of standard weapons (they were armed with two infantry battalions that were part of the brigade). In addition, for the sake of creating new brigades, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered within a week to revise the lists of personnel of all combat arms and "withdraw all junior and rank-and-file personnel who previously served in artillery units." It was these fighters, having undergone a short retraining in the reserve artillery brigades, and made up the backbone of the anti-tank brigades. But they still had to be re-equipped with fighters who did not have combat experience.

Crossing the artillery crew and 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K across the river. The crossing is carried out on a pontoon from A-3 landing boats

By the beginning of June 1942, twelve newly formed fighter brigades were already operating in the Red Army, which, in addition to artillery units, also included a mortar battalion, an engineering battalion and a company of machine gunners. And on June 8, a new GKO decree appeared, which brought these brigades into four fighter divisions: the situation at the front required the creation of more powerful anti-tank fists capable of stopping German tank wedges. Less than a month later, in the midst of the summer offensive of the Germans, who were rapidly advancing to the Caucasus and the Volga, the famous order No. 0528 was issued "On renaming anti-tank artillery units and subunits into anti-tank artillery units and establishing advantages for the commanding and rank-and-file personnel of these units."

Pushkar elite

The appearance of the order was preceded by a lot of preparatory work, concerning not only calculations, but also how many guns and what caliber new parts should have and what advantages their composition would use. It was quite clear that the soldiers and commanders of such units, who would have to risk their lives every day in the most dangerous sectors of the defense, needed a powerful not only material, but also a moral incentive. They did not assign new units during the formation the rank of guards, as was done with the Katyusha rocket launchers, but decided to leave the well-proven word “fighter” and add “anti-tank” to it, emphasizing the special significance and purpose of the new units. For the same effect, as far as can be judged now, the introduction of a special sleeve insignia for all soldiers and officers of anti-tank artillery - a black diamond with crossed golden barrels of stylized Shuvalov's "unicorns" was calculated.

All this was spelled out in the order in separate clauses. Special financial conditions for new units, as well as norms for the return of wounded soldiers and commanders to the ranks, were prescribed by the same separate clauses. So, the commanding staff of these units and subdivisions was given one and a half, and the junior and private - a double salary. For each destroyed tank, the gun crew was also entitled to a cash bonus: the commander and gunner - 500 rubles each, the rest of the crew numbers - 200 rubles each. It is noteworthy that initially other amounts appeared in the text of the document: 1000 and 300 rubles, respectively, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin, who signed the order, personally lowered the prices. As for the norms for returning to service, the entire commanding staff of the fighter anti-tank units, up to the division commander, had to be kept on a special account, and at the same time, the entire composition after treatment in hospitals had to be returned only to the indicated units. This did not guarantee that a soldier or officer would return to the same battalion or division in which he fought before being wounded, but he could not be in any other divisions, except for anti-tank destroyers.

The new order instantly turned the anti-tankmen into the elite of the Red Army's artillery. But this elitism was confirmed at a high price. The level of losses in the anti-tank subunits was noticeably higher than in other artillery units. It is no coincidence that anti-tank units became the only subspecies of artillery, where the same order No. 0528 introduced the position of deputy gunner: in battle, crews that rolled out their guns to unequipped positions in front of the defending infantry front and fired direct fire, often perished earlier than their equipment.

From battalions to divisions

New artillery units quickly gained combat experience, which spread just as quickly: the number of anti-tank fighter units grew. On January 1, 1943, the Red Army's anti-tank artillery consisted of two fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, two heavy anti-tank fighter regiments, 168 anti-tank fighter regiments and one anti-tank fighter division.

An anti-tank artillery unit on the march.

And for the Battle of Kursk, Soviet anti-tank artillery received a new structure. Order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 0063 of April 10, 1943 introduced at least one anti-tank regiment of the wartime army state in the composition of each army, primarily the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Southwestern and Southern fronts: six batteries of 76 mm guns, that is, a total of 24 guns.

By the same order, one anti-tank artillery brigade of 1215 people was organizationally introduced into the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-Western and Southern fronts, which included an anti-tank regiment of 76 mm guns - only 10 batteries, or 40 guns, and a regiment of 45-mm cannons, armed with 20 guns.

Guards artillerymen roll a 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937) into a prepared trench. Kursk direction.

A relatively calm time separating the victory in Stalingrad battle from the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the command of the Red Army used it to the fullest in order to complete the formation, re-equip and retrain the anti-tank units as much as possible. No one doubted that the upcoming battle would largely rely on the massive use of tanks, especially new German vehicles, and it was necessary to be ready for this.

Soviet artillerymen at the 45-mm anti-tank gun M-42. In the background is a T-34-85 tank.

History has shown that the anti-tank units had time to prepare. The Battle of the Kursk Bulge was the main test of the artillery elite's strength - and they withstood it with honor. And the invaluable experience, for which, alas, the fighters and commanders of the anti-tank subunits had to pay a very high price, was soon understood and used. It was after the Battle of Kursk that the legendary, but, unfortunately, already too weak for the armor of the new German tanks, "magpies" began to gradually remove from these units, replacing them with 57-mm anti-tank guns ZIS-2, and where these guns were not enough, on the well-proven divisional 76-mm cannon ZIS-3. By the way, it is the versatility of this gun, which has shown itself well both as a divisional gun and as an anti-tank gun, along with its simplicity of design and manufacture, that allowed it to become the most massive artillery gun in the world in the entire history of artillery!

Firebag Masters

In ambush "forty-five", 45-mm anti-tank gun model 1937 (53-K).

The last major change in the structure and tactics of using anti-tank artillery was the complete reorganization of all fighter divisions and brigades into anti-tank artillery brigades. By January 1, 1944, there were as many as fifty such brigades as part of the anti-tank artillery, and in addition to them there were 141 more anti-tank artillery regiment. The main weapons of these units were the same 76-mm ZIS-3 cannons, which the domestic industry produced at an incredible speed. In addition to them, the brigades and regiments were armed with 57-mm ZIS-2 and a number of "forty-five" and 107 mm guns.

Soviet artillerymen from the units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps fire at the enemy from a camouflaged position. In the foreground: 45 mm anti-tank gun 53-K (sample 1937), in the background: 76 mm regimental gun (sample 1927). Bryansk front.

By this time, the principled tactics of the combat use of anti-tank fighter units had also been fully developed. The system of anti-tank areas and anti-tank strongholds, developed and tested before the Battle of Kursk, was rethought and refined. The number of anti-tank guns in the troops became more than sufficient, experienced personnel were enough for their use, and the fight against Wehrmacht tanks was made as flexible and effective as possible. Now the Soviet anti-tank defense was built on the principle of "fire sacks" arranged along the path of movement of German tank units. Anti-tank guns were placed in groups of 6-8 guns (that is, two batteries) at a distance of fifty meters from each other and camouflaged with great care. And they opened fire not when the first line of enemy tanks was in the zone of confident defeat, but only after practically all the attacking tanks entered it.

Unknown Soviet girls, privates from the anti-tank artillery unit (IPTA).

Such "fire bags", taking into account the characteristics of the anti-tank artillery guns, were effective only at medium and short combat ranges, which means that the risk for the gunners increased many times over. It was necessary to show not only remarkable restraint, looking at how German tanks pass almost nearby, it was necessary to guess the moment when to open fire, and to conduct it as quickly as the capabilities of technology and force of calculations allowed. And at the same time, be ready to change position at any moment, as soon as it was under fire or the tanks went beyond the distance of confident defeat. And to do this in battle, as a rule, they had to literally on their hands: most often they simply did not have time to fit the horses or cars, and the process of loading and unloading the gun took too much time - much more than the conditions of the battle with the advancing tanks allowed.

A crew of Soviet artillerymen fires a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model (53-K) at a German tank on a village street. The number of the calculation gives the loader a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile.

Heroes with a black diamond on their sleeve

Knowing all this, one is no longer surprised at the number of heroes among the fighters and commanders of anti-tank destroyer subunits. Among them were real gunners-snipers. Such as, for example, the commander of the gun of the 322nd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Regiment of the Guards Senior Sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov, who had almost three dozen Nazi tanks on his account, and ten of them (including six "Tigers"!) He knocked out in one battle. For this he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Or, say, the gunner of the gun of the 493rd Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, Sergeant Stepan Khoptyar. He fought from the very first days of the war, marched with battles to the Volga, and then to the Oder, where in one battle he destroyed four German tanks, and in just a few January days of 1945 - nine tanks and several armored personnel carriers. The country appreciated this feat at its true worth: in April of the victorious forty-fifth, Hoptyar was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Hero of the Soviet Union, gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter-Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard, Senior Sergeant Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich Asfandiyarov (1918-1977) and Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter-Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the 1919 Varmaylovich Guards - 99 read the letter. In the background, Soviet artillerymen at the ZiS-3 76-mm divisional cannon.

Z.L. Asfandiyarov at the front of the Great Patriotic War since September 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the liberation of Ukraine.
On January 25, 1944, in the battles for the village of Tsibulev (now the village of Monastyrischensky district of the Cherkasy region), the gun under the command of the guard senior sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov was attacked by eight tanks and twelve armored personnel carriers with enemy infantry. Letting the attacking column of the enemy on the range of a direct shot, the crew of the gun opened aimed sniper fire and burned all eight enemy tanks, of which four tanks of the "Tiger" type. The guard himself, senior sergeant Asfandiyarov, destroyed one officer and ten soldiers with fire from his personal weapons. When the gun went out of action, the brave guardsman switched to the gun of a neighboring unit, whose crew was out of order and, repelling a new massive attack of the enemy, destroyed two Tiger-type tanks and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. In just one battle, the crew of the guard of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov destroyed ten enemy tanks, of which six were of the "tiger" type and over one hundred and fifty enemy soldiers and officers.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2386) to Asfandiyarov Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich was awarded by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 1, 1944.

V.M. Permyakov was drafted into the Red Army in August 1942. In the artillery school he received the specialty of a gunner. Since July 1943 at the front, he fought as a gunner in the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment. He received his baptism of fire at the Kursk Bulge. In the first battle, he burned three German tanks, was wounded, but did not leave the combat post. Sergeant Permyakov was awarded the Order of Lenin for his courage and perseverance in battle, accuracy in the defeat of tanks. Particularly distinguished himself in the battles for the liberation of Ukraine in January 1944.
On January 25, 1944, in an area at a fork in the road near the villages of Ivakhny and Tsibulev, now the Monastyrischensky district of the Cherkasy region, the crew of the guard of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov, the gunner of which was Sergeant Permyakov, was among the first to meet the attack of enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers by infantry. Reflecting the first onslaught, Permyakov destroyed 8 tanks with precise fire, four of which were of the "Tiger" type. When the enemy troops approached the positions of the artillerymen, they engaged in hand-to-hand combat. He was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield. Having repulsed the attack of the submachine gunners, he returned to the gun. When the gun went out of action, the guards switched to the gun of the neighboring unit, the crew of which was out of order and, repelling a new massive attack of the enemy, destroyed two more Tiger-type tanks and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. During the raid of enemy bombers, the gun was broken. Permyakov, wounded and shell-shocked, was sent to the rear unconscious. On July 1, 1944, Guard Sergeant Permyakov Veniamin Mikhailovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2385).

Lieutenant General Pavel Ivanovich Batov presents the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to the commander of the anti-tank gun Sergeant Ivan Spitsyn. Mozyr direction.

Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin at the front since August 1942. Distinguished himself on October 15, 1943 when crossing the Dnieper. Sergeant Spitsin's crew destroyed three enemy machine guns by direct fire. Having crossed to the bridgehead, the gunners fired at the enemy until a direct hit broke the gun. The artillerymen joined the infantry, during the battle captured enemy positions along with the cannons and began to destroy the enemy from his own guns.

On October 30, 1943, Sergeant Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 1641) for exemplary performance of military missions of the command at the front of the struggle against the German-fascist invaders and for the courage and heroism shown at the same time.

But even against the background of these and hundreds of other heroes from among the soldiers and officers of the anti-tank artillery, the feat of the only twice Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Petrov stands out. Drafted into the army in 1939, he graduated from the Sumy Artillery School right on the eve of the war, and met the Great Patriotic War as a lieutenant, platoon commander of the 92nd separate artillery battalion in Novograd-Volynsky in Ukraine.

Captain Vasily Petrov earned his first "Gold Star" Hero of the Soviet Union after crossing the Dnieper in September 1943. By that time, he was already deputy commander of the 1850th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, and on his chest he wore two Orders of the Red Star and a medal "For Courage" - and three stripes for wounds. The decree conferring the highest degree of distinction on Petrov was signed on the 24th, and published on December 29, 1943. By that time, the thirty-year-old captain was already in the hospital, having lost both arms in one of the last battles. And if it were not for the legendary order No. 0528, ordering the return of the wounded to the anti-tank divisions, the freshly baked Hero would hardly have gotten a chance to continue fighting. But Petrov, always distinguished by firmness and perseverance (sometimes disgruntled subordinates and bosses said that stubbornness), achieved his goal. And at the very end of 1944 he returned to his regiment, which by that time had already become known as the 248th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment.

With this regiment of the guard, Major Vasily Petrov reached the Oder, forced it and distinguished himself, holding a bridgehead on the west bank, and then participating in the development of the offensive on Dresden. And this did not go unnoticed: by the decree of June 27, 1945, Artillery Major Vasily Petrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the spring exploits on the Oder. By this time, the regiment of the legendary major had already been disbanded, but Vasily Petrov himself remained in the ranks. And he remained in it until his death - and he died in 2003!

After the war, Vasily Petrov managed to graduate from Lvov State University and the military academy, received a Ph.D. in military sciences, rose to the rank of lieutenant general of artillery, which he received in 1977, and served as deputy chief missile forces and artillery of the Carpathian military district. As the grandson of one of General Petrov's colleagues recalls, from time to time, getting out for a walk in the Carpathians, the middle-aged military leader managed to literally drive up his adjutants, who could not keep up with him, on the way up ...

Memory is stronger than time

The post-war fate of the anti-tank artillery completely repeated the fate of all the Armed Forces of the USSR, which changed in accordance with the changes in the challenges of the time. Since September 1946, the personnel of units and subunits of anti-tank artillery, as well as subunits of anti-tank rifles, ceased to receive increased salaries. The right to a special sleeve badge, of which the anti-tank crews were so proud, was preserved for ten years longer. But it also disappeared over time: another order on the introduction of a new uniform for the Soviet army canceled this patch.

The need for specialized anti-tank artillery units was gradually disappearing. The cannons were replaced by anti-tank guided missiles, and units armed with these weapons appeared in the state of motorized rifle units. In the mid-1970s, the word "fighter" disappeared from the name of anti-tank subunits, and twenty years later, together with Soviet army the last two dozen anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades also disappeared. But whatever the post-war history of Soviet anti-tank artillery may be, it will never undo the courage and those feats with which the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army's anti-tank artillery fighters glorified their branches during the Great Patriotic War.